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ABSTRACT 
 
Foreign aid has been used on the one hand by donors as an important international relations 
policy tool and on the other hand by developing countries as a source of funds for development. 
Since its inception in the 1940s, foreign aid has been one of the most researched topics in 
development economics. This study adds to this growing aid effectiveness literature, with a 
particular focus on the under-researched relationship between foreign aid and extreme poverty. 
The main empirical assessment is based on a sample of 120 developing countries from 1981 to 
2013. The study had two main objectives, namely: (i) to estimate the impact of foreign aid on 
poverty reduction and (ii) to examine the direction of causality between foreign aid and poverty 
in developing countries. From these two broad objectives, there are six specific objectives, 
which include to: (i) examine the overall impact of foreign aid (total official development 
assistance) on extreme poverty, (ii) investigate the impact of different proxies of foreign aid on 
the three proxies of extreme poverty, (iii) assess whether political freedom (democracy) or 
economic freedom enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid, (iv) compare the impact of foreign 
aid on extreme poverty by developing country income groups, and (v) examine the direction 
of causality between extreme poverty and foreign aid. To achieve these objectives, the study 
employed two main dynamic panel data econometric estimation methods, namely the system-
generalised method of moments (SGMM) technique and the panel vector error correction 
model (VECM) Granger causality framework. While the SGMM was used to assess the impact 
of foreign aid on extreme poverty, the panel VECM Granger causality was used to examine the 
direction of causality between foreign aid poverty. The SGMM was used because of its ability 
to deal with endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity, 
whereas the panel VECM was preferred because the variables were stationary and co-
integrated.  
 
The main findings from the system-generalised method of moments analysis can be 
summarised as follows:  
i. Foreign aid does have a positive impact on poverty reduction in developing countries. 
ii. An analysis of the impact of the different types of aid on the three proxies of extreme 
poverty reveals that grants, bilateral and multilateral aid reduce the poverty headcount 
rate, but loans do not; and grants, loans, and bilateral aid reduce both the poverty gap 
and the squared poverty gap, but multilateral aid does not. 
iii 
 
iii. Almost all foreign aid proxies (total ODA as a percentage of GNI), grants, loans, 
bilateral and multilateral aid were found to be more likely to be effective in reducing 
extreme poverty in an environment where there is political and economic freedom, 
confirming that both political and economic freedom are channels through which 
foreign aid impacts extreme poverty. 
iv. The study found strong evidence that foreign aid reduces poverty in the lower and upper 
middle-income countries but not in low-income countries. This implies that foreign aid 
is less effective in poorer countries, and it becomes more effective as the country 
graduates to middle-income status.  
v. In all the estimations where GDP per capita was included, it was found that the GDP 
per capita generally had a higher poverty-reducing effect (higher elasticity) compared 
to ODA which confirms the importance of GDP growth in the fight against poverty. 
Furthermore, the inequality coefficient was generally found to be positive and 
significant, confirming that an increase in income inequality leads to an increase in 
poverty.  
 
The results from the panel VECM-based Granger causality framework which examined the 
direction of causality between foreign aid and poverty in a panel trivariate setting revealed the 
following: 
i. In the short run, there was evidence of unidirectional causal flow from poverty rate to 
foreign aid. Other results show that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between 
the GDP per capita and headcount poverty rate and a unidirectional causal flow from 
GPD per capita to foreign aid. 
ii. In the long-run, the study found that (a) foreign aid tends to converge to its long-term 
equilibrium path in response to changes in poverty rates and per capita GDP, and (b) 
both poverty rate and GDP per capita jointly Granger causes foreign aid in the long-
run. However, no evidence was found of a long-run relationship or causality when 
poverty rate and GDP per capita were the dependent variables. 
iii. There was a strong joint causal flow from poverty rate and GDP per capita to foreign 
aid. This result seems to confirm that the majority of aid is directed towards poor 
countries.  
 
Based on these results, the main policy implications are that (i) development partners should 
continue to focus on poverty reduction as the main objective for official development 
iv 
 
assistance; (ii) aid allocation should be focused on channels that have a higher poverty-
reduction effect, such as per capita income as well as political and economic freedom; and (iii) 
aid-recipient countries should be encouraged to devise income distributional policies that allow 
the benefits of growth to accrue to many people and thereby lifting the majority out of extreme 
poverty.  
 
KEY TERMS 
 
Official development assistance (ODA); foreign aid; extreme poverty; bilateral aid; multilateral 
aid; grants; loans; poverty headcount rate; poverty gap index (PG); squared poverty gap index 
(SPG); economic growth; inequality; aid effectiveness literature (AEL); democracy; economic 
freedom; globalisation; civil conflict; developing countries; dynamic panel data analysis; 
system-generalised method of moments (SGMM) estimators; vector error correction model 
(VECM); Granger causality.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1. Introduction and Background to the Study 
 
According to official data collected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), official development 
assistance (ODA) or foreign aid from all donors reached a new peak of US$176 billion (at 
constant prices) in 2016, up from US$162 billion in 2015 (OECD, 2017). Compared to the 
1960 figure of US$36 billion per annum, ODA has increased over the years by approximately 
390%. By 2013, it was estimated that total foreign aid since 1960 amounted to US$4.7 trillion 
in 2013 prices (Ravallion, 2016, p. 518). As a result of these volumes, foreign aid has attracted 
an unprecedented amount of attention from politicians, scholars, media, and even celebrities 
(Easterly, 2008; Moyo, 2009). This attention also led to significant and polarising debates on 
the effectiveness of foreign aid in delivering on developmental goals (sustained economic 
growth and poverty reduction), with poverty reduction emerging as an explicit objective after 
the introduction of the Millennium development goals (MDGs) (Sachs, 2005; Ravallion, 2016). 
In actuality, the first MDG was to halve the global “US$1 a day” poverty rate by 2015. 
Furthermore, one of the main targets of the recently promulgated sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) is to eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere by 2030 (United 
Nations, 2014). To achieve this global poverty reduction goal, rich nations made further 
commitments to increase aid to poor countries by 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI), 
a target set during the 1960s. The United Nations has emphasised the importance of foreign aid 
as “one of the most powerful weapons in the war against poverty” (United Nations, 2005, p. 
16). 
 
Despite this noble objective of eradicating poverty, debates have been raging on since the 1950s 
on whether ODA has been or is an effective tool to reduce poverty in developing countries. 
Many scholars and decision makers have raised the question, “does aid work?” The answer to 
this seemingly easy question has led to aid being labelled as controversial (Sumner & Glennie, 
2015) and containing “bipolarity” (Easterly, 2008).  
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On the one side of the debate are strong advocates for foreign aid who argue that it is the most 
effective weapon in the war against poverty and that it helps to reduce poverty by increasing 
economic growth, improving governance, and increasing access to public services (Easterly, 
2008, p. 1). Gates and Gates (2014) argue that “foreign aid is … a phenomenal investment. 
Foreign aid does not simply save lives; it also lays the groundwork for lasting, long-term 
economic progress”. Sachs (2005), Stiglitz (2007), and Arndt et al. (2010, 2015) are among 
those who have strongly argued that foreign aid has been effective in reducing poverty and 
therefore must be increased.  
 
On the other side of the debate are equally strong anti-foreign aid sentiments. Two of the most 
quoted critics are Moyo (2009, p. 28), who argues that aid “perpetuates the cycle of poverty 
and derails sustainable economic development”, and Deaton (2013, p. 272), who states that 
“giving more aid than we currently give will not better the situation”. Other critics of foreign 
aid include Bauer (1972), Friedman (1958), Easterly (2003, 2006, 2008), Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2009) and Deaton (2013). 
 
A third group has emerged, starting with Burnside and Dollar (1997, 1998, 2000) and the World 
Bank (1998) which argues that once channels through which foreign aid affects development 
are distinguished, several degrees of positive impact on development and a diminution of 
poverty may be observed. This depends on the choice of channel, the recipient country features, 
and the domestic economic policies. This strand of literature has gained traction over the years 
and has led to the advent of aid conditionalities (Collier & Dollar, 2002; Collier, 2007; Mosley 
et al., 2004; Gomanee et al., 2005a, 2005b; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017, 2018).  
 
Amid this ongoing debate, the relative importance of ODA compared to other financial flows 
to developing countries has changed over the last five decades. In the 1960s, ODA constituted 
around 55% of all net disbursements by DAC countries; however, it has decreased to roughly 
30% in recent years. The proportion of private flows, which include foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and commercial bank loans, has grown from 29% to 57% over the same period. Despite 
these shifts, Arvin and Lew (2015, p. 1) still believe that “foreign aid today is one of the most 
important factors in international relations and in the national economy of many countries”. 
 
This study aims to make a further contribution to the understanding of the economics of poverty 
and foreign aid. It delves deeper into the chronology of economic development thoughts on 
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poverty and the history of foreign aid. Economic development theories are discussed in the 
context of how they have shaped the allocation of aid over the years. Furthermore, 
contemporary and sometimes heated debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid are discussed 
within the framework of the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty. The dynamics 
and trends of foreign aid and extreme poverty in developing countries are explored, together 
with an overview of the possible success of foreign aid. This includes graduation from ODA 
dependence, meeting of the MDGs, and general improvement in the countries’ prosperity.  
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
Aid effectiveness literature (AEL) is dominated by theoretical and empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in economic growth. Two main problems exist with this aid-growth 
nexus. First, it does not directly address the primary goal of foreign aid allocation which is 
poverty reduction. According to the World Bank (1998), and White (2015), consensus has been 
reached among donors and recipient countries since the 1990s that the main aim of foreign aid 
is poverty reduction. This position was further emphasised in the year 2000 by the United 
Nations General Assembly’s promulgation of the MDGs whose primary focus was halving 
extreme poverty and improving the welfare of the world’s poorest by 2015 and achieving recent 
SDGs (Sachs, 2005).  
 
The second problem with the aid-growth nexus in the AEL is the implicit assumption that aid 
affects poverty through growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2001, 2002; White, 
2015). Though this might be correct, as sustainable improvements in social outcomes require 
high and sustained growth rates, there has been a narrow interpretation that if aid does promote 
economic growth, then it implies poverty reduction. This is not particularly satisfactory, as aid 
can affect poverty directly or through other channels (Gomanee et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 
2004; Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014). 
 
There is a general dearth of empirical literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid in the 
reduction of extreme poverty which is the central focus of the MDGs and SDGs. According to 
White (2015, p. 187), the poverty-reducing effects of aid are not well documented, with other 
critics claiming that this type of aid has been wasted because “poor countries are still poor” 
(Crosswell, 1999). A few studies have, however, investigated the effect of aid on different 
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socio-economic development indicators such as infant mortality rate, extreme poverty 
(headcount, gap, and squared poverty gap), the Human Development Index (HDI), and 
education among others. Other studies explored the channels through which aid affects poverty, 
with a special focus on social and public spending such as agriculture, health, and education. 
However, as with the aid-growth literature, evidence on the effectiveness of aid in poverty 
reduction is mixed. Even though the majority of the studies reviewed seemed to support the 
view that foreign aid has a positive impact on poverty, the number of studies is still too small 
to make a general conclusion.  
 
This study consequently adds to the AEL by (i) investigating whether ODA or foreign aid has 
been effective in reducing extreme poverty; (ii) testing whether the type of aid, geographical 
region, or country income group aid matters; (iii) examining whether political or economic 
freedom enhances aid effectiveness; and (iv) assessing the direction of causality between 
foreign aid and poverty in developing countries. The study uses recent dynamic panel data 
estimation techniques, including methods that deal with endogeneity by controlling for 
simultaneity and the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
1.3. Objectives and Hypotheses of the Study 
 
1.3.1. Objectives of the study 
 
The two main objectives of this study are to (i) assess the impact of foreign aid on extreme 
poverty and (ii) examine the direction of causality between foreign aid and extreme poverty in 
developing countries. The specific objectives of this study are to: 
 
i. Empirically assess the overall impact of foreign aid (total ODA) on extreme poverty 
(headcount poverty rate) in developing countries; 
 
ii. Empirically test the impact of different proxies of foreign aid on the three proxies of 
extreme poverty;  
 
iii. Empirically investigate whether political freedom (democracy) and economic freedom 
enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid;  
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iv. Compare the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty according to developing country 
income groups; and  
 
v. Examine the causal relationship between foreign aid and extreme poverty in developing 
countries. 
 
1.3.2. Hypotheses of the study 
 
The following alternative hypotheses are tested in this study: 
i. Foreign aid (total ODA) leads to a reduction in extreme poverty (headcount poverty 
rate) in developing countries; 
 
ii. Different types of foreign aid (loans, grants, as well as bilateral and multilateral aid) 
lead to a reduction in different proxies of extreme poverty (headcount poverty rate, 
poverty gap, and squared poverty gap index) in developing countries; 
 
iii. Political and economic freedom enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing 
extreme poverty in developing countries; 
 
 
iv. The effectiveness of foreign aid in extreme poverty reduction spans across different 
country income groups; and 
 
v. Foreign aid Granger causes extreme poverty.  
 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
 
Although this study is an addition to the existing aid effectiveness literature, it differs 
significantly from most previous studies on the subject in several ways. First, the majority of 
studies on aid effectiveness focus on the impact of aid on economic growth. This research 
contributes to the small group of studies that specifically examine the impact of aid on extreme 
poverty.  
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Second, this study explores the subject matter further by investigating the effect of the five 
types of foreign aid. They are total ODA as a percentage of GNI, grants, loans, and both 
bilateral and multilateral aid on the three proxies of extreme poverty: poverty headcount rate, 
poverty gap, and squared poverty gap.  
 
Third, the study compares the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty by country income 
group. This includes a comparison across three developing country income groups: low-
income, lower middle income, and upper middle income.  
 
Fourth, few studies have tested the so-called “Washington Consensus” (WC)1 model of aid 
allocation2. This study empirically tests whether one of the “aid conditionalities” helps 
countries to escape poverty – that foreign aid should be allocated to countries which promote 
political and economic freedom. The study tests whether political or economic freedom 
enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. 
 
Fifth, this study combines the assessment of the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty with 
an examination of the direction of causality between the two variables. This enriches the 
discussion and understanding of the relationship between these two variables. In the impact 
assessment, the study uses several control variables (to produce unbiased estimates and robust 
results), and for the causality analysis, a trivariate framework (with an intermittent variable) is 
estimated.  
 
Sixth, as mentioned earlier, the study uses recent dynamic panel data estimation techniques, 
including methods that deal with endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity and the 
unobserved heterogeneity. The majority of studies on aid have been criticised for not 
considering the potential endogeneity between aid and its possible outcomes, such as poverty 
and economic growth.  
 
 
                                               
1The term “Washington Consensus” was first used by an English economist named John Williamson in 1989.  
2 The term “WC” refers to a set of economic policy prescriptions associated with institutions based in Washington, 
D.C., such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department. 
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1.5. Organisation of the Study 
 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the dynamics of foreign aid 
and extreme poverty in developing countries, while Chapter 3 covers the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between foreign aid and poverty. Chapter 4 offers a 
detailed discussion of the econometric estimation techniques used in this thesis, including the 
theoretical and empirical model specifications, endogeneity, as well as identification and 
robustness checks. The chapter also discusses the sources of data and the choice of variables 
used. Chapter 5 contains the econometric analysis, the empirical findings and a discussion of 
the results. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises and concludes the study and offers policy 
implications. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE DYNAMICS OF POVERTY AND FOREIGN AID IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The phrases “economic development” and “development economics” were historically thought 
of as synonymous with economic growth. In recent years, however, these terms have come to 
be associated with “poverty reduction” (Deaton, 2006). The World Bank (1990, p. 24) asserts 
that “reducing poverty is the fundamental objective of economic development”. Clunies-Ross 
et al. (2009, p. 595) argue that the promotion of the MDGs led to the shifting of emphasis on 
the foreign aid motive from increasing economic growth rates to poverty reduction. This 
emphasis has continued under the SDGs period (United Nations, 2015). 
 
The previous chapter provided an introduction and background to the study. This chapter 
chronicles the history of global poverty and official aid (OA) in developing countries. It starts 
by defining developing countries in the first section, and it then proceeds to describe possible 
causes, definitions, and measurements of poverty before highlighting the global trends in 
extreme or absolute poverty in the third section. The fourth section provides a global overview 
of foreign aid in terms of history, volumes, and the main bilateral donors, while section five 
brings the two main variables together through a discussion of the core movement of extreme 
poverty and foreign aid. Section six concludes the chapter by highlighting the main findings.  
 
2.2. Characteristics of Developing Countries 
 
The economies of the world are broadly divided into two groups: developed and developing 
countries. This study focuses on poverty and foreign aid in the latter countries. It follows the 
World Bank (2017) classification which uses the level of the GNI per capita (calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method) as the main criterion for country grouping. According to this 
classification criterion, low-income economies are those which had a GNI per capita of US$1 
005 or less in 2016. Lower middle-income economies had a GNI per capita of between US$1 
006 and US$3 955), upper middle-income economies between US$3 956 and US$12 235, and 
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high-income economies had US$12 236 or more. Therefore, developing countries are those 
with a per capita GNI below the US$12 236 threshold.  
 
According to Ravallion (2016, p. 2), in 1820 approximately 80% of the world’s population 
lived in material conditions similar to those of the poorest 20% today. This suggests that the 
world has made progress in reducing poverty over the years. However, this progress has been 
uneven over time and space (Ravallion, 2016, p. 2), with poverty now concentrated in 
developing countries.  
 
Developing countries are typically classified into six geographical regions, namely: EAP, ECA, 
LAC, MENA, SA, and SSA. According to Atkinson and Bourguignon (2014), developing 
countries cover almost 75% of the total world land area and constitute around 85% of the total 
world population.  
 
Table 2.1 summarises changes in some basic demographic, economic, and socio-economic 
statistics from 1980 to 2015. The table shows that the total population in developing countries 
has almost doubled over the last 35 years. The poorest region in terms of GNI per capita (Atlas 
method) is SA, followed by SSA. However, when using the GNI per capita based on the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) method, SA seems to be marginally richer, with a higher value 
than that of SSA. Based on both the PPP and Atlas methods, the GNI for ECA is generally 
higher than that of other regions and has the highest HDI.  
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Table 2.1: Population, gross national income, and Human Development Index in developing countries by region 
 
Source: Population data is from the United Nations (UN) Demographic Yearbook. Gross national income (GNI) per capita is in international dollars adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP) and in current US$ (Atlas Method) are from the World Development Indicators (WDIs). The Human Development Index 
(HDI) is from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) human development reports. Finally, the GNI and HDI are unweighted averages across countries.  
 
 
Population 
(millions)
PPP 
Method
Atlas 
method HDI Countries
Population 
(millions)
PPP 
Method
Atlas 
method HDI
Population 
(millions)
PPP 
Method
Atlas 
method HDI
Developing countries 3 505 153.00 5 840 7 023 4 291 0.61 6 159
East Asia and Pacific 1 360 1 273 24.00 1 961 4 911 2 992 0.62 2 035 16 082 9 771 0.72
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 350 5 816 30.00 476 12 558 7 815 0.75 411 30 175 24 275 0.76
Latin America and the Caribbean 345 2 125 31.00 584 9 789 6 433 0.71 605 15 070 8 968 0.75
Middle East and North Africa 167 13.00 331 6 462 3 647 0.64 363 18 846 8 229 0.69
South Asia 900 273 8.00 1 633 3 429 1 704 0.54 1 744 5 661 1 535 0.62
Sub Saharan Africa 383 670 47.00 853 3 288 1 798 0.45 1 001 3 569 1 631 0.52
Developed countries 932 62.00 1 055 37 303 38 818 0.86 1 187
Total/Average 7 941 0.00 2 031 0.00 368.00 12 733 10 595 8 437 0.65 13 505 14 900 9 068 0.68
Regions
1980 2010 2015
GNI per capita GNI per capita GNI per capita
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2.3. History, Measurement, and Global Poverty Trends 
 
2.3.1. Causes of poverty 
 
For centuries, various theories have been developed in attempts to explain the main causes of 
poverty. Depending on the understanding or assumed causes of poverty during those successive 
years, different policies and programmes were enacted to solve the problem of poverty.  
 
According to Ravallion (2016, p. 4), one of the earlier and influential schools of thought is that 
the (poor) individuals are responsible for their poverty situation through substandard choices 
or negative behaviour. Poverty was thus attributed to the poor people themselves, who were 
deemed to be lazy, not hard-working enough, imprudent, or reluctant to take risks. Some 
variations of this theory attributed the cause of poverty to low intelligence and genetic issues 
of the poor. However, Ravallion (2016, p. 4) argues that blaming poor people for their 
predicament has long afforded an excuse for public inaction against poverty. The argument 
then was that directly helping the poor would be counterproductive as it would encourage “bad 
behaviour”. The solutions to combat poverty, based on this “bad behaviours” theory, included 
initiatives to issue money to the working poor in the form of an earned income tax credit (EITC) 
as a way of motivating them to work. To address issues of lower intelligence or lower 
education, development strategies were formulated to help the poor to improve their education 
(Lipton & Ravallion, 1993). 
 
Another school of thought is that poverty is caused by cultural belief systems that support sub-
cultures of poverty. This thinking is mainly attributed to Lewis (1959), an anthropologist who 
coined the term “culture of poverty”. This theory postulates that a set of beliefs, values, and 
skills that are socially created but individually held can create poverty. According to Lewis 
(1998, p. 7), “people in the culture of poverty have a strong feeling of marginality, of 
helplessness, of dependency, of not belonging. They are like aliens in their own country, 
convinced that the existing institutions do not serve their interests and needs”. People in a 
certain community, suburb, or region can thus hold the same “culture of poverty” and pass it 
on to future generations. The solution would be to focus on cultural education programmes or 
individual families moving out of that neighbourhood.  
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An understanding of poverty based on these first two theories would lead to four approaches 
to poverty: acceptance, palliation, insurance, or theft (Lipton & Ravallion, 1993, p. 3). Poverty 
was accepted based on the belief that it was an unhappy way of life. Those who decided to act 
against poverty chose the palliative route, whereby the private sector, a charity, or Christians 
helped through almsgiving which was regarded as a religious duty. Chiefs or landlords 
collected some insurance fee in the form of grain or labour from the poor in return for military 
protection. Lastly, in the absence of palliation or insurance, theft was an ethically accepted cure 
for life-threatening poverty (Lipton & Ravallion, 1993, p. 3). 
 
The third theory of poverty is attributed to Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540)3, who argued that 
poverty is caused by cumulative and cyclical interdependencies, and that poverty would 
generate costs for non-poor as well (Ravallion, 2016). These costs include crime, disease, or 
the problem of having too many beggars (Ravallion, 2016, p. 4). Based on this argument and 
understanding, the rich and those in leadership positions began to establish anti-poverty 
policies.  
 
Recent theories of poverty maintain that it is caused by economic, political, and social 
distortions or discriminations. The World Bank (2000, p. 34) argued that one of the ways in 
which to explore the causes of poverty is to probe the dimensions highlighted by the poor 
themselves. These include (i) a lack of income and assets to attain basic necessities; (ii) a sense 
of voicelessness and powerlessness in the institutions of state and society; and (iii) vulnerability 
to adverse shocks linked to an inability to cope with them. An understanding now exists that 
the poor face some socio-economic constraints which limit them from accessing opportunities 
to improve their well-being. As a result of these constraints, the poor are excluded from the 
formal economy, institutions of support, markets and services from the government (Ravallion, 
2016). This new thinking has placed the goal of poverty reduction at the core of international 
development and public policy. Domestically, governments are now increasingly measured on 
their effectiveness in eliminating poverty. 
  
 
 
                                               
3 Juan Luis Vives is regarded as the founding father of modern psychology (Ravallion, 2016).  
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2.3.2. Definitions of poverty 
 
When asked to define poverty, a poor man in Kenya said, 
“Don’t ask me what poverty is because you have met it outside my house. Look at the 
house and count the number of holes. Look at the utensils and the clothes I am wearing. 
Look at everything and write what you see. What you see is poverty” (Todaro & Smith, 
2012, p. 6). 
 
Defining poverty in the South African context, Bundy (2016) said the following: 
“Poverty is material want, shabbiness, and squalor … clothes patched beyond repair; 
shoes literally down-at-heel; bedding stained and worn thin; furniture and fittings that 
sigh with exhaustion … housing without basic amenities, comforts or security that home 
life is supposed to afford” (Bundy, 2016, p. 7).  
 
A blind and poor woman in Moldova explained her experience of poverty, saying, 
“For a poor person, everything is terrible – illness, humiliation, shame. We are 
cripples; we are afraid of everything; we depend on everyone. No one needs us. We are 
like garbage that everyone wants to get rid of” (Todaro & Smith, 2012, p. 6). 
 
From these three definitions, based on poverty experience, one can conclude that poor people 
are impoverished and suffer from undernutrition and poor health, have little or no literacy, live 
in environmentally degraded areas, hardly have any political voice, are excluded socially and 
economically, and earn meagre incomes. However, these definitions are too general and make 
poverty challenging to measure, thereby making it difficult to track progress in the fight against 
poverty.  
 
The World Bank (1990, p. 26) defines poverty as the inability to attain a minimal standard of 
living. Todaro and Smith (2012, p. 2) qualify poverty and define “absolute poverty” as “a 
situation of being unable to meet the minimum levels of income, food, clothing, healthcare, 
shelter, and other essentials”. The next sub-section focuses on how to measure the standard of 
living or well-being, how to identify the poor, and how to determine an overall indicator of 
international poverty that can be used for global poverty comparisons.  
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2.3.3. Measurement of poverty 
 
2.3.3.1. Basic approaches to measuring the prevalence of poverty 
 
Lok-Dessallien (1999, p. 1) states that the way in which poverty is measured reveals the 
fundamental assumptions made about the nature and causes of poverty. Broadly, there are three 
basic approaches to measuring the prevalence of poverty in a household, community, country 
or region. The first approach is termed the income or expenditure method, which is mainly 
based on the human basic needs approach (BNA). The BNA sets minimum absolute standards 
of (primarily material) needs in a number of measurable dimensions (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, 
p. 251). It is a consumption-oriented approach as it predominantly focuses on the minimum 
requirements for a decent life, such as health, nutrition, and literacy. In this approach, poverty 
is defined as a lack of income or of consumption (Deaton, 2006, p. 9). This approach to poverty 
measurement assumes that individuals or a group of people are poor if their income or 
consumption is below a particular level usually defined as a minimum threshold or a “poverty 
line”. Clunies-Ross et al. (2009, p. 251) argue that the MDGs were developed using the BNA 
by listing the “needs” that had to be met. The BNA leads to several poverty indicators, 
commonly referred to as monetary measures of poverty such as per capita gross national 
product (GNP), headcount index, poverty gap index (PG) and SPG. These poverty indices will 
be discussed in greater detail under the monetary measures of poverty sub-section.  
 
The second method is called the human capabilities approach (CA) and is centred on the 
pioneering work of Amartya Sen during the 1980s and 1990s. This approach defines poverty 
as the absence of basic human capabilities to function at a minimally acceptable level within a 
society (Lok-Dessallien, 1999, p. 11; Deaton, 2006, p. 10). The CA looks at improving people’s 
well-being by expanding their “capabilities” so that they can look after themselves. The CA 
notion hypothesises that poverty is a result of a lack of capability to “function” or to “achieve” 
well-being (Wagle, 2005, p. 302). Well-being is defined as the “ends”, while capability is 
defined as the “means” to achieve it (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2000).  
 
The CA to poverty measurement tries to measure poverty by looking at poverty outcomes or 
“ends”, such as individuals’ abilities and opportunities to live long, healthy, and enjoyable 
lives; to be literate; and to have the freedom to pursue what they value (Sen, 1981, 1992, 1999; 
Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). Based on this definition, it can be argued that the CA is a more 
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comprehensive approach to poverty measurement compared to the BNA, as it places poverty 
within the broader context of human development (Lok-Dessallien, 1999, p. 11). The majority 
of the CA poverty indicators include non-monetary poverty measures or social indicators such 
as life expectancy, literacy rates, and malnutrition. 
 
The third approach to poverty measurement is a hybrid method, which recognises that poverty 
is a multidimensional phenomenon. There has been a realisation that even though income-
based measures are simple and widely used, employing these types of measures solely would 
lead to the neglect of important features of poverty (Deaton, 2006). Furthermore, Schaffner 
(2014, p. 85) highlights that the choice between income and non-income measures has an effect 
on policy goals. As such, goals for reducing income poverty are not necessarily the same as 
those for reducing mortality rates, for example.  
 
2.3.3.2. Non-monetary measures of poverty 
 
As argued above, the human capability approach places emphasis on people’s abilities and 
opportunities to enjoy long, healthy lives and to be literate and participate freely in their society. 
Therefore, the poverty indicators under the CA would include, inter alia, life expectancy, 
literacy rates, and malnutrition. These indicators can be described as measures of well-being in 
terms of final outcomes, and they are normally collected by national statistical agencies. 
However, the main disadvantage of these indicators is that no perfect aggregates exist for some 
of them. Some are group measures and cannot be used to gauge household or individual well-
being (i.e., life expectancy). Furthermore, some of the indicators are stock variables, which 
change slowly over time, thereby limiting their usefulness for short- and medium-term poverty 
monitoring (Lok-Dessallien, 1999, p. 12).  
 
The second group of poverty indicators can be referred to as multidimensional poverty 
estimates, indices, or composite measures. It can be argued that the HDI of the UNDP is a 
combination of both the basic needs and the capacities approach. It is a mixed measure of three 
dimensions of human development, namely (i) a long and healthy life, as measured by life 
expectancy at birth; (ii) education or knowledge, measured by adult literacy and the gross 
enrolment ratio for primary, secondary, and tertiary institutions; and (iii) a decent living 
standard, which is proxied by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in PPP in U.S. 
dollars (UNDP, 2005, p. 214).  
16 
 
Another example is the Human Poverty Index (HPI) which was developed by the UNDP as a 
complementary measure to the HDI (UNDP, 1997). The HPI combines basic dimensions of 
poverty, and the variables used are longevity (percentage of the people expected to die before 
age 40), adult illiteracy, access to health services and to safe water, and under five malnutrition 
rates (UNDP, 1997, p. 14; Lok-Dessallien, 1999, p. 8). In 2010, the UNDP replaced the HPI 
with its new Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The new index identifies the poor using 
dual cut-offs for levels and numbers of deprivations and then multiplies the percentage of 
people living in poverty by the percentage of weighted indicators for which poor households 
are deprived (Todaro & Smith, 2012, p. 215). The MPI uses a range of health, education and 
standard of living indicators, which are considered as important direct household indicators of 
deprivation (Todaro & Smith, 2012).  
 
2.3.3.3. Monetary measures of poverty 
 
As briefly discussed above, the monetary measures, sometimes referred to as income or 
consumption measures, can also be regarded as an indirect way of measuring poverty (Alkire 
& Santos, 2014). The income method has been implemented in official poverty measures for 
most countries of the world, and its indicators include per capita GNP, headcount index, PG, 
and SPG. Lok-Dessallien (1999) argues that per capita GNP is too gross and misleading, and 
that per capita personal income is therefore a better aggregate income indicator. 
 
The World Bank (2000, p. 16) traces the history of the monetary or income measures of poverty 
to Seebohm Rowntree’s classic study of poverty in the English city of York in 1899. Deaton 
(2010, p. 5) however, traces the recent World Bank poverty indicators to the work of Ahluwalia 
et al. (1979). The actual calculations of the international poverty indicators in the World Bank’s 
World Development Report 1990 (World Bank, 1990) are based on the research for that report 
which was later documented by Ravallion et al. (1991)4. These poverty measures are founded 
on the international poverty line, popularly known as the “dollar-a-day poverty line”. This was 
incorporated into international poverty discussions and policymaking through the 
promulgation of the MDGs (World Bank, 1990; Ravallion et al., 1991; Ravallion et al., 2009; 
Deaton, 2010). The first goal of the MDGs was to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
                                               
4 Please see Ravallion et al. (2009) for more details.  
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proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day” (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 617; 
Deaton, 2010, p. 5).  
 
The international poverty line measures absolute or extreme poverty below which an individual 
is unable or barely able to meet the subsistence essentials of food, clothing, and shelter 
(Ravallion et al., 2009, p. 163; Todaro & Smith, 2012, p. 211). The development of this global 
poverty line occurred through three major steps, namely (i) collecting poverty lines (mainly 
based on national household income and expenditure surveys) from a group of developing 
countries, (ii) converting these poverty lines into international dollars using the PPP exchange 
rates from the International Comparison Project (ICP), and then (iii) estimating the 
international poverty line (Ravallion et al., 1991; Ravallion et al., 2009; Ravallion, & Chen, 
2010). The main advantages of the international poverty line are that it is simple, transparent, 
and easier to use when comparing poverty levels across countries and regions (Deaton, 2010, 
p. 5). However, it faces criticism based on disparities in survey designs, the reliability of the 
PPP, given economic disparities, and the actual calculation of the international poverty line, 
which was described by Deaton (2010, p. 17) as a “simple average” of poor countries’ poverty 
lines.  
 
Through successive revisions, the international poverty line of “US$1 a day” was revised 
upwards to US$1.08, US$1.25, and recently US$1.90, based on new price surveys by the ICP. 
The current poverty measures from the World Bank’s PovcalNet Online database5 are updates 
of global poverty rates from 1981 to 2013 based on the 2011 PPP from the ICP. The new 
poverty estimates combine PPP exchange rates for household consumption with data from 
more than 1 000 household surveys across 138 countries in 6 regions and 21 other high-income 
countries. According to the (World Bank, 2016a), over 2 million randomly sampled households 
were interviewed for the 2013 estimate, representing 87% of the population of the developing 
world. 
 
Once the international poverty line has been determined, a class of poverty measures could be 
decomposed following the work of Foster et al. (1984), which is illustrated as follows: 
 
                                               
5 See World Bank (2016b): http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx  
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where ∝ is the sensitivity of the index to poverty, or a measure of “poverty aversion”  (Foster, 
et al., 1984, p. 763); 𝑁௣ represents the number of poor people; 𝑍 is the poverty level; and 𝐺௜ is 
the poverty gap6. The three poverty measures used in this paper are the poverty headcount 
index, the PG, and the SPG (Schaffner, 2014).  
 
According to Alvi and Senbeta (2012, p. 960) and Schaffner (2014), when α = 0, the expression 
in Equation 2.1 corresponds to the headcount index; α = 1 corresponds to the PG; and α = 2 
corresponds to the SPG. The headcount index or the poverty rate measures the proportion of 
households in a population with incomes per person below the poverty line. Therefore, it 
measures the prevalence of poverty in terms of the spread thereof within the population. 
Although the headcount index is the most popular measure used by researchers, its main 
disadvantage is that it does not offer an indication of the depth of poverty (Schaffner, 2014).  
 
The PG measures this depth of poverty, and it considers the dispersal of the poor. It averages 
the proportional income gaps across everyone in the population against the poverty line. 
According to Schaffner (2014), the PG can be understood as the cost per person for eliminating 
poverty in an entire country7: 
“The PG can be interpreted as the cost per person in the entire economy of eliminating 
poverty (if money could be targeted perfectly and costlessly), expressed as a share of 
the poverty line. A PG of 0.05, for example, indicates that bringing the incomes of the 
poor up to the poverty line would require a per capita expenditure of 5% of the poverty 
line” (Schaffner, 2014, p. 88).  
 
The SPG, on the other hand, is sensitive to both global prevalence and the average depth of 
poverty, as well as the occurrence of deep poverty among the poor. Given its wider reach, the 
index is also referred to as the poverty severity index. It is argued that the squaring of the 
poverty gap or shortfall magnifies “the contribution to the overall measure of the income 
                                               
6 According to Alvi and Senbeta (2012), Gi = Z − Xi, where Xi is the per capita income and N is the population 
size. 
7Assuming that money and resources are targeted perfectly and in a costless manner. 
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deficits experienced by those in deepest poverty” (Schaffner, 2014, p.89; Alvi & Senbeta, 
2012).  
 
2.3.4. Global poverty levels 
 
Obtaining reliable measures of poverty that are comparable across countries is one of the main 
challenges in the understanding of and fight against global poverty (Besley & Burgess, 2003; 
World Bank, 2015). This section attempts to provide a broad overview of the global and 
regional trends in the dimensions of poverty such as income (consumption), education, and 
health. The main focus of this study, however, is on monetary measures of poverty whose 
trends are discussed in greater detail. 
 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of the well-being of citizens by region in terms of gross GDP 
per capita, life expectancy, mortality rates, and school enrolment. The GDP per capita offers a 
measure of the average annual income per person, assuming that the income in the region is 
distributed equally. As shown in Table 2.2, even though the average income per person has 
increased over the years, large regional disparities still exist. On average, the world has 
recorded an increase in GDP per capita of 178% from 1960 to 2015. Over the same period, the 
EAP region recorded the highest growth of 1 814%, growing from an average of US$287 to 
US$5 500. This is followed by SA (409%), and the least growth was recorded in the SSA 
region, which witnessed a mere 54% increase (from US$1 074 to US$1 659) over more than 
half a century. It is also important to note that by 1960, SSA was almost four times richer than 
EAP, whereas now, a complete reversal has taken place, as EAP is currently around three times 
richer.  
Table 2.2: Monetary and non-monetary poverty indicators by region of the world 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
1960 1990 2015 1960 1990 2015 1960 1990 2015 1970 1990 2014
World 3 690       7 154        10 242   52 65 72 122 63 32 41 51 75
High income 11 750     29 283     41 459   68 75 81 36 10 5 78 92 106
Lower middle income 556           947           2 018     47 63 70 161 83 40
Developing Countries  
(excluding high income)
Europe & Central Asia 6 261        8 333     63 68 72 39 15 81 91 106
Middle East & North Africa 2 724        47 65 72 168 52 21 26 57 79
East Asia & Pacific 287           945           5 500     45 68 74 45 15 35 44 88
Latin America & Caribbean 3 552       6 275        9 027     56 68 75 121 44 15 27 76 94
South Asia 314           553           1 599     42 58 68 168 92 42 23 36 65
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 074       1 252        1 659     40 50 59 108 56 13 23 43
GDP per capita (constant 
2010 US$)
Life expectancy at birth, 
total (years)
Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births)
School enrolment, 
secondary (% gross)Region
20 
 
However, though the GDP per capita offers useful and thought-provoking insight into 
prosperity levels (Schaffner, 2014, p. 2), it does not provide an accurate picture of the level of 
deprivation and the standard of living. This is complemented by other non-income measures 
of poverty. Table 2.2 shows that for many people in developing countries, life is short, the 
probability of a child dying is still high, and school enrolments are still extremely low. On 
average, SSA ranks lowest in all measures. The life expectancy in SSA is only 59 years, 
compared to 81 years for high-income countries. Furthermore, 1 out of every 17 babies born in 
SA dies before the age of 5 years, while only 43% of children attend secondary school. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1 below, the World Bank (2016b) estimated that more than 1 billion 
people have been lifted out of extreme poverty during the last 3.5 decades (1981 to 2015). 
However, approximately one-tenth of the global population still lived on less than US$1.90 a 
day which was estimated at around 700 million people in 2015 (World Bank, 2016b, p. xv).  
 
Figure 2.1: Global poverty levels 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a; 2016b) 
 
The 2015-year mark is significant in that it signifies the end of the 15-year target for achieving 
the MDGs. The world target was that the global poverty rate should be halved from the 1990 
levels by 2015. In 1990, there were roughly 1.9 billion people living below US$1.90 a day 
(constituting 36.9% of the world population), and this number is projected to have reduced to 
700 million people with an estimated global poverty rate of 9.6%. The statistics suggest that, 
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at a global level, the world met the MDG target in 2010, which is 5 years ahead of schedule. 
However, there are some regional disparities as depicted in Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2: Regional dynamics of poverty ($1.90 a day) 
 
Source: Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
Figure 2.2 plots the US$1.90 a day poverty rate for the 6 regions and the total for all developing 
countries. The global poverty rate for all developing countries decreased from around 54.7% 
in 1981 to 13% in 2013, and it is estimated to have decreased further to 11.9% in 2015. As 
shown in Figure 2.2, however, there are significant regional disparities in the levels of progress 
in the fight against global poverty. Ravallion (2011, p. 79) also remarked that progress against 
poverty has been uneven over time and space. A comparison of progress in poverty reduction 
between the six regions over this period demonstrates that there has been a striking re-ranking. 
For example, the poverty rankings of the regions in 1981 indicated that poverty was highest in 
EAP, followed by SA, SSA, LAC, MENA, and lastly ECA in that order. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the EAP region had the greatest number of people in extreme 
poverty during the 1980s and early 1990s. The marked reversal in fortunes took place within 
the first two decades. The regions with the highest poverty rate in 1981 were the EAP at 80.5%, 
SA (54.5%), and SSA (49.2%). However, by the early 1990s, EAP had swapped places with 
SSA. From then on, SSA remained the poorest region, though its poverty rates have been 
decreasing from around 2000. East Asia and the Pacific has recorded the sharpest decrease in 
poverty rates during this period, from 80.5% in 1981 to less than 10% in 2011, and the rate was 
projected to be less than 5% in 2015. 
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Both Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 also illustrate that the decrease in incidences of poverty was 
greater in some periods compared to others. Global poverty rates fell by large margins between 
1981 and 2010, and the most rapid decline occurred during the 2000s. More than 1 billion 
people escaped extreme poverty during this period. The estimated figures for 2015 show that 
global poverty is concentrated in three regions (SSA, SA, and LAC). However, the other 2 
regions have reached a US$1.9-per-day headcount poverty rate of less than 15%, with the 
exception of SSA, which remained stubbornly high at 35.2% in 2015. This means that there 
were still around 350 million people who were living on less than US$1.9 per day, and this 
figure was roughly half of the world’s poor. It is not a surprise that the top 10 poorest countries 
of the world are in SSA8. 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts the distribution of the estimated 700 million people living below the 
US$1.90-a-day poverty line. In the 1980s and early 1990s, EAP had the highest number of poor 
people followed by SA.  
 
Figure 2.3: Regional distribution of people living below the U$1.90-a-day poverty line 
(2013 purchasing power parity), 2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
                                               
8 The top 10 poorest countries of the world in terms of 2013 headcount poverty levels are, starting with the poorest, 
the CAR, Madagascar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, South Sudan, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, 
Zambia, Rwanda, and Mozambique.  
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According to the latest estimates by the World Bank (2016a), as illustrated in Figure 2.3, by 
2015, SSA and SA accounted for approximately 80% of the global poor. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
with about 350 people living on less than US$1.90 per day, had around half of the world’s 
poverty-stricken population.  
 
2.3.5. Progress in meeting the millennium development goals  
 
In the year 2000, the United Nations General Assembly promulgated the MDGs as a set of 
developmental goals and targets agreed by the international community. The primary focus of 
the MDG was on halving extreme poverty and improving the welfare of the world’s poorest by 
2015. There were eight specific and measurable development goals. The first seven of them 
concentrated on eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary 
education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; 
improving maternal health; combating the human immunodeficiency virus infection and 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), malaria, and other diseases; and ensuring 
environmental sustainability. The eighth goal focused on the creation of a global partnership 
for development, with targets for foreign aid, international trade, and debt relief (IMF, 2015).  
Clunies-Ross et al. (2009, p. 595-6) argue that the promotion of the MDGs marked the shift in 
“aid for development” from increasing economic growth rates to tangible reduction of poverty 
and general deprivation. This is more pronounced by the first goal, which targeted cutting 
global poverty by half (Sachs, 2005; Deaton, 2010) – that is, to reduce the proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty (below US$1 a day) from close to 30% of the developing world’s 
population in 1990 to 15% by 2015 (Besley & Burgess, 2003, p. 3). To achieve the MDGs, rich 
nations had to make a commitment to increase OA to poor countries by allocating 0.7% of their 
GNI, a target set since the 1960s.  
 
Based on the statistics presented in the previous sections, especially Figure 2.1 and Figure 
2.2, the world met the MDG target of halving the global poverty rate in 2010, 5 years ahead 
of schedule (World Bank, 2016b, p. 1). In 1990, there were nearly 1.9 billion people living 
below U$1.90 a day (constituting 36.9% of the world population). This number is projected 
to have reduced to 700 million people by 2015, with an estimated global poverty rate of 9.6%. 
Based on these statistics, it could be concluded that the world met the above-mentioned MDG 
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target. However, SSA is the only region that has not met its MDG target (Asongu & Kodila‐
Tedika, 2017; Asongu & Le Roux, 2018; Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2018)9.  
 
The World Bank (2016b, p. 1) further argues that the MDGs were effective in reducing income 
poverty and in spurring global development progress. They were however less successful in 
improving non-income deprivations such as access to quality education or to basic health 
services. The report further asserts that development has advanced more rapidly over the 15-
year MDG era than at any other time in human history, and the lessons learnt could hence be 
used to drive the success of the new SDGs by 2030.  
 
2.4. Foreign Aid History, Allocation, and Global Trends 
 
2.4.1. Definitions and forms of foreign aid 
 
Broadly defined, foreign aid comprises of all resources – physical goods, skills and technical 
know-how, financial grants (gifts), or concessional loans – which are transferred by donors to 
recipient countries (Riddell, 2008). Two broad types of foreign aid exist: official development 
finance (ODF) and ODA. The latter is sometimes used interchangeably with OA. On the one 
hand, ODA and OA cover (i) grants and (ii) concessional loans that have at least a 25% grant 
component (World Bank, 1998, p. 6). Both ODA and OA come from official sources and are 
issued principally for promoting economic development and welfare in developing countries 
(OECD, 2009, p. 50). The only difference between ODA and OA is that OA involves payments 
to “transitional countries” and some “advanced” developing countries, while ODA covers the 
rest of the developing countries (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 618). On the other hand, ODA is 
a subset of ODF (World Bank, 1998). Official development finance also includes non-
concessional multilaterals and bilateral developmental loans with less than a 25% grant element 
(OECD, 2006). The OECD also reports on “other official flows” (OOFs), which show 
transactions by the official sector with countries on the “DAC List of ODA Recipients” that do 
not meet the conditions for ODA eligibility. This is because they are not primarily aimed at 
development or because they have a grant element of less than 25% (OECD, 2018b). 
 
                                               
9 A more detailed discussion on the regional dynamics of poverty can be found in Section 2.5 of this chapter. 
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Foreign aid can also be classified into two broad groups: bilateral (two-sided) and multilateral 
(many-sided) aid. The former refers to aid given by one donor government directly to a 
recipient government, usually administered by agencies of the donor government. The latter is 
offered by an international institution representing a number of donor governments. 
International institutions that administer multilateral aid include the UN, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other development agencies (Hjertholm & White, 
1998). According to the OECD (2009), more than two-thirds of the total ODA from DAC 
member countries is provided bilaterally, mostly in the form of grants. Furthermore, debt relief 
grants have been a significant part of ODA in recent years, accounting for around 21% of ODA 
in 2005 and 18% in 2006 (OECD, 2009, p. 52). In recent years, there has been growth in aid 
disbursement through non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Traditional NGOs include 
Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and recently the Gates Foundation all of which deliver 
essential services and public goods to poor countries (Hjertholm & White, 1998).  
 
Another categorisation of aid is in terms of whether it is “tied” or “untied”. Some bilateral aid 
is “source or donor tied”. This means that the donor provides aid with a condition that the 
recipient country must acquire products from the donor country (World Bank, 1998 and 
Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). Untied aid has no such constraints. The World Bank (1998, p. 6) 
states that “tied aid reduces the value of assistance by about 25 percent” and further argues 
that “untying bilateral aid would make it more effective”.  
 
Lastly, foreign aid can be classified according to its intended use. Project aid is granted solely 
to finance a specific project, such as the construction of a dam or road. Programme aid, on the 
other hand, is less restrictive. The recipient government has some discretion over the use of 
programme aid within a sector (for sectoral aid) or for general government support (Clunies-
Ross et al., 2009). 
 
This study focuses on official foreign aid (both ODA and OA) as per the OECD’s DAC 
definitions. The official and operational definition of foreign aid is as follows: 
“Flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each 
transaction of which meets the following criteria: (1) it is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
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objective and (2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 
25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent)” (Riddell, 2008, p. 19). 
 
The World Bank (1998) further affirms that this is the aid aimed at assisting in development 
and poverty reduction. Furthermore, as explained by Riddell (2008, p. 17), development 
partners concerned with world poverty would focus on narrower types of foreign aid, often 
referred to as development assistance or development aid. The empirical analysis of this study 
disaggregates foreign aid by source, namely (i) bilateral and (ii) multilateral, and by type: (i) 
grants and (ii) loans.  
 
2.4.2. Purpose and motives for foreign aid allocation 
 
Similar to the foregoing discussed varied types and definitions of foreign aid, many motives 
exist for donors granting aid. Clunies-Ross et al. (2009) grouped these motives into three 
categories: (i) humanitarian, (ii) political interests, and (iii) commercial considerations. Riddell 
(2008, p. 18) argues that foreign or development aid has always been defined from the 
perspective of donors in terms of the “purpose for which aid is given”. Over the years, aid has 
been issued for various purposes, including emergency, humanitarian, and development 
purposes. In recent years, however, there has been a growth in aid allocation for debt 
forgiveness (Riddell, 2008). Some of the geopolitical and global security arguments for 
increasing aid are that a world with higher economic growth and less poverty is more likely to 
be peaceful. As argued in the next section on aid allocation, the majority of donor governments 
tend to support international allies. Though not explicit, commercial objectives can play a part 
in aid allocation. This is a situation where a donor country uses aid to facilitate the procurement 
of raw materials, energy, and minerals. China and Japan have been accused of pushing their 
commercial interests through aid allocation, especially in Africa (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). 
 
Heerde and Hudson (2010) examine factors that motivate people in developed countries to 
donate towards poverty reduction in developing countries. The study found that individual 
concern for poverty stems from self-interest, awareness of poverty and assessments of 
achieving the MDGs (Heerde & Hudson, 2010, p. 389). Dreher et al. (2012) argue that official 
donors are motivated by their own political and economic interests, while NGOs are prompted 
by the recipient country’s need and use merit as the main allocation criteria. Edwards and 
Hulme (1996, p. 970) suggest that NGOs have often become “the implementer of the policy 
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agendas” of their own governments, especially if they depend on official financing. Dreher et 
al. (2012, p. 1 449) found a “herding behaviour”, whereby German NGOs were following the 
government as well as NGO peers in their allocation of aid. The same study also found that 
German NGOs were more active in poorer countries. Empirical studies by Headey (2008) and 
Alvi and Senbeta (2012) confirm the assertion that bilateral aid is mainly motivated by 
“geopolitical and strategic” interests, while multilateral aid is focused on development goals, 
including poverty reduction. 
 
The main focus of this study is on OA for development purposes, which is ODA or OA. This 
is the aid that is given with the main expectations that it will contribute funds for development. 
It is, however, also important to note that foreign aid is not the only source of foreign funds. 
Other sources of developmental funds for developing countries include FDI, loans from 
international markets and international remittances.  
 
2.4.3. Brief history of foreign aid 
 
As presented in Table 2.3, the history of foreign aid can be traced as far back as the late 1870s 
and early 1920s when the United Kingdom (UK) began the discussion on how to finance the 
development of poor countries which were then British colonies. In the United States of 
America (USA), the government transferred its food surplus to poor countries in 1896 with the 
intention of developing its agricultural markets. In 1912, the United States Congress officially 
passed an Act for the Relief of the Citizens of Venezuela. Even during the first period of World 
War I (WWI), countries were helping one another, but aid allocations (which were treated 
mainly as gifts) were patchy and temporary (Hjertholm & White, 1998).  
 
According to the World Bank (1998) and McGillivray et al. (2006), the provision of 
development aid started as it is known today after World War II (WWII). In 1947, the USA 
established and funded the Marshall Plan, which was aimed at rebuilding Europe after the war. 
As illustrated in Table 2.3, aid has grown to become a global phenomenon with annual 
disbursements estimated at around US$176 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2017).  
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Table 2.3: Chronological history of foreign aid 
Decade 
(Period) 
Main Activity (Year) Main Motive or Purpose 
of Aid 
Types of Aid Main ODA Trend  
1812-1900 - First discussions in the UK about official finance for colonies under 
Chamberlain (1870s) 
- Transfer of food surplus (under Ministry of Agriculture) begins from 
the US, with the intention of developing new markets (1896) 
- Humanitarian (relief) 
- Donor commercial or 
political interest  
- Food and 
humanitarian aid 
- Aid allocations were 
patchy and 
temporary 
1901-1939 - The USA Congress passes the Act for the Relief of the Citizens of 
Venezuela (1912) 
- The USA ships 6.23 million tonnes of food aid to Europe after WWI 
(1918) 
- Formation of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919 
- First U.K. Colonial Development Act (1929) 
- Great Depression (1930s) 
- The USA passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a price support 
scheme which marked the beginning of systematic shipments outside of 
emergency situations (1933) 
- Humanitarian (relief) 
- Donor commercial or 
political interest 
 
- Food and 
humanitarian aid 
- Non-administrative 
aid (through the 
UK’s Colonial Act) 
- Aid allocations were 
patchy and 
temporary 
1940s-
1950s 
- Establishment of the UN in 1942 (formally came into being in 1945, 
with the signing of the UN Charter).  
- Formation of UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 
1943 
- Bretton Woods conference. Formation of Oxfam and CARE (1944) 
- Formation of the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation in 1945 
- End of WW II in 1945 
- The UK passes the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945) 
- Formation of UNICEF (1946) 
- France creates its aid agency (FIDES) in 1946 which was eventually 
superseded by the Ministry of Cooperation 
- Launching of Marshall Plan (1947/48) 
- The USA Act of International Development and President Truman’s 
Point Four speech (1949) 
- Establishment of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance 
(EPTA) by the UN (1949) 
- Launch of the Colombo Plan (1950) 
- Growth of the Community Development Movement (CDM) in the 
1950s. 
- The U.S.A. Mutual Security Act (1951) 
- The U.S.A. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (1954) 
- Humanitarian (relief) 
- Donor commercial or 
political interest 
- Developmental aid, 
mainly funded through 
the Marshall Plan and 
the UN system 
- Ideology (i) focused on 
central planning and 
(ii) was anti-
communist  
- Donor focus on the 
CDM 
- Programme aid 
(Marshal Plan), 
mainly towards 
reconstruction  
- Humanitarian aid 
- Projects aid 
- Technical assistance  
- Aid allocations were 
still patchy and 
temporary  
- Proper records began 
to be kept in the 
1950s 
- Aid started to grow 
in the mid-1950s, 
and the USA 
contributed over half 
of all the official aid 
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Decade 
(Period) 
Main Activity (Year) Main Motive or Purpose 
of Aid 
Types of Aid Main ODA Trend  
- First meeting of non-aligned movement (1955) 
- Soviet Union, under President 1956 – Khrushchev announces expanded 
Soviet Union aid programme, which took over funding of the Aswan 
Dam in Egypt. 
- Formation of India Aid Consortia by the World Bank and five main 
donors (1958) 
- The UN Special Fund starts operations (1959) 
1960s-
1970s 
- Establishment of the International Development Association (IDA) 
under the auspices of the World Bank (1960) 
- The OECD is founded in 1961, with the formation of the DAC 
- The U.S.A. President (Kennedy) launches the Alliance for Progress 
(1961) 
- Creation of the Nordic countries aid agency (1962) 
- Formation of World Food Programme (WFP) in 1963 
- Formation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
through the merging of the UN Special Fund and EPTA (1965)  
- The DAC agrees on definition of ODA in 1968 
- The Pearson Report (1969) proposes 0.7% of GNI target for ODA 
donors 
- The World Bank President (and former U.S.A. Defence Secretary) 
Robert McNamara’s speech launches the World Bank’s reorientation 
towards poverty (1973) 
- World oil crisis (1973) 
- The USA International Development and Food Assistance Act (1975) 
- The U.K. Government publishes a white paper on aid titled “The 
Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: More Help for the Poorest” 
(1975)  
- Developmental aid, 
with a special focus on 
poverty (1970s) 
- Humanitarian (relief) 
- Donor commercial or 
political interest 
(specially to allies) 
- Ideology: state 
intervention in the 
market  
- Donor focus is on (i) 
support for 
infrastructure 
development and the 
productive sectors and 
(ii) poverty, including 
support for agriculture 
and social sectors 
- Bilateral aid 
- Technical assistance 
- Budget support 
- Debt relief 
- Multilateral aid 
- Infrastructure aid: 
funding of large-
scale industrial 
projects 
 
- Aid stagnation (mid-
1960s to mid-1970s) 
- Expansion in aid 
levels (mid-1970s to 
late 1980s). Official 
development 
assistance from 
DAC donors 
quadrupled from 
around US$6.8bn in 
1970 to over 
US$27bn by 1980 
- The expansion could 
be due to the 
escalation of the 
Cold War  
- Fall in food aid in 
the 1970s 
- World grew to 
become the largest 
source of 
development finance  
1980s-
1990s 
- First structural adjustment loans (SAL) in 1980 and the increasing 
popularisation of the WC (1980s) 
- Publication of Brandt Reports: “North-South: A Programme for 
Survival” (1980) and “Common Crisis” (1983) 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa” (1981) 
- Start of debt crisis (1982) 
- Launch of Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) in 1987 
- Developmental aid, 
with more pronounced 
shifts in donor policy 
toward poverty 
reduction  
- Introduction of neo-
liberal orthodoxies, 
focused on “removing 
- Rise of NGO aid 
- Emergency aid 
- Sectoral aid 
- Financial programme 
aid 
- New focus on SSA 
- Rapid expansion in 
aid levels, with some 
volatility in the 
1980s 
- Oil exporters 
become aid donors 
- Rise in NGO aid 
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Decade 
(Period) 
Main Activity (Year) Main Motive or Purpose 
of Aid 
Types of Aid Main ODA Trend  
- Unicef publishes a study “Adjustment with a Human Face” (1987) 
- The World Bank launches governance agenda (1989) 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “Sub-Saharan Africa: From 
Crisis to Sustainable Growth” (1989) 
- End of the Cold War (1990) 
- First Human Development Report (UNDP) and World Development 
Report (from the World Bank) on poverty (1990) 
- Copenhagen Summit, culminating in the 2020 initiative and the 
formulation of DAC targets (1994) 
- Helleiner Commission Report emphasising the importance of “local 
ownership of aid programmes and initiatives” (1995) 
- The World Bank and the IMF jointly launch a debt relief initiative for 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in 1996 
- The OECD publishes a report titled “Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation” (1996) 
- Several donors publish white papers or other policy documents 
embracing partnership for development initiatives (1997) 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “Assessing Aid” (1998) 
impediments to 
growth” 
- Conditions for aid: 
adoption of market-
oriented policies and 
trade liberalisation  
- Ideology: market-based 
economic structural 
adjustment 
programmes (ESAPs), 
especially in the 1980s 
- Aid was used as the 
tool for the 
implementation of an 
ESAP in the 1980s 
- Donor focus on poverty 
reduction and 
governance 
- Aid as a tool to foster 
democracy and 
governance in the 
1990s  
- Japan becomes the 
largest OA donor in 
the 1990s 
- Fall in aid after the 
end of the Cold War, 
regarded as the end 
of “political aid”  
2000s-
Present 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “Attacking Poverty” (2000) 
- Adoption of the UN “Millennium Declaration” and the publication of 
the MDGs in 2000 
- 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attack on U.S.A. soil 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “A Case for Aid: Building 
Consensus for Development Assistance” (2002) 
- Publication of the Zedillo Report (2002) on the funds and strategies 
needed to achieve the international development goals (IDGs) or 
MDGs. 
- The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002)  
- The Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003)  
- The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
- The World Bank publishes a report titled “Annual Review of 
Development Assistance: The World Bank’s Contribution to Poverty 
Reduction” (2005) 
- Developmental aid, 
with renewed focus on 
poverty reduction as 
per the MDGs 
- Focus on the role of 
donor-recipient 
partnerships for aid 
effectiveness 
- Ideology: linking aid 
effectiveness to 
governance, 
transparency, and 
human rights policies 
- Donor focus: meeting 
MDGs by 2015.  
- Developmental aid 
- Humanitarian aid 
- NGO aid 
- Emergency aid 
- Sectoral aid 
- NGO aid 
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Decade 
(Period) 
Main Activity (Year) Main Motive or Purpose 
of Aid 
Types of Aid Main ODA Trend  
- Launch of the Millennium Villages Project (2005) 
- Commission for Africa Report, titled “Our Common Interest” is 
published (2005) 
- Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
- Busan Partnership Agreement (2011) 
Source: Own Compilation from Moyo (2009), Hjertholm and White (1998), and Riddell (2008) 
32 
 
2.4.4. Global trends in foreign aid 
 
2.4.4.1. Foreign aid volume and its components 
 
According to official data collected by the OECD DAC, development aid at constant prices 
reached a new peak of US$176 billion in 2016 (OECD, 2017). At a high level, the main 
components of development aid include (i) humanitarian aid, (ii) in-donor refugee costs, and 
(iii) net ODA. Figure 2.4 and Table 2.4 present a historical picture of the official and private 
flows of funds from developed to developing countries since 1960. Total flows (ODA + OOFs 
+ Private) to developing countries have been increasing over the years but with significant 
fluctuations. The main drivers of fluctuations are private flows, which are linked to changing 
market conditions. Compared to total flows, ODA (from all donors) increased almost five-fold 
– from around US$36 billion in 1960 to US$176 billion in 2016.  
 
Figure 2.4: Total official and private flows to developing countries, net disbursements, 
constant prices (1960-2017) 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
The relative importance of ODA compared to other financial flows to developing countries has 
decreased over the last five decades (see Table 2.4). In the 1960s, ODA constituted around 
55% of all net disbursements by DAC countries; however, it has since decreased to 
approximately 30% in recent years. Private flows, which include FDI and commercial bank 
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loans, have grown from 29% to 57% over the same period. As with ODA, OOFs (consisting of 
export credits and investment transactions) have remained relatively small and have decreased 
from their peak of 7% in the 1970s to a lowly 1% in the 2010s. These dynamics demonstrate 
that the main source of funds for development has shifted significantly from ODA to private 
(mainly FDI) funding. As also shown in Table 2.4, private funds from all DAC donors were 
averaging at US$253 billion during the period 2010 to 2016 compared to US$125 billion in 
ODA.  
 
Table 2.4: Average official and private flows to developing countries, net disbursements 
(1960-2016) 
Variables  1960s 1970s 1980s  1990s 2000s 2010-16 
ODA (All Donors, Total) 41 310.67  59 895.56  80 061.69  80 760.54  108 549.66  151 784.66  
ODA (DAC Countries, Total) 41 114.70  44 641.84  65 516.51  71 706.68  94 909.13  125 181.91  
Private Flows, DAC 22 178.71  57 834.91  60 797.26  103 759.59  129 762.99  252 998.47  
OOFs, DAC 3 395.19  8 426.52  8 604.71  10 155.45  3 498.27  3 948.66  
Total ODA + OOFs + Private (DAC 
Countries) 
75 579.80  136 673.96  151 129.65  197 596.63  244 665.76  430 458.43  
ODA (DAC) % of Total 55% 35% 46% 40% 44% 31% 
Private (DAC) % of Total 29% 39% 38% 48% 47% 57% 
OOF (DAC) % of Total 4% 7% 6% 6% 2% 1% 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
2.4.4.2. Trends in net official development assistance  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the total ODA from all donors reached a new peak of US$176 
billion (constant prices) in 2016. Figure 2.5 provides a closer analysis of the trends in ODA 
from DAC countries. For example, when official statistics began to be collected, ODA at 
current prices averaged at US$1.9 billion per annum in the early 1950s, reaching a peak of 
US$61 billion in 1992 before undergoing a decade of decline. The sharp increase in ODA in 
both current and constant (2016) prices started in the early 2000s, possibly in response to the 
call by the international community to meet the MDGs. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 also show 
that ODA was fairly stagnant from the 1960s to the mid-1970s. Notable events in the aid 
calendar during this period include the establishment of the International Development 
Association (IDA) in 1960, the formation of the DAC in the following year, and the merging 
of the UN Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) into 
the UNDP in 1965. During this period, there was a refocusing of aid towards poverty, as 
highlighted by the World Bank President (and former U.S.A. Defence Secretary Robert 
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McNamara’s speech in 1973). This aimed to reorient the bank towards poverty reduction. The 
dip in 1973 could be partly due to the world oil crisis (see Table 2.3).  
 
The late 1970s to the early 1990s witnessed the early resurgence of aid flows to developing 
countries. This was the era for economic structural adjustment programmes (ESAPs) and the 
height of the Cold War. The Cold War ended in 1990 and was followed by a sharp fall in aid 
volumes throughout the 1990s. However, with the exception of the short-term dip in ODA 
during the global financial crises in 2007 and 2009, aid has recorded the longest period of 
expansion since 2001.  
 
Figure 2.5: Net official development assistance disbursements, Development Assistance 
Committee donors (1950-2017) 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
From as early as 1969, the Pearson Commission called upon donor countries to allocate aid 
equivalent to 0.7% of their GNI (Riddell, 2008). However, despite repeated calls, on average, 
DAC donors have not reached that target except for a few countries. As pictured in Figure 2.5, 
the ODA/GNI ratio was highest in the early 1960s and has been decreasing apart from some 
fluctuations. Figure 2.6 shows that only the following 8 donor countries, in ascending order, 
met or exceeded the 0.7% target in 2016: the UK (0.70%), Germany (0.70%), Denmark 
(0.75%), Turkey (0.79%), Sweden (0.94%), Luxembourg (1%), Norway (1.11%), and the 
United Arab Emirates (1.12%).  
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Figure 2.6: Net official development assistance (ODA) from donor countries (ODA/gross 
national income [GNI]), 2016 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 show aid by main sources (bilateral and multilateral) and types (grant 
and loan). Since the 1960s, more than 70% of ODA has been disbursed through bilateral 
channels. In fact, the bilateral aid proportion reached a peak of 93% in the period between 1993 
and 1994, and it is now averaging at around 75%.  
 
Figure 2.8 illustrates that not only is the greatest component of ODA disbursed as bilateral aid, 
but it is also distributed most in the form of grants.  
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Figure 2.7: Bilateral and multilateral official development assistance, net disbursements, 
constant 2016 prices 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
Figure 2.8: Bilateral, multilateral, grant, and loan disbursements, constant 2016 prices 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
2.4.4.3. Main aid donors 
 
By the year 2016, there were 29 DAC member countries in the OECD, and together they 
contributed over US$144 billion in ODA (OECD, 2018a). As depicted in Figure 2.9 and  
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Table 2.5, the top five bilateral donors are the USA, Germany, the UK, Japan, and France. 
Riddell (2008) demonstrates that the USA has been the single largest OA donor since the 
1950s.  
 
Table 2.5 shows that on aggregate, the USA has disbursed more than US$1.1 trillion in OA 
from 1960 to 2017. This constitutes approximately 24% of all the OA recorded during this 
period. In spite of these high numbers in terms of aid volume, the USA has never reached the 
UN target of a 0.7% ODA/GNI or the OECD/DAC average. Furthermore, Riddell (2008, p. 
55) argues that the main purpose of the USA’s OA is to “protect America’s interest” and 
promote democracy and freedom in the world, as opposed to the World Bank and UN-led 
poverty reduction and economic development.  
 
Figure 2.9: Net official development assistance by Development Assistance Committee 
donor country, 2016 (US$) 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
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Table 2.5: Net official development assistance disbursement, top 10 donor countries 
(1960-2017) 
Donor Total (1960-2017) 
U.S. Dollar, Millions, 2016 
Percentage Share 
(1960-2017) 
The USA 1 170 381.02 24% 
Germany 464 940.02 9% 
France 438 280.14 9% 
Japan 433 198.23 7% 
The UK 361 755.05 4% 
Saudi Arabia 198 066.34 4% 
Netherlands 191 186.64 4% 
Canada 160 748.66 3% 
Italy 152 672.03 3% 
Sweden 131 761.23 3% 
Other donors 1 240 608.99 25% 
      
Non-DAC Countries, Total 410 334.64 8% 
Multilaterals, Total 333 936.76 7% 
EU Institutions 333 936.76 7% 
      
DAC Countries, Total 4 199 326.94 85% 
All Donors, Total 4 943 598.33 100% 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
Table 2.6 summarises the donor effort from 1960 to 2017. The latest donor efforts are compared 
to the UN target and OECD/DAC average in Figure 2.6. The Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden) have been consistently exceeding the UN target of 0.70% from the 
1970s. Other countries that have surpassed this objective over the years include the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, and Germany and the UK have recently reached it (see Figure 2.6). The 
ODA/GNI average for DAC countries in 2016 was 0.32%, and the USA was well below this 
average, at 0.18%. Of note, aid effort for Australia, Belgium, and Canada has been decreasing 
over the last five decades. 
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Table 2.6: Net official development assistance disbursements by all donors 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
2.4.4.4. Sectoral composition of official development assistance 
 
Figure 2.10 illustrates the percentage composition of total sectoral aid in constant 2016 prices. 
It shows that of all the aid disbursed from 1967 to 2016, 35% has gone toward social 
infrastructure and services, which include education, health, water and sanitation, and 
Aid type
Year 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-17 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-17
All Donors, Total 41 310,67 59 895,56 80 061,69 80 760,54 108 549,66 154 727,15 .. .. .. .. .. ..
  DAC Countries, Total 41 114,70 44 641,84 65 516,51 71 706,68 94 909,13 127 554,79 0,47 0,32 0,34 0,27 0,27 0,30
    Australia 991,64 1 564,96 1 846,01 1 838,65 2 340,80 3 482,42 0,51 0,54 0,45 0,32 0,27 0,31
    Austria 87,25 250,51 517,41 489,61 1 138,55 1 170,09 0,08 0,16 0,27 0,19 0,35 0,31
    Belgium 710,40 1 042,78 1 249,46 1 114,37 1 828,73 2 199,94 0,56 0,52 0,52 0,37 0,46 0,49
    Canada 731,63 2 365,02 3 138,48 3 214,08 3 360,90 4 080,95 0,22 0,47 0,46 0,38 0,28 0,29
    Czech Republic .. .. .. 42,42 128,03 207,15 .. .. .. 0,03 0,10 0,12
    Denmark 176,61 731,20 1 352,95 2 070,53 2 384,34 2 452,01 0,17 0,53 0,82 1,00 0,89 0,83
    Finland 31,86 140,33 520,83 640,08 837,25 1 218,94 0,05 0,15 0,40 0,44 0,39 0,52
    France 5 977,23 4 571,41 7 513,73 9 036,45 8 622,09 10 133,89 0,94 0,44 0,56 0,53 0,40 0,42
    Germany 3 816,46 4 996,35 7 475,62 7 939,10 9 312,65 16 192,29 0,40 0,36 0,44 0,33 0,32 0,48
    Greece .. .. .. 211,84 390,95 286,17 .. .. .. 0,15 0,19 0,14
    Hungary .. 122,87 141,49 11,70 88,57 129,92 .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,12
    Iceland .. .. .. 8,99 29,31 42,46 .. .. .. 0,03 0,21 0,24
    Ireland .. 50,40 96,33 190,31 682,33 769,72 .. 0,13 0,21 0,25 0,45 0,41
    Italy 835,74 1 005,36 3 603,76 3 520,03 3 324,04 3 722,85 0,16 0,12 0,28 0,23 0,18 0,20
    Japan 2 132,13 4 283,02 8 539,13 10 653,34 9 895,02 9 771,47 0,23 0,23 0,31 0,27 0,22 0,20
    Korea .. .. 51,70 185,34 590,05 1 749,74 .. .. 0,02 0,03 0,07 0,14
    Luxembourg .. .. 24,11 105,52 301,16 368,26 .. .. 0,15 0,42 0,85 1,00
    Netherlands 749,95 2 023,23 3 431,73 3 825,56 5 033,45 5 068,44 0,41 0,71 0,99 0,83 0,81 0,70
    New Zealand 89,37 204,73 197,39 211,69 315,32 416,43 0,19 0,32 0,27 0,25 0,26 0,26
    Norway 131,27 673,98 1 588,27 2 088,67 2 764,58 3 717,75 0,18 0,62 1,03 0,98 0,90 1,02
    Poland .. 84,96 24,72 15,81 167,55 434,63 .. .. .. 0,01 0,06 0,10
    Portugal .. .. 79,68 368,45 500,91 440,11 .. .. 0,09 0,27 0,28 0,23
    Slovak Republic .. .. .. 16,64 44,21 80,10 .. .. .. 0,04 0,07 0,10
    Slovenia .. .. .. .. 49,63 59,95 .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,14
    Spain .. .. 529,03 1 768,44 3 364,66 2 715,57 .. .. 0,10 0,24 0,31 0,23
    Sweden 264,48 1 304,70 1 964,43 2 209,91 3 393,40 5 049,00 0,19 0,68 0,87 0,86 0,90 1,05
    Switzerland 187,84 515,49 1 017,79 1 494,73 2 028,22 3 029,44 0,08 0,17 0,29 0,33 0,38 0,47
    United Kingdom 3 812,02 4 137,91 3 822,68 4 044,85 8 045,25 15 390,99 0,49 0,42 0,34 0,29 0,39 0,65
    United States 20 400,94 14 696,70 16 825,98 14 576,59 23 998,61 33 174,10 0,51 0,26 0,22 0,14 0,16 0,19
  Multilaterals, Total .. 2 165,71 4 090,23 6 016,05 9 501,38 14 525,37 .. .. .. .. .. ..
    EU Institutions .. 2 165,71 4 090,23 6 016,05 9 501,38 14 525,37 .. .. .. .. .. ..
  Non-DAC Countries, Total 1 959,71 13 088,01 10 454,95 3 037,81 4 139,14 12 646,98 .. .. .. .. .. ..
    Azerbaijan .. .. .. .. .. 13,53 .. .. .. .. .. 0,03
    Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. 46,89 .. .. .. .. .. 0,10
    Croatia .. .. .. .. .. 44,20 .. .. .. .. .. 0,08
    Cyprus .. .. .. .. 30,80 26,20 .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,13
    Estonia .. .. .. 0,57 9,93 29,70 .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,14
    Israel .. .. .. 139,41 157,15 233,16 .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,08
    Kazakhstan .. .. .. .. .. 26,18 .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
    Kuwait .. 1 730,78 1 461,05 573,16 166,30 339,42 .. .. .. .. .. ..
    Latvia .. .. .. .. 11,93 22,00 .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,08
    Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. 21,26 25,35 .. .. .. .. 0,55 0,64
    Lithuania .. .. .. .. 21,10 45,89 .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,12
    Malta .. .. .. .. 12,97 18,10 .. .. .. .. 0,18 0,21
    Romania .. .. .. .. 128,50 160,08 .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,10
    Russia .. .. .. .. .. 656,24 .. .. .. .. .. 0,06
    Saudi Arabia 1 959,71 6 325,02 6 788,59 1 096,26 2 096,60 5 507,01 .. .. .. .. .. ..
    Chinese Taipei .. .. 28,08 94,20 465,47 291,86 .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,07
    Thailand .. .. .. .. 84,80 51,33 .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,01
    Timor-Leste .. .. .. .. .. 3,50 .. .. .. .. .. ..
    Turkey .. .. .. 112,26 384,48 3 600,54 .. .. .. 0,05 0,09 0,46
    United Arab Emirates .. 3 754,24 1 575,19 1 097,98 934,18 3 032,84 .. .. .. .. 0,37 0,86
    Other donor countries .. 1 277,97 624,51 62,87 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ODA % GNI (Percentage)ODA Net Disbursements (US Dollar, Millions, 2016 Conctant Prices)
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governance support. The second largest component (21%) was allotted to economic 
infrastructure and services (e.g. transport, communication, energy, and banking services). The 
third highest amount (15%) was allocated to production sectors (such as agriculture, mining, 
construction, and tourism) and the least, at 6% apiece, comprises allocations related to debt and 
humanitarian aid. 
 
Figure 2.10: Sectoral composition of aid, net disbursement total (1967-2016), constant 
2016 prices 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
Time series data, illustrated in Figure 2.11, demonstrates that the composition of social 
infrastructure and services aid peaked at almost 70% in 1972, declined to an all-time low of 
28% in 1983, and rose again to almost 60% in 2007 before a steady decline to 48% in 2016. 
The marked relative emphasis on aid for social infrastructure and services could be a reflection 
of donors’ realisations that developing countries need to improve their human capabilities 
(Hjertholm & White, 1998). The increase in the proportion of aid dispensed for economic 
infrastructure and services in the 1980s could be because of donors’ support for ESAP; while 
the surge from 2002 to 2016 could be a result of the MDGs and the need to promote economic 
growth. The first spike in action relating to debt in 1990 could be a response to the debt crisis 
which started in the early 1980s. The second spike in 2005 is likely a result of the combined 
debt relief efforts under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) Initiative and the 
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Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in response to the call to accelerate the progress 
towards the MDGs (IMF, 2018).  
 
Figure 2.11: Official development assistance commitments by sector, all donors, constant 
2016 prices (1967-2016) 
 
Source: OECD (2017), DAC statistics 
 
2.4.5. Official development assistance allocation by geographical region and country 
income group 
 
Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 list the historical levels of ODA received by each of the six 
geographical regions and developing country income groups as a percentage of GNI and net 
ODA received per capita respectively. Over the years, SSA has obtained the highest net ODA 
as a percentage of GNI. Among other things, high levels of poverty and lower per capita 
incomes could be the reasons for the high volumes of humanitarian relief aid flowing into the 
region. Though the MENA and ECA regions have been receiving lower levels of net ODA as 
a percentage of GNI, the high pressure from the oil crisis in the early 1990s could have resulted 
in a greater increase in the ratio of ODA per capita in the MENA region. The net ODA as a 
percentage of GNI was generally highest in the 1980s and 1990s. Lastly, least-developed and 
low-income countries tend to receive net ODA as a percentage of GNI compared to lower- and 
middle-income countries.  
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Table 2.7: Net official development assistance received (% of gross national income) 
Region 
Years 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-2014 
East Asia and Pacific 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.83 0.29 0.09 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia  - - - 0.76 0.78 0.56 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 0.98 0.48 0.54 0.43 0.30 0.23 
Middle East and North 
Africa - - - 1.49 1.80 1.07 
South Asia 2.31 1.90 1.65 1.29 0.82 0.66 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.50 2.29 3.96 5.38 4.77 3.12 
  
Least-developed 
countries - - 8.38 10.09 7.95 6.03 
Low income - - 7.95 12.37 12.68 10.77 
Lower-middle income 2.34 2.63 2.24 2.28 1.38 0.89 
Middle income 1.44 1.16 1.08 0.93 0.57 0.29 
Upper-middle income 0.69 0.35 0.42 0.37 0.27 0.10 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
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Table 2.8: Net official development assistance received per capita (current US$) 
Region 
Years 
1960s 1970s 1990s 1990s 2000s 2010-2014 
East Asia and Pacific 0.79 1.63 3.48 4.58 4.41 4.80 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia  1.64 0.99 2.57 11.29 22.57 36.42 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean  3.23 4.17 10.53 11.93 13.88 20.02 
Middle East and North 
Africa 6.61 25.08 33.45 23.37 43.62 57.55 
South Asia 2.31 3.13 5.50 4.11 5.74 9.07 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.91 8.98 26.44 26.06 37.79 50.23 
 
Least-developed 
countries 2.62 9.68 26.44 23.08 34.48 50.41 
Low income 2.93 8.07 24.88 25.38 40.31 60.59 
Lower-middle income 2.66 6.16 10.79 9.71 11.73 16.47 
Middle income 1.89 3.70 7.24 7.38 10.02 12.29 
Upper-middle income 1.02 1.35 3.62 4.50 7.66 6.70 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
The net ODA received per capita trend (Table 2.8) shows that over the indicated period, MENA 
received the highest in per capita net ODA. In the 1960s, the region received $6.61 per capita, 
and the second largest recipient was sub-Saharan Africa, acquiring $3.91 per capita. By 2014, 
these figures increased by 770% and nearly 1 200% for MENA and SSA, respectively. As can 
be expected, the highest supply of aid was to less developed, low-income economies, while at 
occasional times of crisis, more economically developed, high-income countries received aid.  
 
It can also be noted that highly populated regions, such as EAP, have the lowest per capita 
ODA compared to MENA and SSA, for example. The higher per capita ODA could be because 
these regions have relatively lower populations but are receiving high volumes of aid. When 
using the inflation-adjusted figures, a general increase is evident in net ODA per capita across 
all regions between 1960 and 2014. 
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2.5. Regional Dynamics of Poverty and Foreign Aid 
 
2.5.1. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.5.1.1. Extreme poverty trends in the sub-Saharan Africa region 
 
Until recently, data on poverty levels in SSA were scant. Early estimates of poverty for SSA 
were done by Ravallion et al. (1991), Chen et al. (1994), Ravallion and Chen (1997), and Ali 
and Thorbecke (2000, p. 9). Ravallion et al. (1991) developed the “absolute poverty line” of 
around US$1 per day and then used it to estimate the number of people living in absolute 
poverty in 1985. According to this measure, the percentage of people living in absolute poverty 
in SSA was estimated at 46.9%. Chen et al. (1994) used a sample of 14 SSA countries 
(representing approximately 37% of the total population) to estimate the level of poverty 
between 1985 and 1990. The poverty measurement used was a “poverty incidence curve 
(PIC)”10, and the results revealed that poverty increased during this period. Ravallion and Chen 
(1997) used an international poverty line of US$1 per person per day in 1985 PPP to estimate 
the level of poverty in SSA11. They found that poverty increased between 1987 and 1993 based 
on the following two poverty measures: (i) headcount ratio, which increased from 38.5% in 
1987 to 39.1% in 1993, and (ii) the PG, which increased by one percentage point from 14.4% 
to 15.3% over the same period. 
 
Figure 2.12 illustrates the poverty levels in SSA in comparison to global poverty trends based 
on recent data from the World Bank. In 1990, SSA had 288 million people who were living 
below US$1.90 a day, and this number increased to 347 million by 2015. In percentage terms, 
SSA used to be home to 15% of the world’s extremely poor people (living below US$1.90 a 
day), and this increased to almost 50% between the period 1990 to 2015. This shows that while 
                                               
10 According to Ali and Thorbecke (2000, p. 10), a PIC “is generated by plotting the proportion of population (p) 
- on the vertical axis-consuming less than a given level z - on the horizontal axis; each point on the PIC gives the 
headcount index of poverty. Poverty deficit curves O(z) and poverty sensitivity curves 5(z) can be obtained from 
the PICs. Using these curves and assuming that the poverty line z is unknown, comparing poverty between two 
dates is conducted by dates if the PIC for the latter date always lies above that for the former date up to a maximum 
poverty line. If the PIC for the two dates cross, then the ranking is ambiguous. The poverty deficit O(z) and the 
poverty sensitivity 5(z) curves provide second- and third-order dominance respectively. Dominance tests are 
nested in the sense that first-order dominance implies second-order dominance, which in turn implies third-order 
dominance”. 
11 The Ravallion and Chen (1997) study included a sub-sample of 19 SSA countries (with 28 surveys) representing 
65.9% of the region’s population in 1993. 
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other regions are witnessing high numbers of people being lifted out of extreme poverty, more 
families in SSA are being entrapped in poverty.  
 
Figure 2.12: Sub-Saharan Africa poverty levels compared to world trends 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
Figure 2.12 also indicates that the headcount index ratio for SSA was 49.1% in 1981, and it 
peaked at 58% in 1999 before gradually decreasing over the years to an estimated 35.2% in 
2015. At this percentage, the poverty rate is still extremely high compared to the developing 
country average of 11.9% and the world average of 9.6%. It is important to note that the 
developing country headcount index ratio was 53.5% in 1981, over 4 percentage points higher 
than the SSA ratio.  
 
According to the World Bank (1990, p. 5), the increase in poverty in SSA during the 1980s and 
1990s is mainly because of slow economic growth coupled with rapid population growth. 
Perkins et al. (2013) argue that much of the progress in the fight against global poverty, which 
saw the reduction of the world’s headcount index ratio from 44% in 1991 to less than 10% in 
2015, is due to the strong growth recorded in many regions of the world. They concluded that 
“economic growth tends to be good for the poor” (Perkins et al., 2013, p. 193).  
 
Figure 2.13 shows the headcount index (poverty rate), PG (poverty depth) and SPG (poverty-
severity index) for the SSA region over the period 1981 to 2013. The three trend lines are 
calculated at the US$1.90 international poverty line, based on 2011 prices. Furthermore, the 
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headcount index and PG are in percentages, while the SPG, as the name suggests, is a square 
of the PG.  
 
Figure 2.13: Headcount, poverty gap, and squared gap in sub-Saharan Africa (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.13, the headcount, poverty gap, and SPG for SSA started off by 
increasing and peaking in 1993; however, they have been decreasing steadily over the years. 
As indicated above, though the majority of researchers use the headcount index in poverty 
analyses, the measure does not provide an indication of the depth of poverty. The analysis in 
Figure 2.13 is therefore mainly focused on the PG and SPG indices. The higher the PG, the 
deeper the levels of poverty, and therefore the costlier it would be to eliminate poverty.  
 
On the one hand, the PG index for US$1.90 per day increased from 21.46% in 1981 to a high 
of 27.12% in 1993 before gradually falling over the years to 15.95% in 2013. This suggests 
that by 2013, bringing the incomes of the people living below US$1.90 per day to this poverty 
line required a per capita expenditure of almost 16% of the poverty line (which is roughly 
US$0.30). From this analysis, it can be deduced that it now costs less money to eliminate 
poverty compared to the 1980s and early 1990s.  
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The SPG, on the other hand, measures the severity of poverty. It takes values between 0 and 1, 
with higher values indicating severe poverty. As shown in Figure 2.13, the SPG fell from 12.28 
to 8.37. 
 
2.5.1.2. Top ten most improved countries in terms of poverty reduction in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region 
 
The best performing SSA countries in terms of poverty reduction between 1981 and 2013 are 
illustrated in Figure 2.14. On average, the proportion of people living on less than US$1.90 per 
day fell by 12.60 percentage points from 1981 to 2013. The largest decrease in poverty was 
recorded in Cabo Verde (58.59 percentage points), Guinea (57.07), and Uganda (52.37), in 
decreasing order. In total, 29 out of 45 SSA countries recorded a decrease in poverty over the 
study period.  
 
Figure 2.14: Top ten most-improved countries in terms of poverty reduction in the sub-
Saharan Africa region (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
Figure 2.15 shows 10 countries with the lowest levels of poverty rates as measured by the 
headcount poverty ratio at US$1.90 per day. Mauritius had the lowest incidence of poverty 
(0.5%) in 2015, followed by Seychelles (1.06%), and Gabon (6.7%) in third place. Cabo Verde, 
which was ranked first in terms of the most improvement in poverty reduction (Figure 2.14), 
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is number four in terms of the lowest incidence of poverty (6.79%). The country’s headcount 
poverty ratio decreased from a high of 65.38% in 1981 to almost 5% in 2013. Another high 
mover is Sudan which recorded a 30-percentage point decrease from 40.26% in 1981 to less 
than 10% in 2013.  
 
Figure 2.15: Ten countries with the lowest poverty levels in sub-Saharan Africa (1981-
2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
As indicated in Figure 2.15, the South African trend mirrors that of the SSA region (see Figure 
2.13). The headcount poverty index for South Africa rose from 22.02% in 1981 to 33.74% in 
1999, possibly because of the civil conflicts associated with the liberation struggle, and it 
decreased over the years to 16.22% in 2013. Overall, out of the 45 SSA countries, the following 
6, starting with the highest, had headcount poverty ratios of less than 10% in 2013: Sudan 
(9.27%), Mauritania (6.92%), Cabo Verde (6.79%), Gabon (6.7%), Seychelles (1.06%), and 
Mauritius (0.5%).  
 
2.5.1.3. Bottom 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the anti-poverty fight 
 
Figure 2.16 presents the 10 worst-performing countries in SSA in terms of the anti-poverty 
fight. These countries recorded the highest increase in headcount poverty rates between the 
years 1981 and 2013. On average, 16 out of 45 countries recorded an increase in headcount 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
South Africa Comoros Botswana Ghana Sudan
Mauritania Cabo Verde Gabon Seychelles Mauritius
49 
 
poverty rates. This means that the proportion of the number of people living below US$1.90 a 
day has increased in these countries12.  
 
Figure 2.16: Ten worst-performing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.16, the top three worst-performing countries are Liberia (with a 49.91 
percentage point increase in headcount poverty rate), Madagascar (24.85), and Cote d’Ivoire 
(21.26). The main commonality among these three countries is that they have experienced civil 
conflicts and wars during this period. South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and Zimbabwe have also experienced similar challenges to varying degrees. Most of 
these countries are also ranked as the poorest in SSA, as illustrated in Figure 2.17.  
 
                                               
12 The 16 countries are Liberia, Madagascar, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, the DRC, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Togo, Nigeria, Malawi, Rwanda, Comoros, Gabon, Kenya, and the CAR.  
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Figure 2.17: Top 10 poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
As Figure 2.17 shows, the Central African Republic (CAR) had the highest proportion of 
people living below US$1.90 a day, standing at 80.71% in 2013. This was followed by 
Madagascar (78.02%), the DRC (75.89%), Burundi (75.28%), and South Sudan (70.51%), in 
descending order. Out of a total of 45 SSA countries, 15 had more than 50% of their citizens 
living in extreme poverty. As noted above, the majority of the top 10 poorest countries are 
currently experiencing or have recently had civil conflicts.  
 
The overall analysis of extreme poverty has demonstrated that the majority of the world’s 700 
million extremely poor in 2015 were residing in the SSA region. Furthermore, SSA was home 
to most of the deeply poor, and the poverty depth and breadth remain a dominant challenge in 
the region. Although some countries have recorded impressive decreases in poverty levels, 16 
out of 45 countries showed evidence of an increase in the proportion of people living below 
US$1.90 a day. Therefore, the number of people living in extreme poverty is increasing in these 
countries.  
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2.5.1.4. Overview of foreign aid trends in the sub-Saharan Africa region 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.18, per capita aid to SSA – the region that is furthest off track from the 
2015 goals – fell from $35 in 1992 to $20 by the year 2000. On average, the SSA region 
received the highest in aid per capita after MENA over the review period. Both aid per capita 
and ODA as a percentage of GNI peaked sharply around the year 2000. This could the result 
of donors’ responses to the MDGs.  
 
Figure 2.18: Net official development assistance received in sub-Saharan Africa (1960-
2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
Most aid in the SSA region might be coming in response to persistent droughts in the Sahel as 
well as in other Savanna climate countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and the greater part of 
Namibia (Alfaro-Pelico, 2010). One positive sign for the future is that foreign aid is being 
increasingly linked to anti-poverty programmes. For example, in 1970, the World Bank spent 
only 5% of its budget on poverty relief, whereas it now devotes many times that amount to 
poverty-related projects (Kalirajan & Singh, 2009, p. 695). 
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2.5.1.5. Foreign aid graduates in the sub-Saharan Africa region 
 
Since 1970, the DAC List of ODA Recipients13 has undergone some substantial changes which 
reflect the general improvement in global prosperity over the last few decades. According to 
the OECD (2018), from 1970, a total of 17 countries have been added to the list and 60 
countries have graduated from it, mainly because of increases in their per capita income. Of 
the latter countries, 45 graduated between 1991 and 2018, and it is projected that another 24 
countries and territories will graduate by 2030 (Sedemund, 2014). 
 
According to the OECD (2018), the Seychelles graduated from the ODA recipient countries in 
2018, which makes it the first country to do so in the SSA region. Moreover, recent trends are 
suggesting a general decline in aid reliance, especially in countries such as Equatorial Guinea, 
Botswana, and Eritrea. The OECD (2014) estimates that the following countries from the SSA 
region might graduate from foreign aid by 2030: Gabon, Mauritius, and Equatorial Guinea.  
 
2.5.1.6. Top 10 aid-recipient countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region 
 
The SSA region constitutes around 46 countries, and nearly all of them have been relying on 
foreign aid over the years to supplement their budgets. Countries bordering the Sahara Desert 
(the Sahel countries) such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania rely heavily on 
humanitarian aid for food, because the region’s land is fast being claimed by the ever-
advancing Sahara Desert sands (University of Maryland, 2018). Elsewhere, southwards in the 
region, the shift from commercial to subsistence farming has drastically reduced agricultural 
output from countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, meaning that aid is a seasonal pattern to 
supplement food needs (Chirwa & Matita, 2012). Ethiopia was, by the end of 2015, the highest 
receiver of aid ($3.2 billion), while the DRC followed with $2,6 billion, and Tanzania came 
third with $2.5 billion. Kenya and Nigeria occupied the fourth and fifth positions respectively. 
Other top aid-recipient countries in the region are Mozambique (6th), Ghana (7th), South Sudan 
(8th, after it attained independence from North Sudan in 2011), Uganda (9th), and South Africa 
(10th). While these rankings are based on the 2015 aid figures, it is important to note that over 
                                               
13 The list is kept and updated by the OECD: http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-standards/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm  
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the years, general fluctuations have occurred in the top aid-receiving countries. For example, 
in 2003, when the Congo war finally ended, the DRC received the highest ODA in the region.  
 
2.5.1.7. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in the sub-Saharan Africa region 
 
For the majority of countries in SSA, the period from the 1980s to the 1990s was characterised 
by a change of governance from colonial to independent government regimes (Mahembe, 2014; 
Tita & Aziakpono, 2016). Most countries adopted the ESAPs which emphasised the 
liberalisation and opening of the financial sectors, as opposed to government control practised 
by previous regimes (Tita & Aziakpono, 2016, p. 9). 
 
Chart A in Figure 2.19 shows that the ODA per capita increased from 1981 to the early 1990s 
before taking a severe knock in the late 1990s to 2002. Thereafter, this value increased, 
reaching a peak of US$52 per person in 2011. Compared to the ODA/GNI ratio (Chart B), the 
latter seems to closely follow the poverty rate levels. Sub-Saharan Africa has been consistently 
receiving the highest proportion of ODA, as a percentage of own GNI compared to other 
regions. This could be because of the region’s high poverty levels.  
 
Figure 2.19: Headcount poverty and foreign aid trends in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
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2.5.2. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
2.5.2.1. Extreme poverty trends in East Asia and the Pacific  
 
The East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)14 region has recorded the most dramatic fall in the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty in recent history. As displayed in Figure 2.20 
and Figure 2.21, EAP had 80.6% of its people (around 1.1 billion) living at less than US$1.90 
a day in 1981, but by 2010, roughly 10% could be regarded as extremely poor. The region 
transformed itself from being the poorest, with approximately 58% of the world’s poorest 
people in 1981, by lifting more than a billion people out of extreme poverty in three-and-a-half 
decades. By 2015, only around 12% of the world’s poorest were from EAP. The World Bank 
(2016, p. 4) estimates that close to 65 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty in EAP 
between 2012 and 2015. 
 
Figure 2.20: East Asian and Pacific poverty levels compared to world trends ($1.90 a day) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
Figure 2.21 shows the headcount index, PG and SPG for the EAP region for the period 1981 
to 2013 based on the US$1.90 poverty line. These indices have been decreasing dramatically 
in EAP over the years. The poverty headcount index fell from 80.46% in 1981 to 3.54% by 
2013, and the poverty gap fell from 38.23 to 0.66% over the same period. The SPG, which 
measures the severity of poverty, decreased from 21.59 to 0.22. 
                                               
14 The sample of countries in the EAP region is 19, and it includes the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, 
Timor-Leste, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vanuatu, Kiribati, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Fiji, China, Vietnam, Tuvalu, Cambodia, Samoa, Tonga, Mongolia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand.  
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Figure 2.21: Headcount, poverty gap, and squared gap in East Asia and the Pacific 
(US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
According to the World Bank and the IMF (2015), the MDGs could have played a part in the 
fight against poverty in EAP. Their report, titled “Global Monitoring Report 2015/2016: 
Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change” argues that the MDGs were effective 
in EAP in influencing local priorities, shaping national budgets, and protecting social 
expenditures. However, it is important to note that even before the promulgation of the MDGs 
in 2000, the number of poor people in EAP was already decreasing. The EAP region reached 
its MDG 25-year target of “halving the proportion of population below US$1 per day between 
1990 and 2015” in 13 years. The region recorded a fall in the headcount index from 60.23% in 
1990 to 28.95% in 2002 which is a decrease of more than half.  
 
2.5.2.2. Top 10 most-improved countries in terms of poverty reduction in the East Asia and the 
Pacific region 
 
The best performing EAP countries in terms of poverty reduction between 1981 and 2013 are 
illustrated in Figure 2.22. On average, the proportion of people living on less than US$1.90 per 
day in EAP decreased by 34.25 percentage points from 1981 to 2013. The largest decrease in 
poverty, in descending order, was recorded in China (86.47 percentage points), Vietnam 
(78.82), Timor-Leste (78.11) and Indonesia (67.01). In total, 18 out of 19 countries recorded a 
decrease in extreme poverty over the study period except for the Federated States of 
Micronesia.  
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Figure 2.22: Top 10 most-improved countries in East Asia and the Pacific (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
The World Bank and the IMF (2015) argue that the MDGs influenced national development 
planning frameworks in nine EAP countries, including Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Cambodia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, and Vanuatu. However, extreme poverty levels 
in Vanuatu only decreased by 0.31 percentage points, from 14.62% in 1981 to 14.31% in 2013.  
 
2.5.2.3. The influence of China in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
Given the number of people lifted from poverty and the dramatic decrease in poverty levels, 
this sub-section attempts to highlight the key trends in China’s poverty reduction journey. The 
country began its pro-market economic reforms, including market liberalisation from around 
1980 onwards (Ravallion, 2011). By this time, national poverty levels were high – roughly 
88.32% in 1981. One of the key reforms which is credited for the major reduction in poverty, 
particularly in rural areas, was the agriculture reform, known as the ‘Household Responsibility 
System’ (Ravallion, 2011, p. 79). The process included the dismantling of collectives and the 
equitable allocation of all farmland to individual farmers (Ravallion & van de Walle, 1991; 
Ravallion, 2011). Perkins et al. (2013, p 189) summarised the discourse of the country’s 
success by stating that “many observers trace the start of China’s success to the economic 
reforms of the late 1970s, which decollectivized agriculture and encouraged farm households 
to produce and market more of their output, pulling them out of poverty”. 
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The results of these policies are demonstrated in Figure 2.23 and Figure 2.24. Figure 2.23 
shows that in 1981, around 88% of the Chinese population (approximately 878 million people) 
was living on less than US$1 a day, and this has miraculously decreased to 1.85% in just over 
3 decades. The total population living in extreme poverty has decreased by more than 850 
million to approximately 25 million in 2013. This decrease in poverty levels took place despite 
the increase in total population over the same period.  
 
Figure 2.23: Poverty dynamics in China (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
Figure 2.24 compares the headcount poverty levels between rural and urban China. As the 
figure illustrates, 96% of the Chinese residing in rural areas were living in extreme poverty in 
1981, and this proportion decreased by 92 percentage points to 3.38% in 2013. The proportion 
of people living in extreme poverty in urban areas decreased from 59.43% to 0.51% over the 
same period.  
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Figure 2.24: China’s headcount ratio (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)   
 
2.5.2.4. Bottom 10 countries in East Asia and the Pacific in terms of the anti-poverty fight 
 
On average, the bottom 10 poorest countries in the EAP region had around 17% of their 
population living in extreme poverty by the year 2013. As shown in Figure 2.25 below, the 
bottom 3 poorest countries in EAP (in terms of proportion of population living in extreme 
poverty) were the Solomon Islands (33.05%), Papua New Guinea (31.49%), and Timor-Leste 
(21.76%). For Timor-Leste, its headcount ratio was almost 100% for the greater part of the 
1980s, and it began to decrease gradually in the early 1990s before declining sharply from 
80.82% in 1996 to 21.76% in 2013. Though Timor-Leste started as the poorest country in the 
region, it is now ranked third from the bottom after the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 
which are ranked bottom and second from the bottom, respectively.  
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Figure 2.25: Bottom 10 poorest countries in East Asia and the Pacific (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)   
 
In summary, the EAP region has transformed itself from being the poorest region, with more 
than 80% of its population living in extreme poverty in 1981, to one of the richest regions in 
the developing world. By 2015, the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty was 
estimated at 4.1%, which was lower than the developing world average of 11.9%. The largest 
decline in the EAP region is because of China which lifted more than 850 million out of 
extreme poverty between 1981 and 2013. Other large declines were recorded in Vietnam, 
Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and Cambodia.  
 
2.5.2.5. Overview of foreign aid trends in East Asia and the Pacific  
 
The ODA figures for the EAP region generally display a lower fluctuation rate, especially when 
compared to other regions such as ECA. Aid flow seemed to be at its lowest in this region 
around 1965, but then a sharp increase to almost US$10 billion occurred. The late 1970s saw 
another decline in the flow of aid before the figures began to fluctuate over the next three 
decades. By 2015, the net ODA flow had dropped again to U$5 billion, which is roughly similar 
to the 1960 figures.  
 
Figure 2.26 demonstrates that foreign aid to EAP has been increasing from the 1960s; it peaked 
in the early 1990s and has been generally decreasing since. This decrease in aid receipt 
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coincides with the sharp drop in extreme poverty rates, as shown in Figure 2.27 in the next sub-
section. 
 
Figure 2.26: Net official development assistance for East Asia and the Pacific (1960-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
2.5.2.6. Foreign aid graduates in East Asia and the Pacific  
 
Several countries in the EAP region have graduated from reliance on aid since the 1960s. By 
1996, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Singapore had discontinued their reliance on aid, while China’s 
Macau and Korea stopped relying on aid just before the turn of the 21st century. The OECD 
(2014) projects that by 2030, three more countries from the EAP region, namely China, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, will graduate from the “DAC List of ODA Recipients”. 
 
2.5.2.7. Top 10 aid-recipient countries in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
By far, Vietnam has received the highest amount of ODA flows into the EAP region. It received 
US$2.5 billion more than the second-highest country in the region (Cambodia with $677 
million). The third highest in ODA flows is the Philippines, while the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic came fourth and Mongolia fifth. Other countries on the top 10 list are Timor-Leste 
(6th); the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (7th); Thailand (8th); Hong Kong (9th); and 
Macau, China (10th).  
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2.5.2.8. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
Figure 2.27 presents the core movement between the headcount poverty rate, ODA per capita, 
and ODA receipts as a percentage of recipient region GNI in the EAP region. The first chart 
(Chart A) illustrates that the ODA per capita has increased over the years. However, this 
increase did not translate to an increase in the ODA/GNI ratio. This could be because of the 
faster increase in the region’s GNI. Using the second chart (Chart B), with the main indicators 
of poverty and aid in the region, it can be concluded that the dramatic fall in extreme poverty 
in EAP has been accompanied by a corresponding reduction in relative aid allocation. The net 
ODA received (% of GNI) rose from 0.93% in 1981 to 1.16% in 1990 before falling sharply to 
0.09% in 2013.  
 
Figure 2.27: Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in East Asia and the Pacific  
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
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2.5.3. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in Europe and Central Asia 
 
2.5.3.1. Extreme poverty trends in Europe and Central Asia 
 
Table 2.9 and Figure 2.28 show that there was a sharp increase in the poverty measures and the 
number of people in extreme poverty in ECA15 in the 1990s. As noted by Ravallion and Chen 
(1997, p. 10), the ECA countries were undergoing major structural changes during this period 
– they were transitioning from largely planned to market-based economies (Milanovic, 1995). 
Milanovic (1995, p. 10) further illustrated that the main causes of the increase in poverty, 
especially in Poland, were long-term unemployment and low-paying jobs (for those who were 
employed). 
 
Table 2.9: Europe and Central Asia poverty levels compared to world trends ($1.90 a 
day)  
1981 1990 1999 2010 2011 2012 2015 
Share of population below 
$1.90 a day (ECA) 
1.3 1.9 7.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.7 
Share of population below 
$1.90 a day (DCs) 
53.5 44.1 34.3 19.1 16.5 14.9 11.9 
Share of population below 
$1.90 a day (World) 
44 36.9 29.1 16.3 14.1 12.7 9.6 
Millions of people below $1.90 
a day (ECA) 
5.6 8.8 36.8 13.2 11.4 10.1 4.4 
Millions of people below $1.90 
a day (DCs) 
1 982.10 1 948.40 1 751.50 1 119.80 983.3 896.7 702.1 
Millions of people below $1.90 
a day (World) 
1 982.10 1 948.40 1 751.50 1 119.80 983.3 896.7 702.1 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
Overall, the ECA region’s headcount poverty rate was below 2% in the 1980s, rising to almost 
10% in the late 1990s before coming down to an estimated 1.7% in 2015. By 2015, around 4.4 
million people were estimated to be living in extreme poverty, compared to a peak of 36.8 
                                               
15 Our ECA sample consists of 30 countries, namely Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (former Republic of Yugoslav), Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
the Russian Federation, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.  
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million in 1990. The ECA poverty data for the 1980s should, however, be used with caution, 
as the developers of the World Bank PovcalNet database  warned that only a paucity of regional 
survey data was available (Ravallion & Chen, 2010) . 
 
Figure 2.28: Headcount, poverty gap and squared gap in East Asia and the Pacific 
(US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
2.5.3.2. Top 10 most-improved countries in terms of poverty reduction in East Asia and the 
Pacific 
 
Figure 2.29 presents the best performing ECA countries in terms of poverty reduction between 
1981 and 2013. By far, the highest reduction in poverty was recorded in Turkmenistan which 
reduced headcount poverty rates from 55% in 1981 to 2% in 2013 (a 53-percentage point 
reduction). For the other countries that reduced poverty rates over this period, the average was 
1.36 percentage points). In total, 1316 out of 30 ECA regional countries recorded a decrease in 
poverty over the study period. 
 
                                               
16 Please note that only the top 10 countries are illustrated in Figure 2.29.  
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Squared poverty gap 0,16 0,15 0,14 0,18 0,97 1,26 1,3 0,95 0,75 0,41 0,37 0,33 0,31 0,27
Headcount (%) 1,28 1,14 1,16 1,93 5,46 7,3 7,98 6,28 4,98 3,12 2,89 2,64 2,42 2,15
Poverty gap (%) 0,33 0,3 0,3 0,43 1,79 2,41 2,54 1,88 1,54 0,93 0,8 0,72 0,65 0,57
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Figure 2.29: Decrease in poverty rates by country in East Asia and the Pacific (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
Figure 2.30 shows the 10 ECA countries with the lowest levels of poverty as measured by the 
headcount poverty ratio at US$1.90 per day. First, all the countries generally had poverty ratios 
of below 5% in the 1980s, the early 1990s, and from 2008 onwards. Second, they all 
experienced a general increase in poverty during the period from 1993 to around 2000. This 
temporary increase in poverty rates is largely attributed to the “transition”, which involved the 
dismantling of the socialist system and a move towards a market economy (Milanovic, 1995; 
World Bank, 2002; Bezemer, 2006).  
 
Figure 2.30: Ten countries with the lowest poverty levels in East Asia and the Pacific 
(1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
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While all the countries in Figure 2.30 experienced an increase in poverty between 1993 and 
2000, Moldova had the sharpest and highest increase. The World Bank (2002) attributes this 
increase to inequality, lower economic growth, and violence (which also affected parts of 
Macedonia and Romania).  
 
2.5.3.3. Bottom 10 countries in East Asia and the Pacific in terms of the anti-poverty fight 
 
Figure 2.31 depicts the 10 worst-performing countries in ECA in terms of the anti-poverty 
fight. These countries recorded the highest increase in headcount poverty rates between the 
years 1981 and 2013. On average, 16 out of 30 countries recorded an increase in those rates. 
This means that the proportion of people living below US$1.90 a day has increased in these 
countries17.  
 
Figure 2.31: Ten worst-performing countries in East Asia and the Pacific (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
As shown in Figure 2.31, the highest poverty rates in ECA were recorded in Uzbekistan (a 
22.67 percentage point increase), Tajikistan (20.45), and Georgia (8.65). These same countries 
had the highest levels of poverty rates in 2013 (see Figure 2.32).  
 
                                               
17 The 16 countries are: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Albania, 
Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 2.32: Top 10 poorest countries in East Asia and the Pacific (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
The most common characteristics of the poverty trends in ECA are that poverty levels were 
lower in the 1980s to early 1990s; they then rose sharply during the late 1990s up to around 
2002 before beginning to decrease. As briefly discussed in this sub-section, each country had 
its own dynamics, but all the countries generally followed the same journey. For example, 
Turkmenistan was the poorest country in 1981, with over 50% of its citizens living on less than 
US$1 a day; however, by 2013, its fortune had completely changed, with only 2% regarded as 
extremely poor. Uzbekistan, which is considered to be the poorest country in the region 
according to 2013 headcount poverty rates (Figure 2.32), had its poverty rate peaking at 66% 
in 2002 before decreasing by more than half to 23% in 2013. Of concern is Tajikistan, which 
saw its fight from a 60% headcount poverty rate in 1996 to a 7% rate in 2008 reversed to 23% 
by 2013. 
 
2.5.3.4. Overview of foreign aid trends in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
Figure 2.33 displays the major trends in ODA per capita and as a percentage of regional GNI 
for the ECA region from 1960 to 2015. The net ODA per capita started fairly low in the 1960s 
but began to increase sharply in the late 1980s and peaked in the early 2000s. The increase in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s could be a response to the widespread debt crisis in the region. 
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From then, major fluctuations occurred in aid receipts over the next two decades. Between 
2000 and 2002, there was a major peak in aid flowing into the region mainly fuelled by the 
need for nations to meet the MDGs.  
 
Figure 2.33: Net official development assistance for Europe and Central Asia (1960-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
2.5.3.5. Foreign aid graduates in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
By 1996, Cyprus was no longer depending on foreign aid, while 3 years later, Gibraltar received 
its last flows of ODA before the turn of the 21st century. Malta also stopped relying on aid by 
2000. However, by 2015, all central Asian countries depending on aid were still receiving it. 
 
2.5.3.6. Top aid-recipient countries in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
By 2015, the top 10 aid-recipient countries in the ECA region included Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kosovo, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania. It is important to note 
that of the top 10 countries, only 3 European countries were on the list, while the top 6 were 
completely dominated by central Asian countries.  
 
2.5.3.7. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in East Asia and the Pacific 
 
The dynamics of foreign aid and poverty in ECA, as illustrated in Figure 2.34, shows that the 
ODA per capita has been increasing exponentially, and the ODA/GNI ratio (Chart B) has been 
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closely following the poverty rate. This suggests that donors disbursed more OA to ECA when 
the poverty rate was rising, and they began to reduce the allocation amounts when poverty 
levels decreased.  
 
Figure 2.34: Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in Europe and Central Asia 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
2.5.4. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
2.5.4.1. Extreme poverty trends in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean18 was home to approximately 600 million people in 2013, 
and this is estimated to have increased to 638 million by 2016 (World Bank, 2017). As pictured 
in Figure 2.35, the incidence of poverty (poverty rates) in LAC has always been lower than the 
developing world average. The poverty rates fell from 16.15% in 1981 to 5.6% in 2015, and 
the number of people living in extreme poverty decreased from 72 million to 30 million.  
 
                                               
18 Though there are more than 30 countries in this region, our sample size, based on the availability of poverty 
data, consist of 25 countries. These countries include Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. 
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Figure 2.35: Latin America and the Caribbean poverty levels compared to world trends 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
The LAC region’s trends in terms of poverty rate, poverty depth, and the poverty-severity index 
for the period 1981 to 2013 are shown in Figure 2.36. While the three lines indicate a decrease 
in poverty over the study period, the fall in the LAC region is not as dramatic as in EAP and 
SA. Perkins et al. (2013, p. 189) maintain that LAC had limited success in decreasing its 
poverty rate. 
 
Figure 2.36: Headcount, poverty gap, and squared gap in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
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2.5.4.2. Top 10 most-improved countries in terms of poverty reduction in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 
 
Figure 2.37 ranks the top 10 LAC countries in terms of percentage decrease in poverty rates 
between 1981 and 2013. Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and St. Lucia 
managed to reduce poverty rates by more than 30 percentage points. In total, 19 out of 25 LAC 
countries recorded a decrease in poverty over the study period, and the regional average 
decrease was 11.6%.  
 
Figure 2.37: Top 10 most-improved countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (1981-
2013) 
 
 Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
Figure 2.38 portrays the trends for the 10 LAC countries with the lowest poverty rates by the 
year 2013. Only the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and to a lesser extent Panama show 
dramatic success in poverty reduction. The Dominican Republic and Costa Rica managed to 
reduce poverty rates from over 35% in 1981 to around 2% in 2013. The remaining seven 
countries illustrated in Figure 2.38 display a trend from lower incidences of poverty before 
1993 to a gradual increase in the late 1990s up to the early 2000s, before a steady decrease to 
single-digit levels. 
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Figure 2.38: Ten countries with the lowest poverty levels in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
2.5.4.3. Bottom 10 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of the anti-poverty 
fight 
 
Figure 2.39 illustrates that of the 25 LAC countries under review, there was an increase in 
poverty in 6 countries. These countries are Venezuela (6.78 percentage points), Trinidad and 
Tobago (3.41), Uruguay (1.44), Bolivia (1.35), Argentina (1.22), and Paraguay (0.1).  
 
Figure 2.39: Ten worst-performing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (1981-
2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
Figure 2.40 shows the bottom 10 poorest countries in LAC. In 1981, the poorest countries in 
this region were St. Lucia and Haiti, with poverty rates of 67.97 and 60.49% respectively. More 
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than three decades later, the poorest countries were still St. Lucia and Haiti, albeit with the two 
countries having swapped positions. Haiti’s record in poverty reduction is similar to SSA 
countries and is in sharp contrast to its neighbours. It is the only country in LAC out of SSA 
with more than 50% of its citizens living in extreme poverty. The World Bank attributes the 
high poverty levels in Haiti to vulnerability to natural disasters; lower economic growth, 
characterised by high budget deficits and high public expenditures, especially towards 
reconstruction; and high inequality.  
 
Figure 2.40: Bottom 10 poorest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (1981-
2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
Brazil is the largest LAC country, accounting for more than a third of the region’s total 
population. Given Brazil’s importance to the region’s fight against poverty, the poverty 
dynamics in the country are briefly discussed next. Figure 2.41 depicts the country’s poverty 
trends. It shows that Brazil’s fight against poverty has been impressive, as it managed to reach 
the MDG target well ahead of schedule. 
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Figure 2.41: Dynamics of poverty in Brazil (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
Brazil managed to reduce headcount poverty rates from a high of 30% in 1984 to less than 10% 
in 2013, and the total population in absolute poverty decreased from 40 million to less than 10 
million during the same period. However, the 1980s and early 1990s were not easy, as poverty 
levels were rising. Ravallion (2011, p. 84) attributes this to the country’s low economic growth; 
hyperinflation; large fiscal deficits; and general macroeconomic populism which was prevalent 
in the LAC region. Ravallion (2011) further credits the sharp decreases in poverty from the 
mid-1990s to the Bretton Woods induced ESAPs which were characterised by the privatisation 
of state-owned companies, trade liberalisation, fiscal discipline, and macroeconomic stability. 
The country also introduced cash transfer programmes and reformed its social policies to make 
them pro-poor (Ravallion, 2011, p. 86).  
 
2.5.4.4. Overview of the foreign aid trends in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
According to Meyer (2018), the USA has been the largest contributor of foreign aid to a number 
of LAC countries since the 1940s, contributing a total of around US$176 billion (in constant 
2016 dollars) between 1946 and 2016. Most of the aid from the USA to the LAC region in the 
1960s and early 1970s was directed towards anti-poverty initiatives, but with the main aim of 
countering the Soviet Union and Cuban influence (Meyer, 2018, p. 3). As demonstrated in 
Figure 2.42, the net ODA as a percentage of GNI was high during this period. Furthermore, it 
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can be shown that the Soviet Union was important in the allocation of aid, as indicated by the 
sharp decline in ODA as a percentage of GNI from the early 1990s. This is also at the same 
time the Central American conflicts ended (Meyer, 2018).  
 
Figure 2.42: Net official development assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(1960-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
Overall, foreign aid inflows have fluctuated; however, as demonstrated in the ODA per capita 
trend, aid has been generally increasing since the 1990s. Some of the reasons for this increase 
include the influence of large international relief organisations such as the OECD, IDA, the 
Alliance for Progress, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, among others; world debt 
crisis relief (especially in the late 1980s to the early 1990s); recurring natural disasters 
(especially in countries such as Puerto Rico and Haiti); and the spread of democracy (Ocampo 
& Martin, 2003; Meyer, 2018). 
 
2.5.4.5. Foreign aid graduates in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Most of the graduates from foreign aid in the LAC region are small island countries, which are 
former European colonies. For instance, by the early 1990s, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda 
were already issuing aid instead of receiving it. At the start of the 21st century, the British 
Virgin Islands and the Netherlands Antilles had also cut reliance on aid. Furthermore, by 2010, 
Trinidad and Tobago Turks as well as the Caicos Islands also stopped relying on ODA, and 
Chile and Uruguay recently joined the ODA graduation list (OECD, 2018a). Lastly, it is 
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projected that by 2030, another 9 LAC countries will graduate from ODA, namely Antigua and 
Barbuda, Panama, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Suriname, Peru, and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines (OECD, 2014). Furthermore, some countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay have developed to the extent that they are able to offer 
technical assistance and aid to other poorer countries in the LAC region (Meyer, 2018). 
 
2.5.4.6. Top 10 aid-recipient countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
The island of Haiti was at the top of the aid-recipient list in the LAC region, with up to 
US$1.042 billion in ODA receipts in 2015. Cuba received the second-highest ODA amount – 
about half that of the Haiti figure – and Honduras had the third-highest ODA receipts. The 
other two countries in the top five were Nicaragua (4th) and Guatemala (5th), and the rest of the 
countries in LAC were Mexico (6th), the Dominican Republic (7th), Costa Rica (8th), El 
Salvador (9th), and Jamaica (10th).  
 
2.5.4.7. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Figure 2.43 shows the core movement of the poverty rate and ODA in LAC. Chart B indicates 
that ODA/GNI increased in the early 1980s until it peaked at 0.52% in 1987, and it then began 
to decrease, while the poverty rate peaked at 19% in 1984 before decreasing. This demonstrates 
that poverty and aid in LAC followed the same path over the study period.  
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Figure 2.43: Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
2.5.5. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in South Asia 
 
2.5.5.1. Extreme poverty trends in the South Asia region 
 
South Asia19 has achieved more rapid poverty reduction over the past 30 years, even though it 
is still home to approximately a third of the world’s poor. As presented in Figure 2.2 and Figure 
2.3, SA had the second highest poverty rate (54.65%) in 1981after the  EAP – even higher than 
SSA (49.18%) – but it has since managed to reduce this rate to an estimated 13.5% in 2015. 
The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 538 million in 1981 to around 230 
million in 2015 (see Figure 2.44). However, despite this progress, the region still had roughly 
a third of the world’s extremely poor population in 2015.  
 
                                               
19 The sample of countries in South Asia is seven, including India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sri 
Lanka, and Bhutan. 
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Figure 2.44: South Asian poverty levels compared to world trends ($1.90 a day) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
Figure 2.45 shows that the headcount, the poverty gap, and the SPG for SA has been decreasing 
over the years. The severity of poverty in the region, as the PG indicates, shows that absolute 
(extreme) poverty was severe in 1981, estimated at almost 20%. By 1999, the PG had fallen to 
less than 10% and continued to decrease to less than 3% in 2013. The same trend was recorded 
for the SPG which decreased from 7.47 in 1981 to less than 1 in 2013.  
 
Figure 2.45: Headcount, poverty gap, and squared gap in South Asia (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
2.5.5.2. South Asian country poverty dynamics  
 
All seven countries in SA recorded decreases in poverty rates ranging from 17 percentage 
points to 96 percentage points between 1981 and 2013. As shown in Figure 2.46, Bhutan had 
the largest decrease in poverty rates from 97% in 1981 to 1% in 2013. This is a remarkable 
achievement, though its population is less than 1 million people and its impact therefore could 
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not be felt at a regional level. Approximately 183 million people were lifted from absolute 
poverty during the same period in India, 38 million in Pakistan, 11 million in Bangladesh, and 
10 million in Nepal. For the other smaller countries, the number was less than 2.5 million 
people per country.  
 
Figure 2.46: Decrease in poverty rates by country in South Asia (1981-2013) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
As depicted in Figure 2.47, the country with the highest poverty rate in 2013 was India 
(17.03%), followed by Bangladesh (11.7%). All the other countries had single-digit poverty 
rates, ranging from 1% to 7%. The poverty trends in Figure 2.47 indicate that all the SA 
countries recorded sharp declines in poverty rates, except for India and Pakistan, which 
experienced some fluctuations over the years. For example, the poverty rate for Pakistan 
decreased from 63% in 1981 to 18% before rising to almost 30% in 2002, and it then descended 
to 7% in 2013.  
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Figure 2.47: Headcount poverty rate in South Asian countries (US1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
In their review of the effectiveness of the MDGs, the World Bank and the IMF (2015) argued 
that MDGs have influenced national development planning frameworks in Bangladesh, India, 
and Nepal, and they attributed the fall in poverty to these policies. Furthermore, as in EAP, 
where the region’s success in fighting poverty was mainly driven by China, the SA region is 
also dominated by India which. India constituted approximately 80% of SA’s total population 
in 2013. 
 
Figure 2.48 compares the headcount poverty rates for urban and rural areas in India. The figure 
demonstrates that both rural and urban areas have experienced sharp declines in poverty rates 
over the years, with steeper declines in rural areas. During this period, India managed to lift 
more than 180 million people out of extreme poverty. Despite this progress, 218 million people 
were still living on less than US$1 a day in 2013.  
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Figure 2.48: India’s headcount ratio (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
2.5.5.3. Overview of foreign aid trends in South Asia 
 
Historically, the SA region has not been a major recipient of foreign aid. However, soon after 
the 9/11 event, the USA and other western countries began to disburse more aid to the region. 
The main aid motives were generally political, including combating terrorism, advancing 
bilateral military agreements, combating socio-economic and political instability and trying to 
reduce extremism (Lum, 2008). This explains the increase in U.S.A. aid disbursements to 
countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Natural disasters such as earthquakes; tsunamis; 
and heavy rains in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh have also attracted humanitarian 
assistance in the SA region.  
 
Overall, foreign aid receipts in the SA region have fluctuated as shown in Figure 2.49. In 
addition, as indicated above, the main motives for aid in the region have been humanitarian 
and political in nature. However, terrorism has led to rethinking to include anti-poverty 
initiatives and developmental aid. This has been cemented by the introduction of the MDGs.  
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Figure 2.49: Net official development assistance for South Asia (1960-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
2.5.5.4. Foreign aid graduates in South Asia 
 
As at 2015, all countries in the region relying on aid have not yet discontinued receiving it. For 
countries such as Bangladesh, yearly floods and famine make it difficult for them to cut all aid 
ties. Moreover, Bangladesh, India, and Afghanistan have to deal with the problem of citizens’ 
limited access to basic resources, which are often challenging for governments to address on 
their own, hence the need for developmental aid to support poor families in becoming self-
reliant. 
 
2.5.5.5. Top 10 aid-recipient countries in South Asia 
 
There are only eight SA countries in the present study’s sample. Of these countries, 
Afghanistan was the leading receiver of ODA in 2015 (US$4.2 billion). In the same year, India 
was the second-largest receiver ($3.1 billion). However, India has been the largest receiver, 
above Afghanistan, since the 1960s into 2003. The other top aid receivers in the region are 
Bangladesh (3rd at US$2.6 billion, fuelled by persistent natural disasters), Georgia (4th), 
Armenia (5th), Bhutan (6th), and Azerbaijan (7th).  
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2.5.5.6. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in South Asia 
 
Chart B in Figure 2.50 illustrates that when headcount poverty was approximately 55% in 1981, 
the region was receiving aid equivalent to 2% of its GNI. As this aid sharply decreased over 
the years, the ODA/GNI also followed the same path. This suggests that aid in SA was 
responsive to poverty levels. 
 
Figure 2.50: Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in South Asia 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a) and World Bank (2017) 
 
2.5.6. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
2.5.6.1. Extreme poverty trends in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
The MENA20 region was estimated to have a population of around 412 million people in 2016 
(World Bank, 2017). It is a fairly small region, with only five countries in this study’s sample, 
namely Djibouti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, and the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
As portrayed in Figure 2.51, absolute poverty levels in MENA have generally been low. This 
is partly because of the abundance of oil in the region. The proportion of people living in 
                                               
20 North African countries include Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Middle East countries are 
Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. 
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extreme poverty was 12.26% in 1981 and fell dramatically to 0.66% in 2013. The region 
managed to reach its MDG target of halving extreme poverty in less than 20 years.  
 
Figure 2.51: Headcount, poverty gap, and squared gap in the Middle East and North 
Africa (US$1.90) 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a)  
 
2.5.6.2. Overview of foreign aid trends in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
The main foreign aid trends and flows to MENA are presented in Figure 2.52. Since the 1970s, 
the MENA region has been the world’s largest recipient of ODA per capita – the third largest 
global recipient of total aid after SSA and EAP (Harrigan, 2011). The main drivers of aid to 
the region are geopolitics, commercial considerations (such as oil), responses to regional 
conflicts, and anti-terrorism (Yousef, 2004; Harrigan, 2011; Middle East Monitor, 2017). 
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Squared poverty gap 1,12 0,64 0,83 0,53 0,32 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,22 0,1 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,06
Headcount (%) 12,26 8,45 9,58 5,88 4,35 4,55 4,6 3,81 3,13 1,33 0,96 0,8 0,73 0,66
Poverty gap (%) 3,09 1,92 2,29 1,36 0,91 0,86 0,87 0,81 0,65 0,29 0,21 0,18 0,17 0,15
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Sq
ua
re
d 
po
ve
rt
y 
ga
p
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
84 
 
Figure 2.52: Net official development assistance for the Middle East and North Africa 
(1960-2015) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
 
Given the importance of this region in geopolitics, it became a battleground between Russia 
and the USA during the Cold War. The main motives for aid in this region were economic 
development (poverty reduction), the influence of ideologies in receiving countries, and the 
furthering of other political interests (Harrigan, 2011). In recent years, in response to the 
MDGs, ODA to the region has been increasing despite the fact that MENA is generally a rich 
region. Aid in this territory was mostly targeted at ensuring that all citizens in countries had 
access to basic human needs such as food, water and sanitation services, education and general 
well-being such as respect for human rights and freedom. 
 
2.5.6.3. Foreign aid graduates in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
A significant number of foreign aid graduates from aid exist in the MENA region. In the late 
90s, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Kuwait hardly relied on aid. 
However, countries such as Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia only stopped receiving aid more 
recently in 2005. 
 
2.5.6.4. Top 10 aid-dependent countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
In these regions, Syria had the highest in total aid receipts by 2015 (US$4.9 billion), while 
Egypt was second (US$2.5 billion) and Jordan third, with US$2.1 billion in aid receipts. The 
top five are also made up of the West Bank and Gaza strip (fourth) and Yemen (fifth). Other 
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countries in the top list are Morocco (6th), Iraq (7th), Lebanon (8th), Tunisia (9th), and Libya 
(10th).  
 
2.5.6.5. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
Though all four countries witnessed dramatic falls in poverty over the study period, Djibouti’s 
poverty rate increased by 21.46 percentage points. By 2013, almost 23% of the small group of 
about 820 000 people, were living in conditions described as extreme poverty. Figure 2.53 
shows that overall, the MENA region continues to receive a higher proportion of aid compared 
to its poverty levels.  
 
Figure 2.53: Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa 
 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
2.5.7. Poverty and foreign aid dynamics in selected countries 
 
Table 2.10 lists the top countries in terms of poverty rate reduction. Bhutan, China, Vietnam, 
and Timor-Leste, in ascending order, have recorded the highest poverty rate reductions of 
above 70 percentage points between the period 1981 and 2013. Bhutan managed to reduce its 
headcount poverty rate from a high of 95% to around 1% in the same period. Thirty-five per 
cent of the countries in Table 2.10 are from SSA, 30% from EAP, and 25% from SA. For the 
SSA region, the largest decreases in poverty were recorded in Cabo Verde (58.59 percentage 
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points), Guinea (57.07), and Uganda (52.37). In total, 29 out of 45 SSA countries recorded a 
decrease in poverty over the study period. 
 
Table 2.10: Top 20 most-improved countries in reducing poverty (1981-2013)  
Headcount poverty rate (%) Net ODA received (% of GNI) 
Country Region 1981 2013 Change 
(1981-2013) 
1981 2013 Average 
(1981-2013) 
Bhutan SA 95.36 1.38 -95.54 7.84 8.89 14.86 
China EAP 88.32 1.85 -86.47 0.10 0.00 0.24 
Vietnam EAP 82.00 3.18 -78.82 0.00 2.62 3.50 
Timor-Leste EAP 99.87 21.76 -78.11 0.00 5.54 16.56 
Nepal SA 75.31 8.46 -69.90 7.72 4.22 7.93 
Indonesia EAP 76.84 9.83 -67.01 1.33 0.01 0.88 
Cabo Verde SSA 65.38 6.79 -58.59 39.66 14.19 26.18 
The Maldives SA 54.62 4.67 -58.07 0.00 1.71 7.05 
Guinea SSA 92.71 35.64 -57.07 0.00 9.85 9.40 
Pakistan SA 62.76 6.99 -56.21 3.56 0.88 2.07 
Turkmenistan ECA 54.81 2.06 -52.75 0.00 0.11 0.70 
Uganda SSA 87.01 34.64 -52.37 7.21 7.04 11.26 
Swaziland SSA 90.94 41.06 -49.88 0.00 2.37 2.48 
Chad SSA 79.54 34.90 -44.64 6.22 3.83 10.70 
Cambodia EAP 45.69 1.69 -44.00 0.00 5.80 9.37 
Botswana SSA 54.10 13.04 -41.06 10.40 0.62 3.89 
Burkina Faso SSA 85.62 45.11 -40.51 11.45 9.60 13.14 
Lao PDR EAP 54.33 15.09 -39.24 0.00 4.35 11.18 
India SA 53.25 17.03 -39.15 1.01 0.11 0.47 
St. Lucia LAC 67.97 29.30 -38.67 5.49 2.04 3.88 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
 
In the EAP region, the largest decreases in poverty were recorded in China (86.47 percentage 
points), Vietnam (78.82), Timor-Leste (78.11), and Indonesia (67.01) in decreasing order. In 
total, 18 out of 19 countries recorded a decrease in poverty over the study period with the 
exception of the Federated States of Micronesia. The World Bank and the IMF (2015) argue 
that the MDGs influenced national development planning frameworks in nine EAP countries, 
including Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
87 
 
Mongolia, and Vanuatu. However, extreme poverty levels in Vanuatu only decreased by 0.31 
percentage points from 14.62% in 1981 to 14.31% in 2013. 
 
China’s remarkable progress is regarded as a world miracle, as the country lifted almost 200 
million people during this period, recording a reduction in the poverty rate from 88% to less 
than 2%. Given the number of people lifted from poverty and the dramatic decrease in poverty 
levels, the key trends in China’s poverty reduction journey are highlighted next. China began 
its pro-market economic reforms, including market liberalisation, from around 1980 onwards 
(Ravallion, 2011). At this time, the national poverty levels were high, around 88.32% in 1981. 
One of the key reforms, which is credited for the major reduction in poverty, particularly in 
rural areas, was the agriculture reform, known as the Household Responsibility System 
(Ravallion, 2011, p. 79). The process included the dismantling of collectives and the equitable 
allocation of all farmland to individual farmers (Ravallion & van de Walle, 1991; Ravallion, 
2011). Perkins et al. (2013, p 189) summarised the discourse of China’s success by stating that 
“many observers trace the start of China’s success to the economic reforms of the late 1970s, 
which decollectivized agriculture and encouraged farm households to produce and market 
more of their output, pulling them out of poverty”. It is important to note that the levels of net 
ODA received (% of GNI) in China were low throughout the study period, averaging at 0.24%.  
 
As with China, India and Brazil helped their respective regions pull the majority of people out 
of extreme poverty. During this period, India managed to lift more than 180 million people out 
of extreme poverty. However, despite this progress, 218 million Indians were still living on 
less than US$1 a day in 2013. Brazil’s fight against poverty, on the other hand, has been 
impressive. It managed to reach the MDG target well ahead of schedule. The country reduced 
headcount poverty rates from a high of 30% in 1984 to less than 5% in 2013, and the total 
population in absolute poverty decreased from 40 million to less than 10 million during the 
same period. However, the 1980s and early 1990s were not easy, as poverty levels were rising. 
Ravallion (2011, p. 84) attributes this to the country’s low economic growth; hyperinflation; 
high fiscal deficits; and general macroeconomic populism, which was prevalent in the LAC 
region. Ravallion (2011) further credits the sharp decreases in poverty from the mid-1990s to 
the Bretton-Woods-induced ESAPs, which were characterised by the privatisation of state-
owned companies, trade liberalisation, fiscal discipline, and macroeconomic stability. Brazil 
also introduced cash transfer programmes and reformed its social policies to make them pro-
poor (Ravallion, 2011, p. 86).  
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Table 2.11: Worst-performing countries, poverty increased (1981-2013)  
Headcount Poverty Rate (%) Net ODA received (% of GNI) 
Country Region 1981 2013 Change 
(1981-2013) 
1981 2013 Average 
(1981-2013) 
Liberia SSA 4.17 54.08 49.91 10.41 35.52 31.08 
Madagascar SSA 53.17 78.02 24.85 5.42 4.35 10.33 
Uzbekistan ECA 0.5 23.17 22.67 0.00 0.49 0.82 
Djibouti MENA 1.06 22.52 21.46 0.00 0.00 16.53 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
SSA 4.1 25.36 21.26 1.85 7.64 5.06 
Tajikistan ECA 2.11 22.56 20.45 0.00 3.77 7.84 
Guinea-
Bissau 
SSA 48.22 67.32 19.10 47.44 9.15 35.78 
The DRC SSA 60.85 75.89 15.04 3.02 10.25 9.22 
Zambia SSA 47.07 60.5 13.43 8.06 4.00 15.60 
Zimbabwe SSA 4.04 17.47 13.43 1.64 7.70 5.44 
Togo SSA 40.02 51.9 11.88 9.21 7.02 10.16 
Nigeria SSA 38.37 49.74 11.37 0.06 0.48 0.98 
Georgia ECA 2.84 11.49 8.65 0.00 4.14 5.69 
Venezuela, 
RB 
LAC 1.27 8.05 6.78 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Malawi SSA 66.53 70.3 3.77 12.84 20.75 19.83 
Rwanda SSA 57.13 60.34 3.21 12.13 13.52 19.35 
Comoros SSA 10.77 13.96 3.19 32.17 15.24 19.06 
Gabon SSA 3.69 6.7 3.01 1.34 0.50 1.53 
Source: World Bank (2016a, 2017) 
Table 2.11 lists countries that have fared poorly in terms of the fight against poverty. In fact, 
poverty levels have increased by at least 3 percentage points in each of the 18 countries listed. 
More than 70% of these worst-performing countries are in the SSA region, with the weakest-
performing country being Liberia, which has been receiving the highest proportion of 
ODA/GNI.  
 
Furthermore, an analysis of poverty rate levels by the population of people living on less than 
U$1.90 a day reveals that around three-fifths of the world’s extreme poor are concentrated in 
only five countries, namely Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, India, and 
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Nigeria. Moreover, the top 10 poor countries in terms of the population in extreme poverty 
consist of slightly more than 70% of the world’s extreme poor. Other countries in the top 10 
include Ethiopia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Pakistan, and Tanzania.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to discuss the dynamics and trends of poverty and 
foreign aid at a global and regional level. With regard to poverty, the chapter discussed the 
causes of, definitions, measurements, and spread of poverty in the developing world in general 
and the regional poverty reduction dynamics. The chapter described the three broad 
approaches to the measurement of poverty, namely the capability, assets-based, and 
multidimensional poverty measures. The description included the differences between the 
three, their corresponding indicators, and the advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
The study then settled for the assets-based income or monetary indicators of poverty. This 
was because they were deemed to be simple, transparent, and widely used by the UN, the 
World Bank, and other development institutions for global poverty measurements and the 
determination of foreign aid allocation (Deaton, 2010, p. 6).  
 
With regard to foreign aid, this chapter also provided a global overview in terms of its history, 
volumes, and the main bilateral donors. In addition, the trends and co-movement of extreme 
poverty and foreign aid were also presented, paying particular attention to regional dynamics 
and the developing world’s status in meeting the MDGs and prospects for the SDGs.  
 
The main finding from Chapter 2 is that the developing world has become increasingly 
prosperous. Some important points in line with this finding will now be briefly summarised. 
First, overall, global headcount poverty rates (at US$1.90 a day) decreased considerably from 
approximately 44% in 1981 to less than 10% in 2015. For the developing world, the poverty 
rate decreased from 53% to 11.9% over the same period. A trend analysis of poverty by regions 
revealed that the composition of global poverty across regions has changed significantly. EAP 
registered a dramatic decline which has been described as miraculous (Quibria, 2002). This 
region was the poorest in the world, with more than 80% of its population living on less than 
US$1.90 a day; however, it reduced this rate to 4% by 2015. Poverty rates in SA have also 
been declining, but not as sharply as in the EAP region, and the rates remain higher than the 
developing country average. SSA on the other hand saw a steady increase in poverty rates 
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between the 1980s and 1990s before a gradual turn; nevertheless, it remains the poorest region 
with more than 35% of its citizens living on less than US$1.90 a day. Half of the world’s 
extremely poor people are now increasingly concentrated in the SSA region, where poverty 
depth and breadth remain a challenge. The growing global share of the SSA region reflects 
slower poverty reduction amid rapid population growth (World Bank, 2016, pp. 5-6). These 
recent trends demonstrate that poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated in SSA and SA 
regions, where its depth and breadth remain a challenge (World Bank, 2016b, p. 1). 
 
Second, at a global level, the world met the MDG target of halving the global poverty rate from 
the 1990 levels by 2015. In 1990, there were around 1.9 billion people living below $1.90 a 
day (constituting 36.9% of the world population) and this number is projected to have reduced 
to 700 million people, with an estimated global poverty rate of 9.6%. Therefore, the world met 
the MDG target in 2010, which is 5 years ahead of schedule. This fall, however, was not 
uniform across regions and time periods. SSA is the only region which has not met its MDG 
target. It remains the poorest region, with more than 35% of its citizens living on less than 
US$1.90 a day and housing around half of the world’s extremely poor people by the year 2015. 
 
Third, the total annual ODA reached approximately US$170.32 billion per year in 2015 
(OECD, 2017). By 2013, it was estimated that total foreign aid since 1960 had amounted to 
US$4.7 trillion, in 2013 prices. However, the proportion of ODA to other capital flows in 
developing countries which used to be around 55% in the 1960s has since decreased to around 
30% in recent years. Private flows, which include FDI and commercial bank loans have instead 
grown from 29% to 57% over the same period. Nevertheless, foreign aid still remains one of 
the most important tools in donors’ foreign policy mix and a vital source of funds for 
development in recipient countries. This study has documented that even though the motives 
of foreign aid allocation have changed over the last five decades, the promulgation of the 
MDGs firmly positioned poverty reduction at the centre of foreign aid allocation.  
 
Forth, it was also noted that although a number of policymakers and academics still criticise 
foreign aid, roughly 60 countries have graduated from the DAC List of ODA recipients since 
1970, mainly as a result of increases in their per capita income. It was found that between the 
period 1970 and 2017: (i) a total of 17 countries have been added to the ODA list, including 
South Sudan  in 2011;  (ii) 60 countries have graduated from the list, mainly due to increases 
in their per capita income; (iii) out of these 60 graduates, 45 graduated between 1991 and 2018; 
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and (iv) it is projected that another 24 countries and territories will graduate by 2030.. The first 
graduate from the SSA region is the Seychelles in 2018.  
 
The results of an exploratory review in this chapter suggest that a number of countries have 
prospered over the years and have therefore not been made worse by foreign aid. Global 
poverty represented by headcount poverty rates (at US$1.90 a day) has been decreasing 
considerably from around 44 percent in 1981 to less than 10 percent in 2015. 
 
Fifth, the analysis of the co-movements of foreign aid and extreme poverty suggests that, on 
average, more foreign aid has been allocated to poorer regions, and as the poverty rates 
decreased, foreign aid disbursements also decreased. Given that the world met the MDG target 
well ahead of schedule, the increasing rate at which many developing countries are graduating 
from reliance on foreign aid (because of increases in their per capita income), and the renewed 
focus of aid on poverty as per the SDGs, a number of developing countries are forecasted to 
reach the “zero extreme poverty” target by 2030. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN AID AND POVERTY 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The foregoing chapter discussed the dynamics of poverty and foreign aid in developing 
countries. This chapter describes in detail the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship and impact of foreign aid and/or poverty. The theoretical sections of the chapter 
explore the theoretical links and transmission mechanisms through which foreign aid affects 
poverty, and they present some major debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
development in general and poverty reduction in particular. Topical discussions on the aid-
growth-poverty nexus, such as development theories, “Dutch-disease”, “aid fungibility”, 
“poverty traps”, and the “micro-macro paradox”, among others – are discussed in detail. The 
empirical section highlights tropical studies on the effectiveness of foreign aid in poverty 
reduction and the causal relationships between these two main variables.  
 
Section 3.2 presents the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty, while the channels 
through which foreign aid affects poverty are discussed in Section 3.3. The significant debate 
on the effectiveness of foreign aid is depicted in Section 3.4. Then, Section 3.5 provides a 
picture of the main empirical literature, and Section 3.6 offers a critique of existing literature. 
Thereafter, Section 3.7 summarises the main findings from the literature review before Section 
3.8 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2. Theoretical Link between Foreign Aid and Poverty 
 
The study of foreign aid by economists began in the 1950s, though aid was still a fairly new 
phenomenon, having been officially formalised in 1947. Earlier theorists suggest that foreign 
aid provides the necessary capital to boost developing countries into self-sustaining economic 
growth (Nurske, 1953; Lewis, 1954). McGillivray et al. (2006) noted that there was no 
empirical research assessing the impact of foreign aid in the 1950s. This section therefore 
deliberates the major development economics theories which have been used to justify the 
importance of aid for development. Some of these theories were also used to estimate the total 
amount of foreign aid required (aid allocation) and to evaluate the effectiveness thereof. 
93 
 
3.2.1. Vicious and virtuous circles 
 
Some development theorists such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Murphy et al. (1993) and Galor 
and Zeira (1993) began by investigating why some poor countries were failing to grow and 
why poverty seemed to be self-reinforcing (Schaffner, 2014). It was suggested that 
underdevelopment and poverty were perpetuated by one or more “vicious circles”, which had 
the effect of preventing growth and confining the economy to a low-income or “poverty trap” 
(Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 109). On the other the hand, “virtuous circles” were thought to 
be opposing forces that promote growth by setting into motion self-reinforcing, income-raising 
systems that work through “circular and cumulative causation” (Myrdal, 1957; Fujita, 2004).  
 
According to Clunies-Ross et al. (2009, p. 109), “a typical vicious circle would see initial low 
productivity levels leading to low per capita income levels – which place a very low ceiling on 
attainable levels of savings – which, in turn, rule out the new capital investment needed to 
improve productivity. The economy is stuck in low-productivity, low-income trap”. Therefore, 
the vicious and virtuous circles theory can be termed the poverty trap model (Murphy et al., 
1989). These theories suggest that a wide range of overlapping vicious circles can hinder 
attempts by the poor to climb out of poverty, thereby impairing national growth performance 
(Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 110). It is further argued that the consequences of poverty may 
inhibit people from breaking out of it. Many economists argued for a “special effort to push 
the economy over a threshold into a region where sustained increase in per capita incomes is 
possible” (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 111). According to Solow (1970), there was a need for 
“a major burst of investment [to] lift the system into a self-generating expansion of income and 
capital per head”21. 
 
Increasing the rate of investment was therefore suggested as the means to grow and break the 
poverty trap. It was argued that developing countries needed a “big push” to free themselves 
from the constraints of the low-level trap (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). 
It was also further argued that efforts to promote growth would be most successful if 
accompanied by simultaneous attempts to reduce poverty and improve income distribution. 
Foreign aid would provide the much-needed increase in investment. The main argument was 
that foreign aid “jump starts economic growth, and initiates a virtuous cycle whereby 
                                               
21 As quoted from (Clunies-Ross, et al., 2009, p. 112). 
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investment generates income and thus raises the economic return to further investment” 
(Shleifer, 2009, p. 381). 
 
3.2.2. Stages of economic growth theory 
 
The “stages of economic growth theory” is commonly associated with Rostow (1960 and 
1990). The theory argues that all countries pass through a series of “stages” as they develop. 
The initial stage is the traditional society, which is characterised by lower economic growth 
rates, with more than 75% of the population involved in agricultural activities. The second 
stage is termed the transitional stage, which involves an increased efficiency of agriculture and 
a general modernisation of the economy. The third and more critical stage in the development 
process is take-off. The take-off is assumed to be a result of a sharp increase in the level of 
savings and investment22, the availability of these funds for entrepreneurs, and the adoption of 
modern production technologies (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, pp. 116-117). The fourth and final 
stages are a drive to maturing and high mass consumption, respectively. This theory was, for 
some time, widely accepted as the “road map” of the development process for poor countries 
(Clunies-Ross et al., 2009) and the justification for foreign aid to help poor countries to take-
off. According to Easterly (2006, pp. 24-25), Rostow (1960) declared that “an increase of $4 
billion in external aid would be required to lift all of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America into regular growth, at an increase of per capita income say, 1.5 percent per annum”.  
 
3.2.3. The Harrod-Domar model and gap models 
 
According to Easterly (1997), the Harrod-Domar model is the most widely model applied by 
development economists and aid policymakers to determine the amounts of aid to be allocated 
to developing countries. This model is an extension of the Keynesian analysis of the economic 
growth model by Harrod (1939 and 1948) and a similar but independent study by Domar 
(1946). The Harrod-Domar equation or relationship is illustrated in Equation 3.1.  
𝑔 =  𝑠 𝑣⁄  [3.1] 
 
 
                                               
22 According to Clunies-Ross et al. (2009), this could be from around 5% to well over 10% of GNI.  
95 
 
where 
 𝑔 is the rate of growth of income (output) in the economy;  
 𝑠 is the savings ratio or rate of savings (which is assumed to be equivalent to available 
savings); and 
 𝑣 is the capital-output ratio.  
 
There are three main assumptions of the model. First, an excess supply of labour exists in the 
economy; second, economic growth is only constrained by the availability and productivity of 
capital; and third, the availability of capital (level investment) is determined by the level of 
savings (McGillivray et al., 2006, p. 1033).  
 
Although it was not the original intention of the creators of the model, development economists 
used the Harrod-Domar relationship to estimate the savings and investment requirements for 
specific rates of economic growth (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). For example, once the capital-
output ratio can be estimated accurately, it would be possible to predict the growth rate, given 
the current savings rate. The savings rate to achieve a targeted growth rate could be equally 
well estimated. Given that the capital-output ratio (𝑣) was assumed to be constant, the main 
policy implication was that the higher the savings (investment ratio), the higher the growth rate 
would be (Hussain, 2001). 
 
The implication for foreign aid allocation was that if the savings rate is too low (which has 
been the case for most developing countries), given the preferred rate of economic growth, then 
there is a “financing gap” which needs to be filled to achieve the desired rate of growth23. The 
total required investment was compared with available domestic savings to determine the 
investment gap and the level of foreign resources that would be required to fill the finance gap. 
Foreign aid could be used to ease the savings constraint, increase the level of available 
investment and therefore boost the rate of growth and ultimately poverty reduction 
(McGillivray et al., 2006).  
 
                                               
23 The starting point of the two-gap analysis was that developing countries are constrained by a dearth of capital 
for investment because of a shortfall in savings. The level of savings available in developing countries was 
assumed to be below the level required to achieve the target level of growth (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 119).  
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Chenery and Bruno (1962) and Chenery and Strout (1966) extended the Harrod-Domar model 
from the original “savings-investment gap” to include the “foreign exchange gap”. It became 
known as the “two-gap or dual-gap model”. According to Hussain (2001, p. 2), the World Bank 
computerised the Chenery’s version of the Harrod-Domar model.  Easterly (1997) argued that 
this version (and its similar updates) were used by around 90% of country economists in the 
World Bank to make economic growth and resource requirement predictions. The foreign 
exchange gap was premised on the notion that in order for developing economies to grow at 
acceptable rates, the importation of significant quantities of capital goods and other essential 
inputs for production are necessary (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009). It was further argued that 
developing countries do not have the export earnings to acquire these capital goods for 
investment (McGillivray et al., 2006). Even with sufficient funds to finance the investment 
gap, the foreign exchange gap was argued to be “binding” and could retard growth rates. An 
important assumption for this two-gap model was that local savings could not be easily turned 
into foreign exchange, at least in the short term. Foreign aid would thus play a dual role: 
augmenting the amount of resources available for investment and providing the much-needed 
foreign exchange.  
 
Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1990, 1994) identified a third gap: the “fiscal gap”. The main 
argument was that some developing countries’ governments do not have the “revenue raising 
capacity to cover the desired level of investment” (McGillivray et al., 2006, p. 1034). 
Therefore, foreign aid given directly to recipient governments could potentially ease the fiscal 
gap provided that the aid is used for investment purposes.  
 
In summary, the Harrod-Domar and the gap models were used to justify the importance of aid 
to developing countries. Using the three-gap models (the savings-investment, the foreign 
exchange, and the fiscal balance gap), it was argued that foreign aid would supplement low 
savings and therefore increase the level of investment funds, provide the foreign exchange 
needed for the importation of crucial capital goods and inputs and boost domestic revenues. 
The overall aim was to raise savings and investments, which were assumed to be key for 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. Early studies on aid effectiveness 
investigated the impact of aid on savings and investment and assumed that “one dollar of 
foreign aid will increase savings and investment by one dollar and therefore lead to increases 
in growth” (McGillivray et al., 2006, p. 1034).  
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The Harrod-Domar models have been criticised for being too rigid and unrealistic. For 
example, the models assume that the marginal propensity to save and the capital-output ratio 
are constant, even in the long run. The harshest critic of the Harrod-Domar and the gap models 
was Easterly (1997). He asserts that “Domar’s model was not intended as a growth model, 
made no sense as a growth model, and was repudiated as a growth model forty years ago by 
its creator” (Easterly, 1997, p. 2). Hussain (2001) supported this assertion and developed an 
alternative model, which is explained in the following sub-section. Despite the criticism, 
Masud and Yontcheva (2005) argued that the Harrod-Domar model and the two-gap model by 
Chenery and Strout (1966) remain the most influential theoretical underpinnings of the AEL. 
 
3.2.4. The Thirlwall-Hussain model 
 
The Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) model, also known as the balance of payments or constrained 
growth model is based on Thirlwall’s law24 (Thirlwall, 1979). This states that the rate of growth 
of any open economy is equal to its export volume growth divided by the income elasticity of 
demand for imports (Thirlwall , 1979). Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) extended this law and 
showed the effects on economic growth emanating from an initial imbalance in the current 
account, terms of trade, and capital inflows. This extended model can be used to forecast 
growth, measure the “financing gap”, formulate policy advice, and offer indicators for 
estimating the development effectiveness of foreign aid (Hussain, 2001). 
 
Unlike neo-classical growth theories, which are supply-side models, the one by Thirlwall and 
Hussain (1982) is a demand-side model. It postulates that the main binding limitation on growth 
in an open economy is a shortage of foreign exchange. The model contends that a country’s 
balance of payments position is the main constraint on growth, because it imposes a limit on 
demand to which supply can adapt (Hussain, 2001). It is further argued that economic growth 
can only be faster and sustainable if exports are expanding more than imports. Countries’ 
growth strategies should thus be anchored to “foreign exchange productivity of investment” 
such as foreign exchange earnings (Hussain, 2001, p. 5). 
 
Hussain (2001) argued that foreign aid can contribute to higher growth rates if it can be used 
to finance the excess of imports over exports. It is further argued that if no corresponding 
                                               
24 Named after Thirlwall (1979).  
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change in the production structure and the pattern of trade in the recipient country occurs, then 
the economy will continue to depend on foreign aid for higher growth rates. Therefore, if the 
fundamental objectives are faster economic growth and poverty reduction, then the allocation 
of foreign aid should be such that it can help poor countries graduate to a self-sustaining growth 
path. The model suggests two broad indicators of measuring the long-term development 
effectiveness of foreign aid: (i) the ability to promote export growth relative to that of imports 
in the recipient country and (ii) the creation of an environment that attracts private capital into 
the aid-recipient country (Hussain, 2001).  
 
Hussain (2001) applied the Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) model to the estimation of the 
financing gap for a sample of 24 African countries, as an alternative model to the Harrod-
Domar approach. The study concluded that foreign exchange is the binding constraint in most 
African countries, and the effectiveness of foreign aid should therefore be measured in terms 
of foreign exchange earnings (or savings) (Hussain, 2001). 
 
However, the Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) model has not been able to find traction in 
development economics and the foreign aid practitioners’ community. It was criticised by 
Ranaweera (2003, p. 2), who asserts that it was an “incomplete model”.  
 
3.3. Channels by which Foreign Aid Affects Poverty 
 
Mosley et al. (1987, p. 616) highlighted three “effects” through which foreign aid can influence 
development in a recipient country. First, aid can have direct effects when its disbursement can 
be traced directly to the project for which the aid money was originally intended. Second, aid 
can affect development outcomes indirectly through its influence on the recipient government’s 
public-sector spending. The availability of foreign aid presents the recipient country with an 
opportunity to reallocate its expenditure. Lastly, the “transfer of aid money raises the prices of 
some goods, depresses the price of some others, and hence has side-effects on the private sector 
of the recipient economy through the price system” (Mosley et al., 1987, p. 617).  
 
Guillaumont (2011) and Guillaumont and Wagner (2014) recently described three main 
macroeconomic channels through which foreign aid can affect poverty. These include an 
impact through growth, an impact through social public expenditures, and the macroeconomic 
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stabilising effect of aid. A clear link exists between these channels and the “effects” proposed 
by Mosley et al. (1987). These channels are briefly discussed below.  
 
3.3.1. Traditional growth channel 
 
This is the traditional channel that is discussed in the theory of foreign aid and mainstream 
empirical literature on the effectiveness of such aid. The empirical analysis is based on the 
growth models that are anchored to savings and investment. It is assumed that foreign aid will 
stimulate growth through increased investment, and economic growth would in turn lead to 
poverty reduction. There are two main debates concerning this channel: the first is whether aid 
has been effective in boosting growth, and the second is whether growth translates to poverty 
reduction. 
 
3.3.1.1. The aid-growth nexus 
 
After many ambiguous and conflicting results, there is now evidence of convergence and 
consensus that foreign aid has a significant impact on growth. However, aid has generally been 
successful in some countries but not in others, and the effectiveness of aid may depend on the 
type of aid, the way in which it is financed, the time horizon, and the policy and institutional 
environment of the recipient country (Kraay, 2005; Radelet, 2006). Kraay (2005, p. 9) argued 
that aid can contribute to poverty reduction through growth, over the medium to long term 
where most changes in poverty depend on growth. There are however factors other than aid 
that will be important for determining the level of poverty alleviation. 
 
3.3.1.2. From growth to poverty reduction 
 
According to Feeny (2003, p. 73), “growth is often viewed as the primary driver of poverty 
reduction and therefore inferences of the impact of aid on poverty are commonly drawn from 
the impact of aid on growth”. Kraay (2005, p. 1) asserts, “sustained poverty reduction is 
impossible without sustained growth”. The main assumption here is that if aid has a positive 
impact on growth and if growth reduces poverty, then aid contributes to poverty reduction 
(Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014, p. 11). The extent to which aid affects poverty will depend on 
the growth elasticity of poverty reduction (or the income elasticity of poverty). Earlier studies 
by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) assumed that the universal income elasticity of poverty is 
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two (2). Furthermore, Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) were explicit in their assumption that 
the aid-poverty-growth channel is the only aid-induced route to poverty reduction. As a result, 
they used this uniform income elasticity of poverty to calculate what they termed the optimal 
aid allocation. However, subsequent studies by Hanmer and Naschold (2000) and Mosley et 
al. (2004) show that the partial growth elasticity of poverty reduction could be around 0.34 and 
0.48 respectively. Overall, the income elasticity of poverty varies according to the recipient 
country’s income distribution (level of inequality), the change in the level of inequality, income 
per capita, and growth volatility (Bourguignon, 2003; Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014).  
 
3.3.2. Pro-poor public expenditure channel 
 
In the aid-growth regressions, Burnside and Dollar (2000) introduced the importance of good 
policies (which included budget deficit, inflation, and openness) as a condition for the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. Subsequent studies incorporated the quality of institutions, 
corruption, governance, and a host of other variables. However, as noted by Mosley et al. 
(2004, p. 223), the policy variables emerging from these aid-growth regressions were highly 
controversial and could not offer a conclusive answer as to how aid will eventually lead to 
poverty reduction. 
 
Gomanee et al. (2003) and Mosley et al. (2004) developed what they termed the pro-poor 
(public) expenditure (PPE) index. This is a composition of public expenditures that are most 
likely to benefit the poor (Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014, p. 14). The PPE index includes 
government expenditures on social sectors such as basic healthcare, primary education, water 
and sanitation, rural roads, and agricultural extension services (Mosley et al., 2004). 
 
Mosley et al. (2004, p. 236) posited that PPE is an important channel by which aid can reduce 
poverty. Gomanee et al. (2005b) further argued that aid can improve human development by 
financing public expenditures that can increase welfare indicators. The empirical analysis of 
the study found that foreign aid can reduce poverty, and that the impact is more significant in 
countries with lower levels of human development indicators (Gomanee et al., 2005b, p. 299). 
Kosack (2003) found that aid has an indirect impact on poverty and well-being if it is spent on 
poor people who are disadvantaged. However, a potential risk of aid crowding out fiscal 
revenue exists (Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014). Furthermore, foreign aid may lead to an 
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increase in the supply of foreign exchange in the recipient country’s economy, which might 
lead to the Dutch disease25 (see discussions on the effectiveness of foreign aid below).  
 
3.3.3. Macroeconomic stabilising effect channel 
 
Guillaumont and Wagner (2014, p. 23) argued that at the macroeconomic level, aid is expected 
to stabilise the recipient country’s economic growth. The main assumption is that growth, 
especially in developing countries, is volatile owing to exogenous shocks, such as exports 
instability. While aid has been accused of instability, unpredictability, and “pro-cyclicity”, 
Guillaumont and Wagner (2014) maintain that aid has a destabilising macroeconomic impact. 
Studies by Collier and Goderis (2009), Guillaumont and Le Goff (2010), and Jeanneney and 
Kpodar (2012), which tested the stabilising impact of aid using different methods found 
evidence that foreign aid has a stabilising effect.  
 
Guillaumont and Wagner (2014, p. 25) further argued that, because economic growth is a major 
factor in poverty reduction, growth instability harms the poor through its adverse effect on 
economic growth. In addition, Collier and Goderis (2009) found that aid reduces the negative 
effect of vulnerability on growth. Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009) investigated the effect of 
aid on income volatility and found that aid makes growth more stable, and that the higher 
effectiveness of aid in vulnerable countries could be a result of aid’s stabilising effect. 
Jeanneney and Kpodar (2012) also found that not only does aid stabilise the resources available 
for the financing of consumption, investment, and trade, but it is also effective in aid-dependent 
and vulnerable countries (also see Collier, 2007). Furthermore, Guillaumont and Korachais 
(2008) found that income instability affects poverty through reduced growth, and it also 
impacts poverty-increasing income inequalities.  
 
Guillaumont and Wagner (2014) therefore reasoned that “if macroeconomic instability 
generates poverty and if aid has a stabilising impact, it should be expected that due to this 
impact, aid contributes to poverty reduction not only by increasing the rate of growth but also 
by making this growth more pro-poor” (Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014, p. 27). The paper, 
however, noted that this field of aid effectiveness, through stabilisation impact is fairly new 
and has not been tested empirically.  
                                               
25 See Collier (2007) and Stiglitz (2007).  
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3.3.4. Other channels of international cooperation for poverty eradication 
 
Guisan et al. (2015) offer an estimation of the quantitative impact of seven channels of 
international cooperation on development and poverty eradication in developing countries, 
including not only foreign official aid but also private aid, foreign trade, remittances, and other 
channels. The results suggest that the impact is usually positive, particularly when the flows 
from international cooperation are used to improve education, health, infrastructures, industry 
and development. 
 
3.4. Debate on the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid 
 
The above discussion on the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty is supportive of 
the idea that such aid is necessary for stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty in 
developing countries. The main argument was that countries were poor because of an 
insufficient savings rate. The solution was to fill this savings gap using outside aid. Foreign aid 
injections would allow developing countries to “take off” as a result of increased growth rates 
in the short run and transition to a higher steady-state income level. It was further assumed that 
growth will “cascade” or lead to poverty reduction. This section presents some of the main 
debates in the aid effectiveness literature. 
 
3.4.1. Theoretical criticism of the effectiveness of foreign aid 
 
According to Shleifer (2009), the early critics of foreign aid were Bauer (1972) and Friedman 
(1958). When the majority of early development theorists were justifying the importance of aid 
using the big push theory and the gap models, Bauer (1972) criticised the big push model, 
arguing then that foreign aid will lead to the misallocation of scarce resources and the 
destruction of economic incentives, and it would therefore not boost economic growth.  
 
Bauer (2000) criticised the argument that foreign aid can assist a country to break out of the 
poverty trap by reasoning that: 
“Development aid is …. not necessary to rescue poor societies from a vicious circle of 
poverty. Indeed, it is far more likely to keep them in that state. It promotes dependence 
on others. It encourages the idea that emergence from poverty depends on external 
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donations rather than on people’s own efforts, motivation, arrangements, and 
institutions” (Bauer, 2000, p. 46).26 
 
Friedman (1958) was more critical of the perceived role of foreign aid, and made the following 
observation: 
“Foreign economic aid is widely regarded as a weapon in the ideological war in which 
the United States is now involved. Its assigned role is to help win over to our side those 
uncommitted nations that are also underdeveloped and poor … The objectives of 
foreign economic aid are commendable. The means are, however, inappropriate to the 
objectives … The proponents of foreign aid have unwittingly adopted a basic premise 
of the Communist ideology that foreign aid is intended to combat. They have accepted 
the view that centralized and comprehensive economic planning and control by 
government is an essential prerequisite for economic development … An effective 
program must be based on our ideology, not on the ideology we are fighting.” 
(Friedman, 1958, pp. 63, 77-78). 
 
Thus, Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1972, 2000) criticised the precise findings of the theoretical 
argument that foreign aid can lead to development and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. These arguments were later expanded on by Moyo (2009), Easterly (2003, 2006, 
2008), Deaton (2013) and other foreign aid critics.   
 
3.4.2. Aid-dependency syndrome  
 
According to Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006), the motive of foreign aid and the empirical 
discussions on the effectiveness thereof in the late 1960s and mid-1970s was its use as a 
political tool. The dominant viewpoint then was that poverty in developing countries was 
because of exploitation by the rich capitalist world. Therefore, aid was treated as compensation 
for past wrongs. Early empirical studies by Griffin (1970) and Weisskopf (1972) were 
counterproductive, as they tended to replace domestic saving, thereby creating aid dependency. 
Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1972) also argued that foreign aid causes dependency by making 
resources available for governments to expand public spending, often times pursuing flawed 
(socialist or populist) policies that are harmful in the long term. It was argued that “excessive 
                                               
26 This quote was taken from Brumm (2003, p. 167).  
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aid” may distort the economy of a recipient country, leading to an aid-dependent, low-growth 
economy (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2006, p. 232). A more recent study by Hansen and Tarp 
(2000) revealed that the optimum amount of aid is about 10-20% of the recipient county’s 
GDP, and beyond that point, aid dependency becomes an increasing problem. Moyo (2009, p. 
28) argued that aid “perpetuates the cycle of poverty and derails sustainable economic 
development”. 
 
3.4.3. Poverty and development traps  
 
As discussed in the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty, some of the arguments 
for foreign aid allocation are the concepts of poverty and development traps. It was argued that 
developing countries are “trapped” in poverty and underdevelopment, and that they need 
outside assistance to “escape the traps”. Kraay (2005) stated that in spite of the popularity and 
plausibility of poverty traps from theoretical literature, few empirical studies found evidence 
for the existence of poverty traps. Sachs (2005) is one of the researchers who attributes the 
underdevelopment in Africa to poverty traps; however, Collier (2007, p. 5) argued that “poverty 
is not intrinsically a trap”. Kraay (2005, p. 3) further asserted that there is “little compelling 
evidence that such [poverty] traps exist”.  
 
Sachs (2005) and Collier (2007) further expounded on how development traps keep poor 
countries poorer. Collier (2007, p. 5) used examples from empirical studies to show that poor 
countries are facing one or more of four development traps, namely the conflict trap, the natural 
resource trap, the trap of being landlocked with unfavourable neighbours, and the trap of poor 
governance in a small country. Collier (2007) concluded that through properly structured and 
targeted aid, poor countries can overcome some of these development traps. However, “aid 
does have serious problems, and more especially serious limitations. … aid alone will not be 
sufficient to turn the societies of the bottom billion around, [though aid] is part of the solution 
rather than part of the problem” (Collier, 2007, p. 123). Moyo (2009) strongly disagreed, 
stating that “the problem is that aid is not benign – it’s malignant. No longer part of the 
potential solution, it’s part of the problem – in fact, aid is the problem” (Moyo, 2009, p. 47). 
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3.4.4. The Dutch disease 
 
One of the channels through which foreign aid can hurt a local economy and lead to an increase 
in poverty is a process called the Dutch disease. Aid comes in the form of foreign exchange27. 
To use this money locally, a government has to sell foreign exchange to obtain the local 
currency equivalent. The buyers of foreign exchange in a local economy are mainly importers, 
which means that the main determinant of demand for foreign exchange is demand for imports. 
Without foreign aid, an economy pays for its imports through exports (the main generator of 
foreign exchange). Now, with foreign aid, importers can choose to acquire foreign exchange 
from exporters or foreign aid. Therefore, foreign aid is now in direct competition with 
exporters: more aid means less need for exports, leading to reduced earnings for exporters. 
According to Collier (2007, p. 162), the mechanism that generates this effect is the exchange 
rate. An increase in foreign aid leads to an increase in foreign exchange in the local economy, 
which in turn leads to the appreciation of the exchange rate. An appreciation of the exchange 
means that a dollar earned by an exporter is now worth less in terms of local currency. Foreign 
aid may crowd out exporters, thereby killing the export competitiveness of already poor 
economies. It should therefore be accompanied by trade liberalisation which increases the 
demand for imports by making them cheaper without the need to appreciate the exchange rate 
(Collier, 2007, p. 163). Stiglitz (2007, p. 148) also recommends that a country must spend part 
of the foreign resource currency on imports and keep some of the rest abroad. 
 
3.4.5. Diminishing returns on aid and aid-absorptive capacity 
 
According to Collier (2007), foreign aid is subject to what is called “diminishing returns”. This 
means that as donor countries continue to increase the amount of aid to a recipient country, the 
returns from each additional dollar tend to decrease.  
 
Clunies-Ross et al. (2009, p. 595) define aid-absorptive capacity as the maximum amount that 
a country can effectively use. A study by Radelet et al. (2004) showed that their category of 
aid (termed short-impact aid) had no effect on growth when it reached 8% of the recipient 
country’s GDP and thereafter, the additional foreign aid had a negative effect on growth. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) also found that the larger the current amount of aid, the smaller the 
                                               
27 Mostly USA dollars, British pounds and euros.  
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additional growth benefit from extra aid. According to Collier (2007, p.100), without a change 
in the aid-absorption capacity, the doubling of aid envisioned in the MDGs might have 
exceeded the limits to aid absorption. Clunies-Ross et al. (2009) however, argued that the aid-
absorptive capacity can still be increased through training, a reduction of corruption, and 
capacity building (or technical assistance). Furthermore, other recent studies demonstrate that 
two thresholds exist: lower- and upper-aid thresholds (Gomanee et al., 2003; Guillaumont & 
Wagner, 2014). The lower threshold justifies the need for a “big push” (Guillaumont, 2011, p. 
8).  
 
3.4.6. Fungibility of aid 
 
Foreign aid is said to be fungible28 when a portion or the full amount of aid money earmarked 
for a particular purpose (which would have been financed anyway) is freeing resources for 
another purpose that would otherwise not have been funded (Guillaumont & Wagner, 2014, p. 
17). A seminal paper by Boone (1996) found that aid was fungible. The World Bank (1998) 
also argued that foreign aid (especially project aid) was fungible, and this reduces aid 
effectiveness. Another study by Feyzioglu et al. (1998) found aid to be fungible in some 
economic sectors, such as education, agriculture, and energy, but also found evidence of 
fungibility in the transport and communication sectors.  
 
However, recent studies have produced mixed results. Mavrotas (2002) did not find evidence 
of aid fungibility in a case study of three countries29. Moreover, a study by Dreher et al. (2008) 
found that even though aid allocated to the education sector was fungible, it led to a positive 
impact on school enrolment. Guillaumont and Wagner, (2014, p. 18) argued that even if aid is 
fungible, it does not mean that it is less effective. They further argued that the recipient 
government may use the extra resources to finance other sectors that are “pro-poor”, such as 
agriculture. Therefore, fungibility can be either beneficial or disadvantageous, depending on 
the recipient government’s decision regarding the use of released resources. However, Moyo 
                                               
28 Fungibility is said to occur when the marginal increase in sectoral expenditure following the receipt of aid is 
lower than the marginal amount of foreign aid dedicated to this particular sector. Fungibility can be total, if aid 
does not have any impact on the targeted sector, or partial, if the impact is lower than the total amount of aid 
affected. 
29 The three countries are the Philippines, Costa Rica, and Pakistan. 
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(2009) argued that the majority of African governments have been diverting freed resources to 
worthless and detrimental agendas such as corruption.  
 
3.4.7. Foreign aid volatility  
 
According to Lele and Goldsmith (1989), donors’ aid commitments and the actual aid flows 
are not always aligned. This causes mistrust, thereby increasing the risk of aid being used to 
support non-productive expenditures. Mosley and Suleiman (2007) further argued that the 
volatility of aid flows affects donor organisations which will in turn affect total aid flows.  
 
Furthermore, the failure to sustain aid flows weakens the political base of support for 
developmental expenditure (Mosley & Suleiman, 2007, p. 140). Chauvet and Guillaumont 
(2009, p. 452), however, found that even if aid is volatile, it “is not clearly as pro-cyclical as 
is often argued, and, even if pro-cyclical, is not necessarily destabilizing”. They further argued 
that foreign aid has a stabilising impact with respect to exports and income volatility.  
 
3.4.8. Foreign aid and consumption 
 
Boone (1996) found that foreign aid does not increase investment, had zero effect on growth, 
and does not reduce poverty (using human development indicators as proxies). Paradoxically, 
the study found that aid increases the size of the recipient government’s consumption 
expenditure. According to Moyo (2009), aid can be inflationary, as it leads to increased demand 
for locally produced, non-tradable goods and imports.  
 
3.4.9. Foreign aid, corruption, governance, and policies 
 
Moyo (2009) argued that because aid is fungible, it is easily stolen, redirected, and extracted, 
thereby leading to increased rent seeking and corruption. Burnside and Dollar (2000 and 2004) 
emphasised that aid is only effective in its goals if the recipient country has ‘good’ policies and 
quality institutions. A study by Barro (1999) argued that democracy helps in combating 
corruption and also encourages more redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. The 
World Bank (2002, p. 8) argued, “we have learned that corruption, bad policies, and weak 
governance will make aid ineffective”.  
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3.4.10. Macro-micro paradox 
 
Mosley (1987) is credited with coining the phrase “macro-micro paradox” of aid. This was 
based on the general observation that, while most micro or project-related studies were quite 
clear about the effectiveness of foreign aid, macro-level studies could not offer such clarity 
(McGillivray et al., 2006, p. 1032). For example, while evaluations of aid effectiveness at the 
microeconomic level continue to indicate positive rates of return, the World Bank (2008) and 
Rajan Subramanian (2008) concluded that at a macro level, “it is difficult to discern any 
systematic effect of aid on growth”. A recent study by Arndt et al. (2010, p. 1) used some 
modern micro methods to evaluate macro phenomenon and after finding positive effects of aid 
on growth from both the micro and macro perspectives, concluded that “there is no micro-
macro paradox”. 
 
3.5. Empirical Literature on Foreign Aid, Poverty, and Freedom 
 
This sub-section reviews literature that has evaluated the effectiveness of aid in reducing 
poverty. A detailed literature search revealed that most of the studies are focused on the impact 
of aid on growth, with an implicit assumption that an increase in growth will translate to 
poverty reduction. Since this study is focused on the impact of foreign aid on poverty, only 
studies that referred to poverty or welfare were considered. The reviewed studies fall into two 
broad categories: those which investigated the impact of aid poverty and (or through) growth 
and those which directly examined aid’s poverty reduction effect. The study also reviews some 
literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid in political or economic freedom.  
 
3.5.1. Empirical studies on foreign aid and non-monetary measures of poverty 
 
A paper by Boone (1996) is one of the earliest to empirically test the effectiveness of aid in 
increasing investment (and therefore growth) and improvement in the HDI, as a poverty proxy. 
Some of the widely-quoted findings are that (i) aid does not promote economic development; 
(ii) aid does not increase investment, but it does increase the size of government, which 
confirms that aid is fungible; (iii) aid effectiveness was not dependent on the political regimes 
(liberal, democratic, or repressive); and (iv) aid does not have a significant impact on poverty 
indicators (infant mortality and primary schooling ratios).  
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One of the most popular papers on aid effectiveness was by Burnside and Dollar (2000). The 
paper in its working form was widely quoted by multilateral institutions and major aid agencies 
(Easterly, 2003). The main conclusion from Burnside and Dollar (2000, p. 847) was that “aid 
has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade 
policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies”. The findings of the working paper 
were reported in a World Bank (1998) report titled Assessing Aid. The most compelling 
argument from Burnside and Dollar (2000) was that a “1 percent gross domestic product in aid 
given to a poor but well-managed country can increase its growth by a sustained 0.5 
percentage points” (Easterly, 2003, pp. 24-25)30. The World Bank (1998) went further and 
argued that aid goes beyond growth, stating that a “1 percent of GDP in assistance reduces 
poverty by 1 percent” (World Bank, 1998, p. 14).  
 
Some of the early papers that examined the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty 
were by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). Collier and Dollar (2001) developed a model of 
“efficient aid” in which aid will be allocated according to “policy improvements that create a 
better environment for poverty reduction and effective aid” (Collier & Dollar, 2001, p. 1787). 
The paper categorically stated that “poverty reduction … depends primarily on the quality of 
economic policy” (Collier & Dollar, 2001, p. 1800). The policy implication from this analysis 
was that a mixture of good policy and foreign aid leads to economic growth and poverty 
reduction.  
 
A year later, Collier and Dollar (2002) derived what they termed a “poverty-efficient”31 
allocation of aid criteria, and they compared it with actual aid allocations to estimate the impact 
on poverty reduction. The authors showed that aid, operating through increased economic 
growth, was responsible for lifting about 10 million people out of extreme poverty each year. 
The study further estimated that approximately 19 million people could be lifted out of poverty 
each year if aid agencies use a “poverty-efficient” aid allocation strategy. However, this 
poverty-efficient reallocation of aid, which was also discussed in the World Bank (1998) 
Report – Assessing Aid – was heavily criticised (Lensink & White, 2000).  
 
                                               
30 Quoting the Financial Times of 2002.  
31 A poverty-efficient aid programme is one which reduces poverty by as much as possible. 
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Hirano and Otsubo (2014) applied the conceptual framework of globalisation and the poverty-
growth-inequality (P-G-I) relationship to investigate the effectiveness of aid in development. 
The paper found that social aid (education, health, and water and sanitation spending) 
significantly and directly benefits the poorest in society. Economic aid (transportation, energy, 
and communication and financial infrastructure spending) also increases the income of the poor 
through growth.  
 
A recent study by Arndt et al. (2015) assessed the impact of aid on economic growth, social 
welfare indicators (poverty and infant mortality) and intermediate outcomes (such as 
investment, consumption, health, education, and agriculture). The study estimated the long-
term cumulative effects of aid in developing countries for the period 1970-2007 using limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) and inverse probability weighted least squares 
(IPWLS) estimators in a simultaneous equation model (SEM) framework. They found evidence 
that aid does stimulate growth, improves social welfare indicators and reduces poverty. Though 
the results indicate that aid does not have a significant effect on inequality, it was found that 
aid can raise investment, improve school enrolment, boost life expectancy, and reduce infant 
mortality (Arndt et al., 2015, p. 14).  
 
3.5.2. Empirical studies on foreign aid and monetary (extreme) poverty 
 
Kosack (2003) assessed the effectiveness of aid in improving the quality of life in aid-recipient 
countries. The study used the ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation techniques on a sample of 49 developing countries over a period 1974-1985. The 
study found that aid can directly increase welfare, but only in democracies, and not in 
autocracies. Moreover, the paper found strong evidence that foreign aid has an indirect effect 
on poverty and well-being if it is spent on disadvantaged poor people. 
 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola (2009) used pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for 49 
developing countries over the period 1981-2002 to estimate the impact of foreign aid on 
poverty. To control for endogeneity, the study used the 2SLS panel estimation techniques. The 
paper found that aid reduces poverty and that inequality is detrimental to poverty reduction. 
Chong et al. (2009) used the DPD method’s instrumental variable (GMM-IV) to examine the 
effect of aid on income inequality and poverty reduction for the period 1971-2002. The study 
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could not find a robust statistical relationship between foreign aid and poverty or income 
inequality even in the presence of good institutions.  
 
Mosley et al. (2004) examined the direct effect of aid on poverty using the GMM three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) methodology in a simultaneous equation set-up. The three main equations 
were poverty, aid, and policy. The policy variable in the Mosley et al. (2004) analysis 
represented a significant departure from the World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) “good” economic policies. To emphasise the departure, they called the proposed 
policies “new conditionality”. They also developed the PPE index. The study found strong 
evidence that corruption, inequality, and the composition of public expenditure are strongly 
associated with aid effectiveness (Mosley et al., 2004, p. F236). The conclusion and policy 
implication of the study was that aid allocations which consider good micro and macro policies, 
income distribution, and GDP per capita are more effective in achieving developmental goals.  
 
Mosley and Suleiman (2007) followed up on the arguments advanced in the earlier paper by 
Mosley et al. (2004). The latest study used both panel data econometric analysis covering all 
developing countries and four case studies of heavily aid-dependent countries in Africa32. 
Mosley and Suleiman (2007) estimated a poverty equation that incorporates the effects of aid 
through growth, macro-economic policy, PPE, and instability in aid levels. They found 
evidence that the level, composition, and stability of foreign aid matter in poverty reduction. 
The paper reaffirms the earlier findings that aid is most effective in reducing poverty if it is 
used for PPEs such as agriculture, education, and infrastructure. Military expenditure was 
found to have a negative impact on poverty reduction. 
 
Gomanee et al. (2005b) tested the hypothesis that aid leads to increasing aggregate welfare 
using a fixed-effect panel data estimation method on a sample of 104 countries for the period 
1980-2000. The proxies for welfare were infant mortality and the HDI. The main findings of 
the paper were that aid directly improves welfare indicators and that the impact is greater in 
low-income countries compared to middle-income countries. The paper also found that growth 
is the channel through which aid indirectly affects welfare. Furthermore, they found no 
evidence that aid channelled through PPE has a positive impact on welfare33. Another study by 
                                               
32 The case studies are Ethiopia and Uganda, where aid effectiveness has been impressively high, and Zimbabwe 
and Malawi, where it has been depressingly low (Mosley & Suleiman, 2007, p. 140).  
33 See also Gomanee et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of PPE. 
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Gomanee et al. (2005a) also investigated the impact of aid on human welfare using quantile 
regressions. The results contradicted the earlier paper, as they found evidence that aid can affect 
welfare through public expenditure and that the effect is greater in countries with lower welfare 
(poorer countries). In addition, they found evidence that the marginal effectiveness of aid in 
alleviating poverty is higher in poorer countries than in richer countries (Gomanee et al., 2005a, 
p. 308). 
 
Masud and Yontcheva (2005) assessed the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. 
The study used development indicators such as infant mortality and illiteracy or education as 
proxies for poverty. The paper compared the impact of two measures of foreign aid: official 
bilateral aid, which flows directly from a donor government to a recipient country, and projects 
aid, which is disbursed through international NGOs to developing countries. The two 
methodologies used were 2SLS regression and the system-generalised method of moments 
(SGMM) approach. The study concluded that NGO aid significantly reduces infant mortality, 
compared to bilateral aid, and that the impact of both types of aid on illiteracy is less significant 
(Masud & Yontcheva, 2005, p. 20). 
 
Kaya et al. (2013) investigated the effectiveness of aid given to the agricultural sector in 
poverty reduction. The study disaggregated total aid into sub-categories and focused on 
agricultural aid. The empirical analysis used four-year averaged, cross-country data for a panel 
of 46 developing aid-recipient countries over the 1980-2003 period. The main dependent 
variable was the poverty headcount ratio at US$ 1, while the main explanatory variables were 
aid issued to the agricultural sector and PPE34. The fixed-effects panel estimator found that a 
1% increase in agricultural aid reduces the headcount poverty ratio by 0.2% in the aid-recipient 
countries. The study also found that the growth elasticity of the headcount poverty ratio ranges 
from 1.7 to 3.5 based on different specifications. The paper concluded that agricultural aid is 
effective in poverty reduction directly and indirectly through growth (Kaya et al., 2013, p. 593). 
 
Alvi and Senbeta (2012) examined the effect of foreign aid on poverty in a sample of 79 
developing countries over the period 1981 to 2004. The study used DPD estimation methods 
(SGMM) proposed by Blundel and Bond (1998). Moreover, it utilised three measures of 
poverty, namely the headcount index, the PG, and the SPG; two sources of aid – bilateral and 
                                               
34 As per Mosley et al. (2004) and Gomanee et al. (2005a).  
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multilateral – and two compositions of aid: grants and concessionary loans. The study found 
that “aid reduces poverty after controlling for average income and income distribution” (Alvi 
& Senbeta, 2012, p. 968). The study further found that multilateral aid and grants reduce 
poverty, while bilateral aid and loans do not.  
 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of some empirical studies which used panel data to analyse the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. The first panel of Table 3.1 lists studies that 
reviewed the impact of aid on non-monetary measures of poverty (such as poverty rate, poverty 
gap, and squared poverty gap, and with social indicators such as HDI, infant mortality, and 
literacy). Seven studies fall under this category, and their main findings are mixed. Four studies 
found evidence that aid improves social development indicators, two found no evidence, and 
another paper had mixed results35. Of the seven studies, six found that aid reduces poverty, 
while one did not find significant evidence.  
 
                                               
35 Masud and Yontcheva (2005) find that NGO aid significantly reduces infant mortality, while bilateral aid does 
not. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of empirical studies on aid and poverty 
Study/Author(s) Period Countries Main Dependent 
Variables 
Main Explanatory 
Variables 
Methodology  Main Findings 
A: AID AND NON-MONETARY MEASURES OF POVERTY (SOCIAL INDICATORS) 
Boone (1996) 1971-
1990 
96 countries  Infant mortality 
 Primary schooling 
ratios 
 Aid as % of GNP 
 Per capita GDP growth 
rate 
OLS, IV, and  
fixed effects 
 Aid does not have a significant impact on 
human development indicators (infant 
mortality and primary schooling ratios). 
Arvin and 
Barillas (2002) 
1975- 
1998 
118 aid-
receiving 
countries. 
 GNP per capita  Aid as % of GNP 
 Democracy 
 (Aid) x (Democracy) 
Granger 
causality  
  The study results show that aid was not 
affecting poverty (GNP per capita) and vice 
versa. 
Kosack (2003) 1974-
1985 
49 developing 
countries 
 HDI  Aid as % of GDP 
 Democracy index 
OLS and 
2SLS 
 The study found that aid can directly increase 
welfare but only in democracies, not in 
autocracies. 
 The paper also found strong evidence that 
foreign aid has an indirect effect on poverty 
and well-being if it is spent on disadvantaged 
poor people.  
Masud and 
Yontcheva 
(2005) 
1990-
2001. 
58 developing 
countries 
 Infant Mortality,  
 Illiteracy 
 
 NGO aid 
 Bilateral aid 
2SLS and 
SGMM 
 NGO aid significantly reduces infant 
mortality compared to bilateral aid.  
 The impact of both types of aid on illiteracy 
is less significant. 
Gomanee et al. 
(2005b) 
1980-
2000 
104 countries   HDI 
 Infant mortality 
 Aid as % of GNI 
 GNP per capita 
 Pro-poor public 
expenditure 
Fixed-effects 
panel 
 Aid directly improves welfare indicators, and 
the impact is greater in low-income 
countries, compared to middle-income 
countries. 
Hirano and 
Otsubo (2014) 
1990s-
2000s 
99 countries  Capita income of the 
poorest quintile 
 Growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
 Aid as % of GNP 
 Sectorial aid 
Panel 2SLS  Economic aid is useful for the poor because 
of its growth-inducing impact.  
 Social aid is beneficial for the poor through 
systematic distributional effects. 
Arndt et al. 
(2015) 
1970-
2007 
78 countries  School enrolment,  
 Life expectancy  
 Infant mortality 
 Aid as % of GDP LIML and 
IPWLS in 
SEMs  
 Aid can raise investment, improve school 
enrolment, boost life expectancy, and reduce 
infant mortality. 
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Study/Author(s) Period Countries Main Dependent 
Variables 
Main Explanatory 
Variables 
Methodology  Main Findings 
B: AID AND MONETARY POVERTY (EXTREME/ABSOLUTE POVERTY INDICATORS) 
Mosley et al. 
(2004) 
1980-
2000. 
34 countries  Poverty headcount  
 Infant Mortality 
 
 Aid as % of GNI 
 GNP per capita 
 Pro-poor public 
expenditure 
GMM 3SLS  Corruption, inequality, and the composition 
of public expenditure are strongly 
associated with aid effectiveness. 
Mosley and 
Suleiman (2007) 
1980-
2002 
39 developing 
and 
transitional 
economies 
 Poverty headcount  Aid as % of GNP 
 GNP per capita 
 Agriculture expenditure 
(%) 
GMM 3SLS  Aid is most effective in reducing poverty if it 
is used for PPEs such as agriculture, 
education, and infrastructure.  
Bahmani-
Oskooee and 
Oyolola (2009)  
1981-
2002 
49 developing 
countries 
 Headcount ratio  Bilateral aid 
 GPD per capita 
 Gini coefficient 
2SLS panel 
estimation 
 Foreign aid reduces poverty. 
Chong et al. 
(2009)  
1971-
2002. 
136 countries  Poverty rate 
 Poverty gap 
 Squared poverty gap 
 ODA as a % of GDP (aid) 
 Aid squared 
 Aid x Corruption 
SGMM 
estimator 
 An insignificant statistical relationship exists 
between foreign aid and poverty or income 
inequality. 
Alvi and Senbeta 
(2012) 
1981-
2004 
79 developing 
countries 
 Poverty rate  
 Poverty gap 
 Squared poverty gap 
 
 Aid as a % of GNI 
 GDP per capita 
 Gini coefficient 
SGMM 
estimator 
 Foreign aid reduces poverty. 
  Multilateral aid and grants reduce poverty. 
 Bilateral aid and loans do not reduce poverty. 
Kaya et al. 
(2013) 
1980–
2003 
46 developing 
countries 
 Poverty headcount 
ratio 
 Agricultural aid  
 GNP per capita 
 Pro-poor public 
expenditure 
Fixed-effects 
panel and 
3SLS 
 Agricultural aid is effective in poverty 
reduction directly and indirectly through 
growth. 
Arndt et al. 
(2015) 
1970-
2007 
78 countries  Poverty headcount 
($1.25 and $2 a day) 
 Aid as % of GDP LIML and 
IPWLS  
 Aid stimulates growth, improves social 
welfare indicators, and reduces poverty.  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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3.5.3. Empirical studies on the impact of political and economic freedom on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid 
 
A review of the AEL shows that researchers generally agree that certain preconditions must be 
met to ensure the effectiveness of aid in recipient countries (Arvin & Barillas, 2002; Jones & 
Tarp, 2016; Knack, 2004). One such key condition is the existence of political freedom (or 
democracy). There is also widespread debate over the influence of aid in promoting better 
governance as well as the influence of better governance/democracy on the volume of aid (Ali, 
2009; Knack, 2004; Swiss, 2014). This sub-section examines empirical studies on the relation 
between foreign aid and political and economic freedom. Special attention is paid to answering 
the following question: does political or economic freedom enhance the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in poverty reduction? 
 
Using data for 155 countries over the period 1960-2011, Bjella (2012) tested the hypothesis 
that “aid leads to greater economic development in a democratic rather than autocratic 
receiving nation” and found that the more democratic countries become, the more effective 
foreign aid tends to be in those places. Arvin and Barillas (2002) used data from 118 countries 
over the period dating 1975 to 1998 to assess whether conditioning aid leads to a reduction of 
poverty in more democratic receiving countries. Using Granger causality, the study found that 
aid did not have a significant impact on poverty reduction given those countries’ states of 
democracy. Moreover, Breuning and Ishiyama (2007) used the World Bank measurement of 
the political stability index to measure the effectiveness of foreign aid in 26 post-conflict 
economies where civil wars ended after 1980 (1996-2005). The study found no conclusive 
evidence that foreign aid flows were influenced by the emergence of political stability in 
conflict areas. 
 
Knack (2004) examined the extent to which the provision of aid leads to democracy in 105 
countries over the period 1975-2000. Two democracy proxies were used: The Change of Polity 
index and the Freedom House index. The study findings suggest that even though countries’ 
levels of democracy were rising over the review period, little if any of this progress was 
attributable to aid flows. Another study by Knack in 2001 utilised cross-country data between 
the years 1975 and 1995 to examine how volumes of aid influence recipient countries’ 
governance. It was found that at higher aid levels, there is a greater tendency for the quality of 
governance to become eroded. In a related study, Ali (2009) corroborated the findings of Knack 
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(2004) after examining the flows of United States of America (USA). aid into Pakistan from 
1947 to 2006. These aid flows indicate that there was a consistent pattern of high aid flows 
from the USA to Pakistan military dictatorships versus low amounts advanced towards 
democratic regimes. Ali (2009) therefore concluded that instead of promoting democratic 
governance in Pakistan, aid flows from the USA have been undermining the development of 
democracy in Pakistan over the review period. 
 
Swiss (2014) found that donor conditions are generally dynamic between recipients with 
diverse economic development stages and over time. While foreign aid was found to be 
responsive to democracy and human rights issues in recipient countries, the study noted that it 
may be too simplistic to assume that aid flows are used as rewards for democracy and upholding 
human rights. The study further argues that complicated interactions exist that influence the 
volume of aid, which suggests that donors can still provide aid to nations despite the lack of 
democratic values and the abuse of human rights. On the one hand, Bjørnskov (2010) found 
that foreign aid targeted at democratic countries seems to be associated with a distribution of 
income to higher incomes groups (elites). This implies that aid in a democratic environment 
might lead to the worsening of poverty and an increase in income inequality. On the other hand, 
Brown (2005) found that aid flows to autocratic regimes tend to strengthen the elites’ hold on 
power, as they use aid receipts to their advantage.  
 
Heckelman and Knack (2008) conducted a similar study using Fraser economic freedom data 
for 74 countries from 1980 to 2000, and they found evidence that the impact of aid on market-
liberalising policy reform differs between regions of countries as well as time periods. 
Heckelman and Knack (2009) extended the argument between aid efficiency and poverty 
reduction in the wake of democratic governments by integrating economic freedom. Cross-
country data was used specifically over the period 1990-2000. Economic freedom was 
measured using the Hedonic index. The study found that foreign aid does not significantly 
influence economic freedom in recipient countries; however, to some extent, it contributes to 
policy and institutional environments that are favourable for economic growth. Connors (2011) 
performed a similar study and found that foreign aid does not have a significant effect on either 
economic freedom or poverty reduction.  
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3.5.4. Empirical studies on the causal relationship between foreign aid, poverty and 
economic growth 
 
According to Todaro and Smith (2012), until recently, it was assumed in economic 
development policy discussions, that an increase in economic growth would naturally “trickle 
down” to the general population and ultimately, result in poverty reduction (Aghion & Bolton, 
1997). Though several studies have criticised the notion of direct “trickle down” economics, 
recent studies have confirmed that economic growth and the quality of growth are important 
for poverty reduction (Norton, 2002; Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Feeny, 2003). This sub-section 
discusses some empirical studies on the causal relationship between foreign aid, poverty and 
economic growth. As explained in the methodology section, economic growth is treated as an 
intermittent variable in the trivariate Granger causality analysis.  
 
3.5.4.1. Studies on causality between foreign aid and poverty  
 
Hoffman (1991) examined the causal relationship between poverty in female‐headed 
households with small children and aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) via transfer 
payments using the USA data for the period 1959 to 1988. The study used a Granger causality 
test and found weak statistical evidence that receipt of aid ‘Granger causes’ poverty but found 
strong statistical evidence that an increase in real value of aid ‘causes’ a reduction in poverty. 
 
Arvin and Barillas (2002) employ Granger causality to investigate the direction of causality 
between aid and poverty in a bivariate framework and then included democracy in a trivariate 
Granger model. Both the bivariate and trivariate models are tested on annual data from 1975 
to 1998 from a sample of 118 aid-receiving countries. The study categorised countries into two 
broad groups: geographical regions and levels of income. For the full sample, the study results 
show that aid was not affecting poverty and vice versa. For the sub-samples, aid was found to 
reduce poverty in the East Asia Pacific region but had a detrimental impact on poverty in low-
income countries (Arvin & Barillas, 2002, p. 2154). 
 
3.5.4.2. Studies on causality between foreign aid and economic growth 
 
A recent study by Forson et al. (2015) examined the causal relationship between European 
Union (EU) aid inflows and economic growth in Ghana during the period from 1970-2013. 
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Granger causality was tested using the Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM), and the study 
found evidence of an independent short-run causal relationship between the two variables and 
a long-run unidirectional causal relationship from EU aid inflows to GDP growth. Amin (2017) 
used the same approach to conduct a Granger Causality test between economic growth, foreign 
aid and other variables using data for Bangladesh for the period from 1980 to 2013. The study 
did not find any statistical evidence for short-run causality between economic growth and 
foreign aid but found evidence that in the long-run, causality was unidirectional from economic 
growth to foreign aid.  
 
Tekin (2012a) investigated the causal relationship among foreign aid, trade openness and 
economic growth in the African least developed countries (LDC) for the period between 1970 
and 2010 using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimator proposed by Zellner 
(1962). The results from this study showed little evidence of any causal relationship between 
foreign aid and economic growth. Another study by Asteriou (2009) used the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) approach to investigate the long-run relationship between foreign aid 
and economic growth using panel data for five South Asian countries for the period 1975 to 
2002. The paper found a positive long-run relationship between aid and GDP growth. 
 
3.5.4.3. Studies on causality between economic growth and poverty  
 
Some of the earliest studies to investigate the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty and whether economic growth ‘trickles down’ to poverty reduction were by Thornton 
et al. (1978, 1980). Using the USA data for the period 1947 to 1974, the two studies found that 
economic growth alleviates the incidence of poverty. This finding was also supported by de 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2000), using a panel of 12 Latin American countries between 1970 and 
1994. However, using a sample of Latin American countries, Korzeniewicz (2000) concluded 
that economic growth had not led to significant poverty reduction in the region.  
 
Using the ARDL-bounds testing approach to co-integration, and the ECM-based Granger 
causality method, Nindi and Odhiambo (2015) examined the causal relationship between 
poverty reduction and economic growth in Swaziland during the period 1980–2011. The main 
results from the empirical investigation are that (i) economic growth does not Granger cause 
poverty reduction in the short run and in the long run, and (ii) property reduction Granger 
causes economic growth in the short run. 
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A recent study by Perez-Moreno (2016) used a panel of 52 developing countries for the years 
from 1970 to 1998 to examine causality between economic growth (proxied by real GDP per 
capita) and extreme poverty (proportion of people living on less than US$1/day). The study 
found that economic growth unidirectionally causes poverty reduction. Pradhan and Arvin 
(2015) used a panel VECM framework for the period 1961-2012 to investigate the causal 
relation between foreign and economic growth and two other variables. The panel cointegration 
tests found evidence of the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the four 
variables and in the short-run, foreign aid was found to unidirectionally Granger cause 
economic growth. The was evidence of bidirectional causality in the long run.  
 
3.6. Critique of Existing Literature on Foreign Aid and Poverty  
 
Literature on aid effectiveness is dominated by empirical studies on the usefulness of foreign 
aid in economic growth. There are two main problems with this aid-growth nexus. First, it does 
not directly address the primary objective of aid allocation which is poverty reduction. 
According to White (2015), there has been consensus among donors and recipient countries 
since the 1990s that the main aim of foreign aid is poverty reduction. This position was further 
emphasised by the promulgation of the MDGs by the United Nations General Assembly in the 
year 2000. The MDGs were a set of developmental goals and targets agreed on by the 
international community, whose primary focus was on halving poverty and improving the 
welfare of the world’s poorest by 2015 (Sachs, 2005). 
 
The second problem with the aid-growth nexus is the implicit assumption that aid affects 
growth through growth (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2001, 2002; White, 2015). 
This might be correct, as sustainable improvements in social outcomes require high and 
sustained growth rates; however, there has been a narrow interpretation that if aid does promote 
economic growth, then it implies poverty reduction. This is not satisfactory, because aid can 
affect poverty directly or through other channels.  
 
A general dearth of empirical literature is available on the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
poverty reduction. The poverty-reducing effects of aid are thus not well documented (White, 
2015, p. 187). A few studies that have been reviewed in this chapter (see Section 3.5) 
investigated the effect of aid on different socio-economic development indicators such as infant 
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mortality rate, poverty (headcount, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap), the HDI, and 
education, among others. Other studies explored the channel through which aid affects poverty, 
with a special focus on social and public spending such as agriculture, health, and education. 
Arndt et al. (2015, p. 6) argued that access to “merit goods” such as primary education and 
basic health is not only a fundamental human right but essential to the development process. 
However, as with the aid-growth literature, evidence on the effectiveness of aid in poverty 
reduction is mixed. Even though the majority of studies reviewed seemed to agree that aid has 
a positive impact on poverty, the number of studies is still too small to make a general 
conclusion.  
 
3.7. Summary of Main Discussion Points in this Chapter 
 
This chapter explored the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty as well as the 
empirical results of the effectiveness of aid in poverty reduction. The dominant theory in the 
aid debate is the two-gap model which assumes that developing countries face constraints on 
savings and export earnings that hamper investment and economic growth (Chenery & Strout, 
1966). Foreign aid can consequently be used to fill the gap between investment needs and 
domestic savings. While the two-gap model has been criticised, it has remained the most 
influential theoretical underpinning of the AEL (Easterly, 2003; Masud & Yontcheva, 2005). 
Other theories include the vicious and virtuous circles, the stages of economic growth theory, 
the Harrod-Domar model, and the Thirlwall-Hussain model. According to Guillaumont and 
Wagner (2014), the theoretical background of empirical studies on aid effectiveness has been 
strongly questioned. 
 
Aid effectiveness literature is dominated by the impact of aid on economic growth. The 
majority of early empirical studies concluded that aid had no significant effect on growth, 
savings, or investment. However, a shift in opinion has occurred, as later studies have found a 
positive though modest impact of aid on growth (Arndt et al., 2015). However, the 
conventional view on the effectiveness of aid in poverty reduction has been built on the basis 
that aid increases the growth rate of per capita income, and that this growth will in turn lead to 
a reduction in poverty rates. As discussed in this chapter, there are other transmission 
mechanisms through which foreign aid affect poverty, other than economic growth.  
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Apart from economic growth, other channels through which foreign aid affects poverty include: 
(i) through aid’s influence on the public-sector spending of the recipient government which 
might lead to human development and welfare indicators; (ii) stabilisation of the recipient 
country’s economic growth; and (iii) building of democratic and economic institutions, among 
others. Below, we briefly discuss previous empirical studies which examined the causal 
relationship between foreign aid, poverty and economic growth.  
 
Both the theoretical and empirical literature on aid effectiveness has generated significant and 
prolonged debates. The following three distinct schools of thought exist on aid effectiveness: 
i. Foreign aid is ineffective and has caused more harm. The main critics of aid are Bauer 
(1972), Friedman (1958), Easterly (2003, 2006, 2008), Moyo (2009), and Doucouliagos 
and Paldam (2009).  
ii. Foreign aid has been effective in reducing poverty and has to be increased, according 
to Sachs (2005), Stiglitz (2007), Arndt et al. (2010, 2015), and Alvi and Senbeta (2012). 
iii. Aid works in certain conditions, including other channels, according to Burnside and 
Dollar (2000, 2004), Collier and Dollar (2002), Collier (2007), Mosley et al. (2004), 
and Gomanee et al. (2005a, 2005b). 
 
Of particular importance to this study is the following: considering that one of the main aims 
of foreign aid is poverty reduction, the poverty-reducing effects of aid are not well documented 
because of the paucity of this strand of studies. Mosley et al. (1987) referred to the lack of 
attention to the poverty impact of aid as “a disgrace”.  
 
Though research on the impact of aid on monetary and non-monetary measures of poverty is 
sparse, the number of studies that find aid to be ineffective are in the minority. Overall, the 
following conclusions can be made from these aid-poverty studies: 
 Earlier analysis of the impact of foreign aid on poverty is based on the notion that aid 
will stimulate growth, and growth will then lead to poverty reduction (Collier & Dollar 
2001, 2002). 
 Studies on monetary poverty generally find a positive effect of aid on poverty. 
 Foreign aid may have either a direct impact on poverty for a given level of income 
growth (Alvi & Senbeta, 2012) or an impact on the income elasticity of poverty (Mosley 
et al., 2004). 
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 The type of aid, sectoral composition and channels matter in aid effectiveness:  
o Multilateral aid and grants reduce poverty, but bilateral aid and loans do not 
(Alvi & Senbeta, 2012). 
o Agricultural aid is more effective in poverty reduction compared to aid given 
through non-agricultural sectors (Kaya et al., 2013). 
o A combination of growth and PPE improves the effectiveness of aid in reducing 
monetary poverty (Mosley et al., 2004; Mosley & Suleiman, 2007; Gomanee et 
al., 2005a).  
 The number of studies on the poverty-reducing effect of aid are in the majority; 
however, given the relatively few studies, it is difficult to sustain absolute conclusions. 
There is a need for further studies, especially on the channels through which aid affects 
poverty and the types of aid.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this chapter was to highlight some of the main debates on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in poverty reduction through a review of both theoretical and 
empirical literature. In the exploration of the theoretical link between foreign aid and poverty, 
it was found that the dominant development theory in the aid debate is the two-gap model 
which states that foreign aid can be used to fill the gap between investment needs and domestic 
savings. The other theories include virtuous and vicious circles, the stages of economic growth 
theory, the Harrod-Domar model, and the Thirlwall-Hussain model. All these theories have 
been heavily criticised, and the theoretical background of empirical studies on aid effectiveness 
has been questioned. The chapter also discussed the possible transmission mechanisms through 
which foreign aid impacts on poverty. The main ones are as follows: economic growth, pro-
poor public expenditure, and macroeconomic stabilising effect channels. 
 
The main findings from this literature review are that no generally accepted economic theory 
exists upon which foreign aid allocation is based, and the debate on the effectiveness of foreign 
aid in poverty reduction is still far from over. While several theories have been advanced, each 
of them has been heavily criticised. Moreover, the results from empirical studies are still 
diverse. There are two distinct and extreme lines of thought: those who believe that foreign aid 
can contribute to a virtuous circle of economic growth and poverty reduction. The other group 
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contends that foreign aid leads to a vicious cycle of poverty and stunted development. Perhaps 
the debate needs to shift to “what makes aid work or how does one make aid work?” In this 
regard, some interesting studies cited in this chapter, demonstrate the positive effect of several 
channels of foreign aid in the diminution of poverty and an improvement in the quality of life 
of recipient developing countries. 
 
The empirical literature on the impact of foreign aid on poverty is divided into three broad 
groups: studies that used non-monetary measures of poverty, those that used monetary 
measures of poverty, and studies on the impact of political and economic freedom on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. The survey shows that the majority of studies reviewing the impact 
of foreign aid on non-momentary measures found that aid does reduce poverty, whereas a few 
found no evidence, and some found diverse results. Of the seven studies that investigated the 
impact of aid on monetary measures of poverty, the majority found that aid reduces poverty 
while a minority did not find significant evidence. Therefore, the number of studies that find 
foreign aid to be effective in poverty reduction are in the majority. Regarding the role of 
political and economic freedom in aid effectiveness, the results are mixed. Considering the 
relatively few studies in the literature, it is difficult to make a conclusive statement. Further 
studies are recommended, especially given the need to evaluate the recently concluded MDGs. 
This will help to document lessons learnt in view of the recently promulgated SDGs which 
envision a world of “no poverty”. The empirical literature also includes studies which 
examined the causal relationship between foreign aid and poverty and the results of which are 
also mixed.   
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION AND 
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter highlighted some of the main debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid 
in poverty reduction through a review of both theoretical and empirical literature. The main 
aim of this chapter is to present a detailed discussion of the econometric estimation techniques 
used in this study as well as the theoretical and empirical model specifications. The two main 
econometric estimation techniques employed in this study are (i) the SGMM for examining the 
impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction and (ii) the panel vector error correction model 
(VECM) for testing the causal relationship between foreign aid and poverty. The chapter is 
divided into five sections. The SGMM estimation framework is presented in Section 4.2 
together with its theoretical framework and model specifications as well as a discussion on 
possible endogeneity, identification, and robustness checks. Section 4.3 explains the steps 
involved in the panel VECM estimation and how Granger causality is inferred. Section 4.4 
discusses the data sources and definitions of variables used in the study, and Section 4.5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. System-Generalised Method of Moments Model: Impact of Foreign 
Aid on Poverty Reduction 
 
4.2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
The central objective of development assistance is poverty reduction. A large volume of 
literature on aid effectiveness finds that aid mainly finances government consumption which 
partially explains why aid has not had a significant positive effect on growth. In these studies, 
it is “implicitly assumed that aid can only reduce poverty by increasing growth”  (Lensink & 
White, 2000, p. 402). Hanmer et al. (1999) suggested that the growth elasticities of poverty 
depend on income distribution. It is also possible that the increase in government consumption 
might benefit the poor through pro-poor social expenditures (Burnside & Dollar, 1998; Masud 
& Yontcheva, 2005). As summarised in Section 3 of Chapter 3, the channels by which foreign 
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aid affects poverty include economic growth, pro-poor public expenditure and the 
macroeconomic stabilisation effect.  
 
According to  (Mosley, et al., 2004, p. F221), the total effect of aid on poverty can be 
disaggregated into direct and indirect impacts. The indirect impact is when aid affects poverty 
through economic growth and changes in policy. The total impact of aid on poverty is 
illustrated in Equation 4.1:  
 
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝑉)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
=
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝑉)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
+  
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝑉)
𝜕(𝐺𝐷𝑃)
඄
𝜕(𝐺𝐷𝑃)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
+
𝜕(𝐺𝐷𝑃)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝐿)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
ඈ
+ 
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝑉)
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝐿)
𝜕(𝑃𝑂𝐿)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷)
 
[4.1] 
 
where డ(௉ை௏)
డ(஺ூ஽)
 is the direct effect of aid on poverty, and the second and third terms represent the 
interaction between aid and growth (𝐺𝐷𝑃) and policy (𝑃𝑂𝐿).  The total impact of foreign aid 
(𝐴𝐼𝐷) on poverty (𝑃𝑂𝑉) is thus a combination of its direct effect, its effect on GDP per capita 
(𝐺𝐷𝑃) plus the effect on policy (the vector 𝑃𝑂𝐿).  
 
As illustrated in Equation 4.1, there are various ways or channels through which aid can affect 
poverty. Foreign aid that generates income earning opportunities or provides social services, 
such as donor-funded projects in health or sanitation, can reduce poverty directly. Aid that 
contributes to economic growth might lead to long-term poverty reduction. Furthermore, aid 
that is directed through government spending can reduce poverty by increasing expenditure on 
those social services that contribute directly to welfare improvement and poverty reduction  
(Gomanee, et al., 2004). Furthermore, aid has been used to strengthen democratic institutions, 
with the hope that strong institutions will lead to sustainable development and poverty 
reduction  (Riddell, 2008).  
 
One of the objectives of this study is to test whether foreign aid can impact poverty through 
enhancement of political or economic freedom. The majority of literature on the aid-growth-
poverty nexus cites the importance of macroeconomic and pro-poor policies, institutions, and 
democracy as the main requirements or channels for aid effectiveness (World Bank, 1998; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Mosley et al., 2004; Alvi & Senbeta, 2012).  
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This study tests the efficacy of the so-called WC36 model of aid allocation. The term WC refers 
to a set of economic policy prescriptions associated with institutions based in Washington, D.C. 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department. The original policy 
prescriptions, in the 1980s, included minimum government intervention in the market, 
privatisation, trade liberalisation, and deregulation (Quibria & Islam, 2015). These were later 
“augmented” to include a set of economic and political conditions such as “good” governance 
and institutional quality, which became known as aid conditionalities or selection criteria 
(Rodrik, 2006; Riddell, 2008; Lew & Arvin, 2015).  
 
This theoretical framework can be located within the seminal studies by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) who found that that aid is effective in reducing poverty only in countries with good 
policy environments. Collier and Dollar (2002) argued that foreign aid can reduce extreme 
poverty and hasten poverty reduction in poor countries with good policies and quality 
institutions.  Kosack (2003) found that foreign aid could be more effective in improving quality 
of life in more democratic countries. According to the United Nations General Assembly 
(1993) and Reinsberg (2015), some donors have embraced political freedom and economic 
liberalisation as part of the conditionalities in their foreign aid allocation.  Following Kosack 
(2003) and Connors (2011), the proxies for the policy variable in this study are political and 
economic freedom which are used separately in the estimations. However, unlike Kosack 
(2003) and other previous studies, the present study’s proxies for the dependent variable 
(poverty) are different measures of extreme poverty.  
 
4.2.2. Empirical model specification for examining the impact of foreign aid  
 
According to Datt and Ravallion (1992), a poverty measure can be decomposed into growth 
and distributional effects as follows: 
 
𝑃௧ =  𝑃(𝑍|𝜇௧, 𝐿௧) [4.2] 
 
                                               
36The term Washington Consensus was first used by an English economist named John Williamson in 1989.  
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where 𝑃௧ is the poverty measure, 𝑍 is the poverty line, 𝜇௧ is the mean income, and 𝐿௧ is the 
vector of parameters explaining the Lorenz curve at time 𝑡 (Datt & Ravallion, 1992, p. 277). 
Taking a derivative of Equation (4.2) will decompose poverty into the following equation: 
 
∆𝑃𝑜𝑣 =  ∆𝑃𝑜𝑣ீ + ∆𝑃𝑜𝑣ோ [4.3] 
 
This implies that changes in poverty measures can be decomposed into growth (∆𝑃𝑜𝑣ீ) and 
redistribution (∆𝑃𝑜𝑣ோ) components37. Datt and Ravallion (1992), Ravallion and Chen (1997), 
and recently Alvi and Senbeta (2012, 2014) used Equations 4.2 and 4.3 as basic specifications 
for poverty analysis.  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌௜௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺௜௧ +  𝜗௜ +  𝜀௜௧ [4.4] 
 
where 𝑃௝௜௧ is a vector of the measures (proxies) of extreme poverty in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Each 
proxy of extreme poverty is represented by the subscript 𝑗. In this study, there are three proxies 
of extreme poverty, namely the poverty headcount rate, the PG, and the SPG. In addition, 𝛽ଵ 
is the growth elasticity of poverty  (Besley & Burgess, 2003) and 𝑌௜௧ is the real per capita 
income (real GDP per capita).  𝐺௜௧ is the Gini coefficient for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝜗௜ is the 
unobserved individual country-specific effect, and 𝜀௜௧ is the idiosyncratic error term.  
 
Following the World Bank (1998), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Mosley et al. (2004), and Alvi 
and Senbeta (2012), Equation (4.4) can be augmented by incorporating foreign aid as shown 
in Equation (4.5):  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌௜௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺௜௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑋௝௜௧ + 𝛽ହ𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧ +  𝜗௜
+  𝜀௜௧ 
[4.5] 
 
                                               
37See Akobeng (2016, p. 212). 
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where 𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧ is a vector of foreign aid proxies, including ODA as a percentage of GNI, loans, 
grants, and multilateral and bilateral aid. Each proxy is used individually in this study’s 
estimation. The coefficient 𝛽ଷ captures the direct effect of foreign aid on poverty. Furthermore, 
𝑋௝௜௧ represents a vector of control variables, while 𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧ is a vector for either political or 
economic freedom for country 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
 
The study is also aimed at exploring the conditions under which foreign aid can lead to poverty 
reduction or channels through which aid impacts on poverty. As demonstrated in sub-section 
4.2.1 (theoretical framework) above, aid may affect poverty through economic growth and 
policy. Literature on the aid-poverty nexus emphasises the importance of policies, institutions, 
democracy and pro-poor policies as the main requirements for aid effectiveness (see World 
Bank, 1998; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Mosley et al., 2004; Alvi & Senbeta, 2012, among 
others). In the present study, these conditions are subdivided into socio-economic policies and 
freedom. The former includes FDI, secondary education, civil conflict trade openness and the 
globalisation index.  
 
Seminal studies by Bane and Ellwood (1986) and Hoynes et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
poverty is persistent, and past levels of poverty can thus explain the current and future poverty 
levels. The lagged poverty level (𝑃௝௜,௧ିଵ) can therefore be introduced as one of the regressors 
to account for the persistent nature of poverty (Equation 4.6). Equation 4.6 is the fully specified 
augmented model.  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜௧ = 𝛼଴ +  𝛽଴𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌௜௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺௜௧ +  𝛽ଷ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑋௝௜௧
+ 𝛽ହ𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧ +  𝜗௜ + 𝜀௜௧  
[4.6] 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to test whether political or economic freedom enhances 
the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty. The interaction of foreign aid with a vector 
for either political or economic freedom is therefore included, as presented in Equation 4.738.  
 
                                               
38According to Brambor et al. (2006), all constitutive terms should be included in the interaction model 
specification.  
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜௧ =  𝛼଴ +  𝛽଴𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃௝௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌௜௧ +  𝛽ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺௜௧ +  𝛽ଷ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑋௝௜௧
+ 𝛽ହlog (𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧  X 𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧) + 𝜗௜ + 𝜀௜௧ 
[4.7] 
 
Differentiating Equation 4.8 with respect to foreign aid (𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧) yields the following (Equation 
4.8): 
𝜕(𝑃௝௜௧)
𝜕(𝐴𝐼𝐷௝௜௧)
=  𝛽ଷ + 𝛽ହlog𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧ [4.8] 
 
where 𝛽ଷ and 𝛽ହ capture the extent to which 𝑃𝑂𝐿௝௜௧ enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid 
in poverty reduction. The introduction of the interaction term means that the effect of foreign 
aid on poverty, in such a specification, should be treated as a marginal effect (see Brambor et 
al., 2006; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; Akobeng, 2016). 
 
All the independent variables in the models estimated (including the policy and control 
variables) have been picked, based on the literature on the decomposition of and determinants 
of poverty. The explanatory variables have also been used in previous poverty and foreign aid 
studies (World Bank, 1998; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Kosack, 2003; Mosley et al., 2004; 
Connors, 2011; Alvi & Senbeta, 2012) and are briefly explained in the next subsection.  
 
4.2.3. Definitions of variables and a prior expectation  
 
The dependent variable for this study is extreme poverty. The class of poverty measure used in 
this study follows the work of Foster et al. (1984), with three proxies for extreme poverty 
measures: (i) poverty headcount index, (ii) poverty gap index, and (iii) squared poverty gap 
index. The headcount index, or the poverty rate, measures the proportion of households in a 
population with income per person below the poverty line. Thus, it measures the prevalence of 
poverty, in terms of the spread of poverty within the population (Schaffner, 2014). The poverty-
gap index measures the depth of poverty and it considers the dispersal of the poor (Schaffner, 
2014, p. 88). The squared poverty gap index (also referred to as the poverty severity index) is 
sensitive to both global prevalence and the average depth of poverty as well as the occurrence 
of deep poverty among the poor (Alvi & Senbeta, 2012; Schaffner, 2014). For this study, the 
international poverty line adopted is US$1.90 a day, commonly known as a “dollar a day”. 
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Foreign or developmental aid is the key independent variable in this study. Foreign aid is 
generally defined as public and private funds given to developing countries – “with the main 
purpose of improving economic development and welfare traps” (Clunies-Ross et al., 2009, p. 
590). The study used the standard definitions used by OECD-DAC. Official development 
assistance and OA include (i) grants and (ii) concessional loans of more than a year’s term, and 
with a 25% or more grant element. Foreign aid can also be categorised according to its (i) 
source and (ii) type. The main sources of foreign aid to developing countries are (a) bilateral, 
which is from one country’s government to another, and (b) multilateral (many-sided), which 
goes through international institutions, such as the World Bank and the U.N. agencies. The 
three types of aid are total aid, loans and grants. This study disaggregated foreign aid into the 
above-mentioned three types and two sources in order to examine the effects of each category 
on poverty. Grants do not carry any interest, and no repayment is required, while loans carry 
interest and need to be repaid. Therefore, their effects on poverty are expected to be different. 
Moreover, the literature suggests that bilateral aid is usually allocated along colonial lines and 
strategic alliances, whereas multilateral aid has “economic development and welfare” as the 
main objective (Peiffer & Boussalis, 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016). If foreign aid (or 
each proxy) indeed reduces poverty, then the coefficient of aid (𝛽ଷ) is expected to be negative. 
 
The main independent variables are based on poverty decomposition by Datt and Ravallion 
(1992) and Ravallion and Chen (1997) who decomposed poverty into growth and distributional 
effects which are proxied by real GDP per capita at 2010 constant prices and the Gini 
coefficient respectively. The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure of inequality. The 
coefficient lies between 0 and 1 (or from 0% to 100%), with higher values signifying higher 
levels of inequality. Both theoretical and empirical literature suggest that economic growth 
leads to poverty reduction; thus, the expected sign for 𝛽ଵ is negative. The coefficient 𝛽ଵ, which 
is the growth elasticity of poverty, captures how growth in average income enables the poor to 
come out of poverty. According to Feeny (2003, p. 73), “growth is often viewed as the primary 
driver of poverty reduction and therefore inferences of the impact of aid on poverty are 
commonly drawn from the impact of aid on growth”. Other studies such as those by Collier and 
Dollar (2001, 2002), Kraay (2005), and Guillaumont and Wagner (2014) support the view that 
foreign aid might affect poverty through growth.  
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The coefficient for the inequality variable or Gini (𝛽ଶ) is expected to be positive, as greater 
inequality is assumed to lead to increased poverty through hampering the extent to which 
growth benefits the poor (Hanmer & Naschold, 2000; Naschold, 2002). However, it is 
important to note that poverty and inequality, though theoretically distinct, are closely related 
(Atkinson, 1987; Karagiannaki, 2017). Therefore, an increase in inequality is expected to be 
associated with a corresponding increase in poverty. 
 
Our policy variables are political freedom (democracy) and economic freedom. The 
relationship between political or economic freedom and poverty seems to have contrasting 
results across the literature.  Theoretically, since the majority of the population in developing 
countries are poor, one would expect that the poor would use their numbers in an electoral 
process to put the government to account (Varshney, 1999). It is further argued that political 
freedom (democracy) is likely to contribute to poverty reduction as long it is deepened to 
include (i) freedom to organise, (ii) real authority for elected rulers, (iii) substantive policy 
agendas, and (iv) direct participation (Moore, 2004; Agborsangaya-Fiteu, 2009). However, 
empirical studies have shown that there is no direct link between democracy and poverty 
reduction. Varshney (1999, p. 4) asserted “that democracies by themselves do not remove 
poverty; economic strategies do.” Bratton (2006, p. v) explored the relationship between the 
poor in sub-Saharan Africa and democratic citizenship. This research discovered that, though 
the poor were dissatisfied with the quality of service delivery, they lacked ‘key capabilities of 
democratic citizenship’ and therefore could not use institutions of democracy to make elected 
national leaders accountable. Furthermore, transitioning to political and economic freedom has 
not led to poverty reduction in some countries (Tuya, 2013; Connors, 2011).  Varshney (1999) 
therefore, suggests that there are poor and rich democracies in the world which implies that the 
impact of political and/or economic freedom on poverty can either be positive or negative.  
 
As postulated by Klein et al. (2001), it would be expected that foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows lead to a reduction in poverty. However, other studies found that FDI might also lead 
to an increase in poverty or a neutral relationship (Huang et al., 2010; Gohou & Soumare, 2012; 
Shamim et al., 2014). Thus, the FDI coefficient could be positive or negative.   
 
According to the World Bank (2002, p. ix), the evaluation of the impact of globalisation, 
defined as “the growing integration of economies and societies around the world” on poverty 
has produced mixed results. Generally, globalisation reduces poverty, because more integrated 
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economies tend to grow faster, and this growth is usually widely diffused. Even though the 
economic arguments in favour of globalisation emphasise the positive relationships between 
increased globalisation and higher living standards (or poverty reduction), the UN (2001) noted 
that the “reality has proven not to be so rosy”. Furthermore, a World Bank (2002) study has 
shown that, on the one hand, globalisation is credited for the massive poverty reduction in poor 
countries with around 3 billion people, whose countries managed to break into the global 
market. On the other hand, poor countries with around 2 billion people are being left behind, 
playing very marginal roles in the global economy (World Bank, 2002, pp. ix-x). Basu (2006) 
agrees with the World Bank (2002) that globalisation can either be good or bad depending on 
period or location among others. This suggests that the impact of globalisation on poverty can 
either be negative or positive.  
 
There are two main schools of thought on the relationship between poverty and conflict in 
literature. The first group posts poverty as the main cause of civil war and conflict (Braithwaite 
et al., 2016). The second group contends that conflict leads to poverty (Collier et al., 2003). 
They argue that “once a country experiences conflict, it faces a reversal of economic 
development, which in turn increases the likelihood of future onsets of conflict” (Braithwaite 
et al., 2016, p. 46). 
 
Justino and Verwimp (2013) investigated the impact of conflict on poverty in Rwanda and 
found that households who had faced violent conflicts were more likely to fall into poverty. 
Braithwaite et al. (2016) found that causality runs from poverty to conflict. Gurr and Marshall 
(2005) found that poverty and civil conflict tend to reinforce each other, as some conflicts are 
caused by a combination of poverty and weak states and institutions. This suggests that there 
is a possibility of endogeneity and causal relationship between poverty and conflict. Thus, the 
coefficient for civil conflict can either be negative or positive. Lastly, civil conflict variables 
need to be treated as endogenous in our estimation.  
 
Many development practitioners and policy makers believe that education is the surest way for 
individuals to overcome poverty (McKinney, 2014; Kilty, 2015). South Africa’s former 
president, Nelson Mandela is quoted as saying: 
“Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that 
the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that the son of a mine worker can 
become the head of the mine, that a child of farm workers can become the president of 
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a great nation. It is what we make out of what we have, not what we are given, that 
separates one person from another” (Mandela, 1995, p. 20). 
 
Theoretically, low levels of education are regarded as one of the causes and symptoms of 
poverty (Pritchett , et al., 2000). Eryong and Xiuping (2018) argue that the higher the level of 
education, the higher the level of income and hence the lower level of poverty. It is therefore 
expected that the coefficient for secondary education will be negative thus implying that the 
higher the level of education the lower the levels of poverty.  
 
Regarding the relationship between international trade (trade openness) and poverty, the World 
Bank Group and World Trade Organization (2015) argue that trade can reduce poverty 
indirectly through economic growth and directly through the creation of employment for low 
skilled and poor workers in export industries. The World Bank Group and World Trade 
Organization (2018, p. 8) further noted that, though there are several channels through which 
trade affects poverty, empirical evidence reveals that the poor are affected differently. This 
suggests that the coefficient of trade openness on a poverty regression could be negative and 
significant or insignificant. According to Harrison (2006), globalisation encompasses 
international trade. This raises the possibility of multicollinearity in our data.  
 
4.2.4. Endogeneity and other methodological issues 
 
One of the main criticisms of the early AEL is that empirical studies lack robustness of 
econometric results (Chauvet, 2015, p. 360). This is partially because of the weaknesses in the 
methodologies used in addressing endogeneity issues. Several seminal studies in the AEL seem 
to conclude that earlier estimates of foreign aid effects may not be reliable because of 
endogeneity bias (Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; Civelli et al., 2018, p. 50). 
 
The endogeneity of foreign aid emanates from two main sources: (i) reverse causality (or 
simultaneity) between aid and poverty and (ii) unobservable heterogeneity or omitted variable 
bias (Baltagi, 2013). In this study’s model, if aid donors are motivated by poverty reduction, 
then the higher the levels of poverty, the greater the desire to offer foreign aid to reduce them. 
Second, some donors might be motivated by a desire to stimulate real income growth in an aid-
recipient country thus leading to a correlation between foreign aid and GDP per capita, which 
are both right-hand-side (RHS) regressors. Furthermore, the addition of the lagged dependent 
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variable (𝑃௜,௧ିଵ) in Equation 4.1 as part of the regressors introduces new complications, 
including autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Endogeneity, autocorrelation, and heterogeneity 
lead to inconsistency of the OLS, random, and fixed-effects estimates (Baltagi, 2005, 2013). 
 
The instrumental variable (IV) methods in this research involve the use of relevant instruments 
that are correlated with foreign aid (the main explanatory variable) but not with the explained 
variable (poverty). According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), an ideal instrument comes from 
institutional knowledge and the researcher’s ideas about the processes determining the variable 
of interest. 
 
For this study, the relevant instrument(s) should be correlated with the explanatory variable 
(foreign aid) but not with the dependent variable (poverty). The instrument (commonly referred 
to as Z) should satisfy the following two conditions: (i) cov (Z, aid) ≠ 0, and (ii) cov (Z, ε) = 
0; that is, the instrument should be highly correlated with the independent or main explanatory 
variable (aid) but uncorrelated with the error, respectively (Asra, et al., 2005, p. 4). The IVs 
proposed in this research should affect the level of foreign aid received by a country while 
being exogenous to the recipient country’s level of poverty. Therefore, the instrument can be 
any factor that is in the foreign aid allocation function but does not appear in the poverty 
function (Baum, 2006).  
 
To address endogeneity issues, several possible external instruments were developed or 
collated and tested for suitability in this study. The instruments include a donor’s friend dummy 
(France colony), as used by Boone (1994, 1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Easterly 
(2005); a recipient country’s arms imports (Boone, 1994, 1996; Burnside & Dollar, 2000); 
population size (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2005); the GDP per capita of the OECD39 
countries multiplied by the inverse of the distance between the aid receiving country and the 
main OECD countries (Tavares, 2003; Akobeng, 2016), and lagged aid (Dalgaard, et al., 2004). 
The other external instruments tested in this study include the recipient country’s arms imports 
(Boone, 1994, 1996; Burnside & Dollar, 2000), population size (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; 
Easterly, 2005), and lagged aid (Dalgaard, et al., 2004). However, the prospect of finding 
                                               
39The 28 donor countries are the UK, the USA, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, 
Portugal, Poland, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Korean Republic, Japan, Italy, 
Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Germany, France, Finland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Canada, Belgium, Austria, 
and Australia.  
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suitable instruments that adequately address the aid endogeneity issue has been criticised by 
Roodman (2008) and Deaton (2009); thus, the study used internal instrumentation techniques. 
In the SGMM framework, the predetermined and endogenous variables in levels were 
instrumented by suitable lags in their own first differences (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Baltagi, 
2013). 
 
4.2.5. Justification for using system-generalised method of moments 
 
Empirical literature posits a number of approaches to estimating a DPD model with suspected 
endogeneity problems. These include (i) an IV approach proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981, 1982), (ii) the first-differenced GMM (DGMM) estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
(iii) a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) or fixed-effects (FE) estimators 
developed by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005a, 2005b), and (iv) the SGMM (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995;  Blundell and Bond, 1998). In a model with highly dynamic data, the first two 
estimation techniques have been proven to suffer from a severe small-sample bias because of 
weak instruments (Nickell, 1981; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Though the LSDVC approach 
performs well in small, dynamic, and unbalanced panel data samples, the model is not suitable 
where endogenous variables exist on the RHS, as it is for “strictly exogenous regressors” 
(Bruno, 2005b, p. 473).  
 
To overcome the problems of endogeneity, simultaneity, autocorrelation, and heterogeneity in 
this study’s data, the endogeneity robust SGMM was adopted. It is an extension of the Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) method by Roodman (2009a, 2009b) and is 
available as xtabond2 in Stata. The SGMM estimator produces dramatic efficiency gains over 
the basic DGMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Baltagi, 2013, p. 168). 
 
Some of the advantages of the SGMM estimation approach over the other methods and its 
suitability for the sample in this research are briefly explained next. First, the method is suitable 
for dynamic or persistent panels.  
 
Second, the SGMM addresses biases due to endogeneity (or reverse causality) by controlling 
for simultaneity (using an instrumentation process) and the unobserved heterogeneity (using 
time-invariant omitted variables). This is partially done through the use of lagged explanatory 
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variables as internal instruments. The estimation technique also allows for the inclusion of 
external instruments.  
 
Third, the technique is suitable in the “small T, large N” context, by addressing the Nickell 
(1981) bias and applying the “Windmeijer finite-sample correction” (Windmeijer, 2005). In 
this study’s sample, the number of countries (N = 120) is greater than the number of years (T 
= 12).  
 
Fourth, the approach eliminates the country-fixed effects by differencing the internal 
instruments to make them exogenous to the fixed effects (Akobeng, 2016, p. 215); however, it 
does not eliminate the country differences. It controls for cross-country dependence, limits 
instrument proliferation, and restricts over-identification (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Roodman, 
2009b; Baltagi, 2013; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018a, 2018b). The estimator 
allows the researcher to control for time-invariant, country-specific effects and the endogeneity 
of foreign aid (Alvi & Senbeta, 2012, p. 955).  
 
Fifth, the two-step SGMM approach was adopted in this research’s specification because of its 
ability to control for heteroscedasticity – instead of the one-step approach, which is consistent 
with homoscedasticity. Forward orthogonal deviations were also adopted rather than 
differencing, so as to minimise data loss (Roodman, 2009b). 
  
4.2.6. Identification, exclusion restrictions, specification, and robustness checks under 
the generalised method of moments approach 
 
Following recent literature on the identification strategy by Love and Zicchino (2006), 
Roodman (2009b), and Boateng et al. (2018), all explanatory variables in this study, with the 
exception of year dummies or time-invariant variables are treated as endogenous or 
predetermined. Therefore, the gmmstyle is adopted for all the explanatory variables. The time-
invariant variable (years) is treated as exogenous, and the corresponding approach for treating 
ivstyle (years) is “iv (years, eq[diff])”. It is plausible to treat years as exogenous, as it is unlikely 
for a time variable to be endogenous in the first difference (Roodman, 2009b; Asongu & De 
Moor, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018).  
 
138 
 
The first source of endogeneity, which is simultaneity, is addressed through instrumentation. 
As indicated above, both external and internal instruments are utilised40. The lagged regressors 
are used as internal instruments for forward-differenced variables. The process involves the 
use of Helmert transformations, which reduces the impact of fixed effects on the relationship 
under examination (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006; Asongu & De Moor, 
2017). This transformation involves deducting the average of all future observations from the 
variables instead of the traditional method of subtracting the past observations from the present 
ones. This process is suitable for unbalanced panels, as it minimises data loss. According to 
Roodman (2009b, p. 21), this transformation, “… no matter how many gaps, … is computable 
for all observations except the last for each individual, so it minimizes data loss. And because 
lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments”. 
 
Lastly, the second source of endogeneity could be omitted variable bias. The IV literature 
requires strict instrument exogeneity. Theoretically, a need exists for exclusion restrictions: 
ruling out any direct effect of the chosen instruments (which is the time-invariant variable) on 
the dependent variable (poverty) or any effect running through omitted variables. This is a test 
for whether the strictly exogenous instruments affect poverty exclusively through the 
predetermined and endogenous variables (Bobba & Coviello, 2007; Asongu & De Moor, 
2017). To test for exclusion restriction, the Difference in Hansen test (DHT) for instrument 
exogeneity is used. The null hypothesis of the DHT should not be rejected for confirmation 
that the instruments are explaining poverty through predetermined and suspected endogenous 
variables.  
 
Overall, four main information criteria are used to assess the validity of the GMM model 
(Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p. 200). First, there is a test for serial- and autocorrelation. 
Therefore, tests are performed for both first- and second-order serial correlations using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test. The null hypothesis is that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the disturbances of the first-differenced equation. By definition, first-order serial 
correlation is expected, but not second order for the consistency of the GMM estimator. The 
null hypothesis of the second-order autocorrelation test [AR (2)] should thus not be rejected 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991; Baltagi, 2013).  
 
                                               
40The xtabond2 approach allows for the use of both external and internal instruments (Roodman, 2009a, 2009b).  
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The second criterion involves testing the validity of instruments or that instruments are not 
correlated with error terms. These are called over-identification restriction (OIR) tests, and they 
can be conducted using the Sargan (1958) or Hansen (1982) J test. The Hansen J test is 
preferable because of its robustness for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. According to 
Baum (2006, p. 201), Hansen’s J statistics can also be used to evaluate the suitability of the 
model; thus, rejection of the null hypothesis implies that IVs do not satisfy the orthogonal 
conditions required41. The null hypothesis for the Hansen J test is that OIRs are valid. It is 
important to note that in the GMM estimation approach, using too many moment conditions is 
as undesirable as using too few moment conditions (Andersen & Sørensen, 1996).  
 
Additionally, the problem becomes more pronounced with panel data, where the number of 
moment conditions grows considerably with the growth in the number of time-series 
observations and strictly exogenous variables. As a rule of thumb requirement, to avoid over-
identification, the number of cross-sectional units should be higher than the number of 
instruments in each specification (see Bobba & Coviello, 2007; Roodman, 2009b; Baltagi, 
2013).  
 
Third, the DHT for instrument exogeneity should be conducted to test the validity of results 
from the Hansen OIR test (Asongu & De Moor, 2017). Fourth, different proxies of aid and 
poverty were used, and the results of the estimation are compared to those of previous studies. 
 
4.3. Panel Data Vector Error Correction Model: Causality Between 
Foreign Aid and Poverty 
 
Apart from investigating the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty, this study also seeks to 
establish the direction of causality between these two main variables. Causality is normally 
investigated through the Granger causality framework (Granger, 1969; Green, 2003; Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2013). The main assumption in the Granger (1969) causality test 
literature is that a variable (say X) can only be said to cause (Granger cause) another variable 
(say Y) if current values of Y are conditional on past values of X. In other words, the future 
cannot cause (or predict) the past.  
                                               
41 However, the Hansen’s J statistic is known to over-reject the null hypothesis in certain circumstances (Baum, 
2006). 
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Recent developments in the Granger (1969) causality literature have seen the extension of this 
methodology from time-series to panel data. Further developments have also included the need 
to test for the time-series properties of the data, including stationarity and cointegration tests. 
If the variables are integrated of the same order [I(1)], and they are co-integrated, then Granger 
causality can be tested through the panel VECM, as proposed by Granger (1988). A vector 
autoregression (VARs) approach could also be employed if the variables are not co-integrated 
(Dumitrescu & Hurlin, 2012; Mahembe, 2014; Muye & Muye, 2016). In summary, the 
conditions for the VECM include the following: (i) the series must be stationary or integrated 
of the same order, (ii) estimated parameters are sensitive to the number of lagged terms 
included in the model, (iii) error terms entering the causality test should be uncorrelated, and 
(iv) variables should be co-integrated (Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, the two-step Engle-Granger causality procedure in the panel VECM framework 
allows for the testing of both short- and long-run causality. There are three possible Granger 
(1969, 1988) causality outcomes: (i) unidirectional causality between two variables, which 
supports a supply-leading or a demand-following hypothesis; (ii) bidirectional causality, 
supporting the feedback hypothesis; and (iii) independence or no causality, which supports a 
neutrality hypothesis. Furthermore, three types of causal inference exist in this setup, namely: 
(i) short-term causal effects; (ii) long-term causal effects; and (iii) strong causal effects, which 
occur when there is evidence of both short- and long-run causal effects. There is also a 
possibility that the system can have evidence of long-run causality without short-run causality. 
This is an exception, however. 
 
The following procedures were implemented in the Granger causality test using the panel 
VECM framework: 
i. model specification 
ii. panel data stationarity test  
iii. panel data cross-sectional dependency (CSD) test 
iv. determination of optimal lags 
v. panel data cointegration test 
vi. panel data causality test, using the panel VECM 
vii. post-estimation diagnostic tests 
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These steps are briefly explained in the next sub-sections. Where possible, a comparison is 
made of different testing methods and a justification is provided for the method(s) chosen.  
 
4.3.1. Empirical model specification for testing the causal relationship between foreign 
aid and poverty 
 
The main purpose of this analysis is to examine the direction of causality between the study’s 
two main variables: extreme poverty (proxied by the poverty headcount rate) and foreign aid 
(proxied by ODA as a percentage of GNI). However, given the prominent role of economic 
growth in achieving poverty reduction, Granger causality was conducted within a panel 
trivariate setting, with economic growth (proxied by the real GDP per capita) as the intermittent 
variable. The choice of having economic growth as an intermittent variable is based on the 
theoretical links between foreign aid and economic growth, between poverty and economic 
growth, and among the three variables simultaneously.  
 
The model specification follows that by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), and it describes the causal 
relationship between foreign aid, poverty, and economic growth, as shown in Equation 4.10:  
𝑃𝑂𝑉 =  𝑓(𝑂𝐷𝐴, 𝐺𝐷𝑃) [4.10] 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑉 is the poverty headcount rate, 𝑂𝐷𝐴 is foreign aid as a percentage of GNI, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
represents economic growth. This structural causal framework can be written in the VECM 
and matrix format as depicted in Equation 4.11: 
 
∆𝑃𝑂𝑉௜௧
∆𝑂𝐷𝐴௜௧
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧
 = 
𝛼ଵ௝
𝛼ଶ௝
𝛼ଷ௝
 + ෍
௤ିଵ
௞ୀଵ
 
𝛽ଵଵ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଵଶ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଵଷ௜௞(𝐿) 
𝛽ଶଵ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଶଶ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଶଷ௜௞(𝐿) 
𝛽ଷଵ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଷଶ௜௞(𝐿)𝛽ଷଷ௜௞(𝐿) 
∆𝑃𝑂𝑉௜௧ି௞
∆𝑂𝐷𝐴௜௧ି௞
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ି௞
 + 
𝜆ଵ௝𝐸𝐶𝑇௜௧ିଵ 
𝜆ଶ௝𝐸𝐶𝑇௜௧ିଵ 
𝜆ଷ௝𝐸𝐶𝑇௜௧ିଵ 
+ 
𝜀ଵ௜௧ 
𝜀ଶ௜௧ 
𝜀ଷ௜௧ 
[4.11] 
 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑉, 𝑂𝐷𝐴, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 are as defined in 4.11 and which alternate in taking the dependent 
and explanatory variable roles; ∆ is the first-difference operator (I − 𝐿); the = 1, …, N; t = 1, 
…, T; 𝛼௦ , 𝛽௦, and 𝜆௦ (j = 1...,3) are parameters to be estimated; 𝜀௝௧ (j = 1...,3) represents white 
noise error terms; 𝐸𝐶𝑇௜௧ିଵ indicates the lagged values of the error correction terms (ECTs) 
from the cointegration regressions, and 𝜆௦ is the speed of adjustment along the long-term 
equilibrium path. Short-run causality is inferred from the lagged dynamic variables of the 
142 
 
explanatory variables (𝛽௦) using the partial 𝝌𝟐 statistics of the Wald test (Wald, 1943). Long-
run causality is tested through the lagged co-integrating vectors 𝐸𝐶𝑇௧ି௝ (𝜆௦).  
 
4.3.2. Panel data unit root tests 
 
One of the key requirements for the panel VECM is that the variables’ stationarity properties 
must be tested. This is done through panel unit root tests which examine the order of integration 
where the panel variable attains stationarity (Pradhan & Arvin, 2015, p. 241). Several panel 
unit root tests exist, but the main ones from empirical literature are by Levin et al. (2002) (also 
known as Levin-Lin-Chu or LLC) and Im et al. (2003) (Im-Pesaran-Shin, IPS). Though both 
tests are based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) principle (see Equation 4.12 below), 
the main difference between the two is that the former assumes a homogeneous unit root across 
all cross-sections, whereas the latter allows for heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2013, p. 276). 
∆𝑦௜,௧ = 𝜌௜ 𝑦௜,௧ିଵ +  ෍ 𝜃௜௅
௉௜
௅ୀଵ
∆𝑦௜,௧ି௅ + ∝௠௜ 𝑑௠௧ + 𝜀௜,௧, for 𝑚 = 1,2,3. [4.12] 
 
where dmt denotes the vector of deterministic variables; 𝜌௜ is the lag-order, which is permitted 
to vary across cross-sections and is determined by choosing a 𝜌௠௔௫ and then using a t-statistic 
of 𝜃௜௅. Finally, i,t is assumed to be independently distributed across i and t, i = 1,..., N, t = 1,..., 
T.  
 
The results of the panel unit root tests inform the panel causality tests procedure. As indicated 
above, two important conditions for the estimation of the panel VECM Granger causality test 
are that the variables must be stationary and integrated of order one (i.e. I(1)). 
 
The null hypothesis under both LLC and IPS is that the series contains a unit root against the 
alternative that each series is stationary. The IPS is preferred because of its ability to cater for 
individual country heterogeneity. The panel unit root tests are performed on each of the three 
variables on both level and first differences. For a robustness check, two other tests were also 
conducted, namely Fisher-ADF and Fisher-Phillips-Perron (Fisher-PP) panel unit root tests 
(Madala & Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001).  
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4.3.3. Panel cross-sectional dependency tests and determination of optimal lags 
 
Testing for CSD is one of the key issues to consider when dealing with panel data Granger 
causality tests (Muye & Muye, 2016). As a consequence of increased globalisation and the 
interconnectedness of the developing countries in this study’s sample, there is a possibility that 
a structural break or shock in one country could affect other countries in the sample. The null 
hypothesis is that no CSD (correlation) exists in residuals, and the test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as standard normal (Tekin, 2012b). In this research, both the Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) and Pesaran (2004) tests were employed, though the former is more valid mainly for a 
large T and small N (Pesaran, 2004). The latter was primarily used for a robustness check.  
 
Panel Granger causality tests are known to be sensitive to lag lengths; therefore, it is important 
to establish the optimal lags (Konya, 2006; Mahembe & Odhiambo, 2016; Tekin, 2012b). The 
most common lag length selection methods42 in literature are the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and Schwarz information criteria (SCs) (Schwarz , 1978). Other 
researchers compared the two models and found that both are generally valid in optimal model 
selection, though Kuha (2004) and Wang and Liu (2006) provided evidence that the SCs 
perform better. Winker and Maringer (2005) showed that SCs perform relatively well in the 
VECM framework. This study therefore employed them using the unrestricted VAR model to 
determine the optimal lag selection. The AIC was also utilised for a robustness check.  
 
4.3.4. Panel cointegration tests 
 
Panel cointegration tests are conducted to determine whether a long-run equilibrium 
relationship exists between non-stationary variables. The results of the panel cointegration tests 
influence the panel Granger causality test strategy and model specification (Karanfil & Li, 
2015). A result that indicates panel variable cointegration implies that the variables under 
consideration move together over time so that short-term disturbances are corrected in the long 
run (Engle & Granger, 1987; Stock & Watson, 1993). Therefore, causality should be 
investigated through the panel VECM framework. Conversely, a lack of cointegration suggests 
that the variables do not have a long-run relation and therefore tend to move randomly away 
                                               
42 Other lag length selection methods include the sequential modified LR test statistic, the final prediction error, 
and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion.  
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from each other (Granger, 1988). A panel VAR should hence be estimated for causality 
analysis. 
 
As with the panel unit root tests, several panel cointegration tests are used in empirical 
literature. These tests can be divided into two broad groups, namely residual-based and the 
likelihood-based tests. The most popular test from the first group is the one developed by Kao 
(1999), while the Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration tests consist of a set of seven tests, 
which combine the residual-based Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests, the ADF, and Philips-Perron 
(PP) principles. This study uses both the Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel 
cointegration tests. The Kao (1999) test is residual-based and assumes a homogenous or 
common co-integrating vector, whereas the Pedroni (1999, 2004) test allows for significant 
heterogeneity. For both tests, the null hypothesis is that no cointegration exists against an 
alternative that there is a co-integrating relationship.  
 
4.3.5. Panel causality and post-estimation diagnostic tests  
 
Having established the order of integration through the panel root tests and the presence of a 
long-run equilibrium through the panel cointegration tests, the next step is to test the direction 
of causality – dynamic panel causality tests. The tests for causality, however, are dependent on 
the panel cointegration results (Granger, 1988; Engle & Granger, 1987; Stock & Watson, 
1993). In the case of no cointegration, a panel VAR equation is estimated. The panel VAR 
equation is similar to Equation 4.11 above but without the error correction component43. In a 
panel VAR, only short-run coefficients are estimated, and short-run causality is inferred. Four 
categories of results are expected from the panel VAR/VECM Granger causality approach: (i) 
joint causality, where the coefficient of the ECT is negative and significant; (ii) short-run 
causality, when the coefficients of the short-run explanatory variables are statistically 
significant; (iii) long-run causality, when the coefficients of the long-run explanatory variables 
are statistically significant; and (iv) strong causality, which is a situation in which the ECT is 
present and both short-run and long-run causality occurs.  
 
 
 
                                               
43A panel VECM is a restricted panel VAR.  
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After estimating the VECM, causality can be inferred in three main ways:  
(i) Checking the regressors’ and ECT t-statistics. Short-run causal effects are inferred 
if the regressors’ t-statistics are statistically significant, while long-run causality is 
inferred when the coefficient of the ECT is negative and statistically significant. 
(ii) Granger/Wald causality test. This a short-run causality test, and it is conducted on 
the lagged explanatory variables. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient(s) of the 
lagged regressor(s) or explanatory variables is equal to zero against the alternative 
hypothesis that the coefficient(s) is not equal to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected 
if the probability value of the 𝜒ଶ statistics is less than 5% (p ≤ 0.05).  
(iii) Pairwise Granger causality test. This was specifically developed to test the 
direction of causality. The null hypothesis is that no Granger-causality exists against 
the alternative that the null hypothesis is not true. The null hypothesis is rejected if 
the probability value of the F-statistics is less than 5% (p ≤ 0.05).  
 
Normally, the three methods lead to the same conclusion. This study used the first and the 
second method, and the third method was used for robust checks only.  
 
The final step in the panel Granger causality test in the VECM framework is to run diagnostic 
tests. For the residual diagnostics, the study ran the serial autocorrelation, normality, and 
heteroscedasticity tests. 
 
4.4. Data Sources and Definition of Variables 
 
4.4.1. Data sources 
 
The extreme poverty proxies (dependent variable) in this study are from the recently released 
World Bank poverty and inequality dataset (PovcalNet). The poverty measures in the 
PovcalNet dataset are estimated using a programme developed by Chen and Ravallion (2001). 
The compilation is based on primary information from nationally representative living-
standard household surveys. The poverty data are estimated by using a combination of PPP and 
exchange rates for household consumption. The latest update from the World Bank (2018) 
database is from 1981 to 2013. It covers 1 500 household surveys across 164 countries in the 
world, including 26 high-income countries (World Bank, 2018). The poverty measures used in 
this study are based on the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day in the 2011 PPP. This 
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is the internationally accepted measure of extreme or absolute poverty, which was originally 
defined as the “dollar a day” poverty line (please see Chen & Ravallion, 2008; Ravallion et al., 
2009; and Ravallion & Chen, 2010 for background papers).  
 
The PovcalNet dataset provides tri-annual estimates of poverty and inequality measures from 
1981 to 2008. Thereafter, there is annual data from 2010 to 2013. Thus, the sample of this 
research is from 1981 to 2013. Since the dependent variable (poverty) is available every 3 years 
between 1981 and 2008, and following Alvi and Senbeta (2012), three-year averages were 
taken of this study’s explanatory variables during the period 1981-2008 and two-year averages 
thereafter. As a result, the T therein covers 12 periods (from 1981 to 2013). The N for 
developing countries is 120 individual countries, which means that N is greater than T. 
Appendix A.1 lists the countries in the sample which were chosen based on data availability. 
However, due to data scarcity, the panel is unbalanced.   
 
The main independent variable in this investigation is foreign aid which is proxied by ODA as 
a percentage of GNI, loans, grants, and multilateral and bilateral aid. Foreign aid data was 
obtained from the OECD-DAC. The political freedom (or democracy score) is proxied by the 
Polity IV Index from the Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV Project, while economic freedom 
data are from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 2017 Report which was compiled 
by the Fraser Institute. The inequality database is from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID)  (Solt, 2016), while the real GDP per capita, secondary education 
enrolment, FDI, and trade openness are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2017). The globalisation index was obtained from the 
Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) Swiss Economic Institute (Dreher et al., 2008); and the 
civil conflict variable was obtained from the Center for Systemic Peace Project’s Major 
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPVs) and the Conflict Regions 1946-2016 database 
(Marshall, 2017). Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018) caution against having more than five 
control variables, as this would lead to biases in estimated coefficients because of instrument 
proliferation. Hence, the control variables were restricted to a maximum of five in each 
estimated equation. See Table 4.1 for a list of all variables, definitions, and their sources. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of variables’ definitions and sources 
Variable Name Variable Definition Source 
Poverty headcount 
rate 
Percentage of population living below the poverty 
line (at $1.90 a day, 2011 PPP)  
PovcalNet, World Bank  
PG The average income shortfall 
as a share of the poverty line (at $1.90 a day, 2011 
PPP) 
PovcalNet, World Bank 
SPG The squared average income shortfall as a share of 
the poverty line (at $1.90 a day, 2011 PPP) 
PovcalNet, World Bank 
ODA as % of GNI Total foreign aid (ODA) as a percentage of GNI OECD‐DAC 
Bilateral aid ODA from bilateral sources as a share of GDP OECD‐DAC 
Multilateral aid ODA from multilateral sources as a share of GDP OECD‐DAC 
Grants ODA grants as a share of GDP OECD‐DAC 
Loans ODA loans as a share of GDP OECD‐DAC 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Gini coefficient The Gini coefficient/index (measure of inequality) SWIID 
Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Democracy score 
(political freedom) 
Democracy score (from 0 to 10) – low value 
corresponding to autocracy, and higher values 
representing democracy.  
Polity IV Project 
Economic freedom 
index 
Economic freedom of the world (from 0 to 10) – 
measures the degree to which institutions adhere to 
the free market ideal 
Economic Freedom of the 
World 2017 Report, Fraser 
Institute 
Secondary 
education 
School enrolment, secondary (% gross) World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Civil conflict Total summed magnitudes of all societal MEPVs Center for Systemic Peace 
Project 
Trade openness  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Globalisation index The KOF Globalisation Index – measures the 
economic, social, and political dimensions of 
globalisation 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
(Konjunkturforschungsstelle) 
Notes: The abbreviations ODA, GDP, and GNI stand for official development assistance, gross domestic product, 
and gross national income, respectively; the others are as defined in the text.  
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the theoretical and empirical model specifications as well as the 
econometric estimation techniques used in the study. The chapter also discussed econometric 
challenges such as endogeneity and how to account for it in the estimation of GMM models, 
including the use of IVs. Furthermore, the chapter elaborated on the steps in the implementation 
of panel data Granger causality. Lastly, data sources and definitions of variables were 
discussed.  
 
The two main econometric estimation techniques employed in this study are briefly 
summarised herein. The first technique is the SGMM estimation framework which was used 
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for estimating the impact of foreign aid on poverty. The SGMM was preferred for the following 
reasons: (i) it is suitable for dynamic or persistent panels; (ii) it can address biases because of 
endogeneity (or reverse causality) by controlling for simultaneity; (iii) it is appropriate in the 
“small T, large N” context by addressing the Nickell (1981) bias and applying the “Windmeijer 
finite-sample correction”; (iv) the method eliminates the country-fixed effects by differencing 
the internal instruments in order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects without 
eliminating the country differences – it controls for cross-country dependence, limits 
instrument proliferation, and restricts over-identification; (v) the two-step SGMM approach 
adopted in this study’s specification has the ability to control for heteroscedasticity; and (vi) 
the framework also allows for the adoption of forward orthogonal deviations instead of 
differencing, so as to minimise data loss.  
 
For causality analysis, the panel VECM Granger framework was adopted because of its ability 
to explicitly distinguish between three types of causal inference, namely (i) short-run causal 
effects; (ii) long-run causal effects; and (iii) strong causal effects, which occur when there is 
evidence of both short- and long-run causal effects. Furthermore, the method was chosen 
because the variables were found to be integrated in the same order and were co-integrated.  
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CHAPTER 5: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The foregoing chapter focused on the econometric estimation techniques employed in this 
study as well as the theoretical and empirical model specifications. This chapter presents the 
econometric analysis and the empirical findings based on the two main methodologies applied 
in this study: (i) an impact assessment of foreign aid on poverty using the SGMM estimation 
method and (ii) an assessment of the direction of causality between foreign aid and poverty 
through panel Granger causality tests in the VECM framework.  
 
Through the use of the SGMM estimation method, the study explores several issues in line 
with the study objectives. They are as follows: 
i. the overall impact of foreign aid (total ODA) on the poverty rate; 
ii. the impact of different proxies of foreign aid on the three proxies of extreme poverty;  
iii. an investigation into whether freedom (political and economic) enhances the 
effectiveness of foreign aid; and 
iv. a comparison of the impact of foreign aid on poverty by developing country income 
groups.  
 
The dynamic panel Granger causality analysis, in the VECM framework, was used to examine 
the direction of causality between the two main variables: (i) extreme poverty, proxied by 
headcount poverty rate, and (ii) foreign aid, proxied by total ODA as a percentage of GNI. 
However, given the prominent role of economic growth in achieving poverty reduction, 
Granger causality was conducted within a panel trivariate setting with GDP per capita as the 
third variable (intermittent variable). 
 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 5.2 presents the econometric analysis 
and the empirical findings of the DPD SGMM estimation, while Section 5.3 focuses on the 
panel Granger causality analysis and results. Then, Section 5.4 offers a detailed discussion and 
summary of the main empirical findings of the study, and Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2. Results on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Poverty Reduction 
 
In this section, the results of the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction are presented and 
discussed in detail. The section starts by highlighting the time-series characteristics of the panel 
data used in the study before discussing the main results from the SGMM DPD estimation.  
 
5.2.1. Summary statistics 
 
The panel consists of 120 developing countries and 12 time periods, averaged over 3 years 
from 1981 to 2013. The dependent variable is poverty, and it is proxied by the poverty 
headcount rate (main proxy), the PG, and the SPG. The main independent variable (variable of 
interest in this study) is foreign aid, which is proxied by ODA as a percentage of GNI (main 
proxy), bilateral aid, multilateral aid, grants, and loans. Based on the poverty identity by Datt 
and Ravallion (1992), the basic specifications of the poverty estimation variables are the real 
GDP per capita (representing economic growth) and the Gini coefficient (as an inequality 
measure representing the distributional effects of poverty).  
 
The policy variables for this study are the political freedom score and the economic freedom 
index. Furthermore, the main control variables included in this study are as follows: FDI, 
secondary education, civil conflict, trade openness, and the globalisation index. Table 5.1 lists 
the descriptive statistics for the logged and normalised data44 in terms of the mean, median, 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviations of the variables. 
 
  
                                               
44All the variables, except for time dummy, democracy, and conflict, have been converted into logarithm form. 
The democracy and conflict variables are normalised so that values are between zero and one. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Poverty headcount rate 1 415 2.59 1.65 -4.61 4.60 
Poverty gap index 1 413 1.44 1.90 -5.30 4.50 
Squared poverty gap 1 397 0.71 2.02 -4.61 4.40 
ODA as % of GNI 1 218 1.14 1.86 -7.70 4.78 
Bilateral aid 1 205 0.74 1.75 -5.70 4.22 
Multilateral aid 1 198 -0.03 1.97 -5.70 4.33 
Grant 1 311 5.28 1.38 -4.20 9.28 
Loan 1 003 4.00 1.85 -4.61 7.86 
GDP per capita 1 338 7.42 1.02 4.79 10.06 
Gini coefficient 994 -0.80 0.16 -1.54 -0.38 
Foreign direct investment 1 189 0.39 1.56 -7.92 4.11 
Political freedom score 1 207 0.51 0.30 0.00 0.95 
Economic freedom index 983 1.72 0.23 0.60 2.11 
Secondary education 1 105 3.73 0.77 0.88 4.74 
Civil conflict 1 190 0.52 0.09 0.48 0.95 
Trade openness 1 241 4.19 0.64 -3.01 5.91 
Globalisation index 1 354 3.76 0.27 2.90 4.37 
Notes: The sample comprises 120 developing countries for the period 1981-2013. These summary statistics are 
based on logged and normalised data. The abbreviations are as follows. Obs. stands for number of observations; 
Std. dev.: standard deviations; Min.: minimum; Max.: maximum; ODA: official development assistance; GDP: 
gross domestic product; and GNI: gross national income.  
 
All the variables in Table 5.1 are in logarithmic format except for political freedom, economic 
freedom, and civil conflict, which are normalised so that their values are between zero and one. 
Since the data have been linearised, the summary of the statistics for the variables shows 
minimum variations across the countries in the sample. 
 
5.2.2. Cross-correlation analysis 
 
Cross-correlation analysis is used to ascertain the correlations between the variables in this 
study’s model. Table 5.2 shows the Pearson (1896) correlation matrix for all the variables 
including the lag of the dependent variable. The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the 
strength and direction of association that exists between two continuous variables. The asterisk 
(*) next to the coefficients indicates the significance at p-values of 0.05 or lower. 
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Table 5.2: Pearson correlation matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Poverty rate 1                    
2. Poverty gap 0.98* 1                   
3. Sqd poverty gap 0.94* 0.99* 1                  
4. ODA as % of GNI 0.39* 0.37* 0.35* 1                 
5. GDP per capita -0.66* -0.63* -0.59* -0.63* 1                
6. Gini coefficient 0.19* 0.20* 0.21* -0.07* 0.17* 1               
7. Grant 0.14* 0.11* 0.09* 0.15* -0.35* -0.05 1              
8. Loan 0.11* 0.09* 0.07* -0.12* -0.27* -0.20* 0.69* 1             
9. Bilateral aid 0.38* 0.36* 0.33* 0.98* -0.59* -0.06 0.10* -0.16* 1            
10. Multilateral aid 0.43* 0.41* 0.38* 0.93* -0.68* -0.12* 0.06* -0.10* 0.86* 1           
11. FDI -0.18* -0.16* -0.15* -0.00 0.26* 0.10* -0.09* -0.14* -0.04 -0.02 1          
12. Political freedom -0.21* -0.19* -0.19* -0.17* 0.31* 0.26* 0.04 -0.02 -0.13* -0.15* 0.22* 1         
13. Econ. Freedom -0.37* -0.36* -0.34* -0.19* 0.35* 0.08* -0.01 -0.15* -0.17* -0.17* 0.49* 0.44* 1        
14. Sec. education -0.62* -0.62* -0.61* -0.48* 0.69* 0.04 -0.21* -0.13* -0.47* -0.48* 0.29* 0.39* 0.50* 1       
15. Civil conflict 0.13* 0.11* 0.09* -0.14* -0.13* -0.05 0.20* 0.24* -0.13* -0.14* -0.25* -0.08* -0.19* -0.06 1      
16. Trade openness -0.22* -0.21* -0.20* 0.15* 0.27* 0.01 -0.31* -0.36* 0.16* 0.10* 0.41* 0.13* 0.37* 0.21* -0.34* 1     
17. Globalisation  -0.50* -0.48* -0.45* -0.43* 0.62* 0.15* 0.15* 0.13* -0.41* -0.44* 0.46* 0.50* 0.63* 0.61* -0.21* 0.30* 1    
18. Lag. poverty rate 0.95* 0.93* 0.89* 0.38* -0.65* 0.21* 0.18* 0.12* 0.38* 0.42* -0.16* -0.19* -0.36* -0.61* 0.13* -0.23* -0.47* 1   
19. Lag. poverty gap 0.94* 0.96* 0.94* 0.38* -0.63* 0.22* 0.14* 0.10* 0.36* 0.41* -0.14* -0.17* -0.35* -0.62* 0.12* -0.22* -0.45* 0.98* 1  
20. Lag. sqd poverty  0.92* 0.95* 0.96* 0.35* -0.59* 0.22* 0.12* 0.07* 0.33* 0.39* -0.13* -0.17* -0.34* -0.61* 0.09* -0.21* -0.43* 0.94* 0.99* 1 
Notes: The asterisk (*) next to the correlation coefficients indicates the significance at p-values of 0.05 or lower. The abbreviations are as follows. ODA stands for official development 
assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; FDI: foreign direct investment; Sec.: Secondary; Econ.: Economic; Lag.: Lagged; and Sqd: Squared.  
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As listed in Table 5.2, all the proxies of aid (ODA, bilateral aid, multilateral aid, loans, and grants) 
are positively and significantly correlated with all the poverty proxies (poverty headcount rate, 
poverty gap, and SPG). Alvi and Senbeta (2012) argued that the positive association between aid 
and poverty could be an indication that more aid goes to poor countries.  
 
It is important, however, to note that the positive correlation between aid and poverty does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship45. Table 5.2 also demonstrates that all 5 proxies of foreign 
aid have a strong, negative, and statistically significant correlation with the real GDP per capita, 
ranging from -0.68 to -0.27. Generally, all the aid and poverty proxies negatively related with the 
majority of the control variables. Among the explanatory variables, GDP per capita is strongly and 
positively correlated with secondary education (0.69) and globalisation (0.62). This strong 
correlation increases the possibility of the problem of multicollinearity among some of the 
explanatory variables. The effect of multicollinearity is that the coefficient estimates of the 
multiple regression may change randomly as a result of small changes in the model or the data. 
However, multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a 
whole; it only affects calculations regarding individual predictors. To address this issue, the study 
used different proxies of aid, GDP, and education in the estimation and added one control variable 
at a time. The addition of one control variable at a time in multivariate regression reduces the 
chances of including “suppressor variables”, which would be highly correlated with another 
explanatory variable (Tzelgov & Henik, 1991; Pandey & Elliott, 2010). 
 
5.2.3. Justification of the use of SGMM estimation technique 
 
According to McGillivray, et al. (2006), one of the main reasons for contradictory findings on 
empirical aid literature is different econometric estimation techniques used. This study considered 
several estimation techniques and found that, based on the data, the best estimation method is 
SGMM. Firstly, as shown in Table 5.2, the correlation between all the three proxies of poverty in 
levels and their corresponding lagged values are higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.8. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the lagged poverty variables in all estimated equations is highly 
significant at the 1 percent level. This confirms that poverty is persistent, and therefore the dynamic 
panel data method is the correct specification, ruling out the standard instrumental variables (IV) 
                                               
45 Section 5.4 of this chapter presents the results from the causality tests. 
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such as two-stage least squares (2SLS or TSLS). In addition, the OLS and the FE methods are 
biased due to the inclusion of the lagged poverty.  
 
Secondly, our sample can be described as having “small T, large N", with the number of countries 
(N=120) greater than the number of years (T=12). Thirdly, the LSDVC method is also considered 
less accurate in a dynamic model with suspected endogeneity (Flannery & Hankins, 2013, p 14), 
while DGMM is considered less efficient compared to SGMM.  Therefore, only the results of the 
more efficient SGMM method are presented and discussed in the next subsections. 
 
All the SGMM estimations used the ‘collapse’ option for instruments to limit instrument 
proliferation and the number of lags in the explanatory variables was set at a one for the same 
reason (Roodman, 2009b).  Furthermore, the unsuitability of the standard instrumental variables 
and the robustness of the internal instruments, meant that the use of external instruments became 
unnecessary. All the explanatory variables, except year dummies or time invariant variables were 
treated as endogenous or predetermined. 
 
5.2.4. Results of the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction 
 
This sub-section presents the results of the impact of all the proxies of foreign aid on all the proxies 
of extreme poverty. These results are based on the SGMM estimation of the augmented equation 
(Equation 4.6). The main aim of this sub-section is to assess whether foreign aid has a direct effect 
on poverty reduction. A negative and significant coefficient of foreign aid proxy implies, on 
average, that particular foreign aid proxy directly reduces the incidence of extreme poverty in 
developing countries. Table 5.3 shows the results of the impact of different proxies of foreign aid 
on the poverty headcount rate. 
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Table 5.3: Impact of different proxies of foreign aid on poverty headcount rate  
Dependent Variables Poverty rate 
(Model 1.1) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 1.2) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 1.3) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 1.4) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 1.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.252*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.244*** (0.000)    
Loan   -0.022 (0.430)   
Bilateral aid    -0.283*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.134*** (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.636*** 
(0.000) 
-0.413** 
(0.011) 
-0.239** 
(0.032) 
-0.693*** 
(0.001) 
-0.383** 
(0.017) 
Gini coefficient  1.542** 
(0.016) 
1.689* 
(0.051) 
0.294 
(0.548) 
2.293*** 
(0.004) 
1.024 
(0.153) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.004 
(0.862) 
-0.038 
(0.115) 
-0.051*** 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.465) 
-0.013 
(0.588) 
Political freedom -0.125 (0.577) 
0.395 
(0.180) 
-0.148 
(0.374) 
0.102 
(0.691) 
0.175 
(0.422) 
Secondary education 0.320*** (0.002) 
0.261** 
(0.010) 
0.209*** 
(0.002) 
0.337*** 
(0.003) 
0.400*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.436 (0.446) 
-0.105 
(0.846) 
0.470 
(0.504) 
-0.378 
(0.535) 
-0.797 
(0.100) 
Trade openness 0.100 (0.469) 
0.221 
(0.131) 
-0.369** 
(0.018) 
0.126 
(0.406) 
0.115 
(0.370) 
Globalisation -2.017*** (0.001) 
-1.300** 
(0.032) 
-0.350 
(0.234) 
-1.954*** 
(0.002) 
-2.479*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.777*** 
(0.000) 
0.915*** 
(0.000) 
0.892*** 
(0.000) 
0.768*** 
(0.000) 
0.840*** 
(0.000) 
Constant - 9.005*** (0.000) 
4.604*** 
(0.000) - - 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.008 0.001 
AR (2) p-value 0.683 0.707 0.659 0.246 0.676 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.372 0.244 0.591 0.426 0.246 
DHT for instruments  
(a) Instrument in levels 
     
H excluding group 0.350 0.302 0.103 0.470 0.133 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.399 0.273 0.894 0.391 0.430 
(b) IV (years, eq[diff])      
H excluding group 0.252 0.060 0.618 0.276 0.136 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.591 0.894 0.441 0.647 0.597 
      
Observations 608 603 436 592 581 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of instruments 49 49 49 49 49 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space, they are not shown here. The abbreviations ODA, GDP, and GNI 
stand for official development assistance, gross domestic product, and gross national income, respectively; the others 
are as defined in the text.  
156 
 
First, a discussion is provided regarding the impact of total foreign aid (ODA as a percentage of 
GNI) on the poverty headcount rate, which is the main extreme poverty proxy. This particular 
result is listed in the second column (Model 1.1) of Table 5.3.  
 
The results displayed in Model 1.1 are generally consistent with a prior economic theory, and they 
can be summarised as follows. First, the coefficient of total foreign aid (-0.252) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that, on average, a 10% increase in the level of 
ODA as a share of GNI is associated with a 0.25% reduction in the poverty headcount rate (which 
is the proportion of people living on less than US$1.90 per person per day). This implies that 
foreign aid is significant in reducing the poverty rate in developing countries. Moreover, this result 
corroborates earlier findings by Mosley et al. (2004), Mosley and Suleiman (2007), Alvi and 
Senbeta (2012), and Arndt et al. (2015) that foreign aid has positive poverty reduction effects.  
 
Second, the GDP per capita is negatively signed and statistically significant at the 5% level. Ceteris 
paribus, a 10% increase in GDP per capita is associated with a reduction in poverty rate of 
approximately 0.65%. Furthermore, the GDP per capita has relatively larger coefficients than 
ODA, indicating that economic growth explains a higher significant part of the decrease in poverty 
levels. This confirms results from an earlier study by Dollar and Kraay (2002), who boldly declared 
that “growth is good for the poor”.  
 
Third, the coefficient for inequality (Gini coefficient) is generally positive and statistically 
significant. This is in line with economic theory which states that an increase in income disparity 
may lead to higher levels of poverty. Ravallion (1997) found that if initial inequality is high, it can 
result in rising poverty irrespective of impressive economic growth. Therefore, inequality hinders 
the world’s progress in the fight against poverty. Fourth, the coefficient of lagged headcount 
poverty rate is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms the strong 
persistent behaviour of extreme poverty rates in developing countries. In addition, this finding is 
in line with earlier studies by Bane and Ellwood (1986) and Hoynes et al. (2006), who showed 
that poverty is persistent. The appropriateness of the dynamic specification in poverty estimation 
is also confirmed by the results of the correlation coefficient between all the headcount poverty 
rates and its corresponding lagged values (0.95) which are higher than the rule of thumb threshold 
of 0.8 (see Table 5.2). 
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Lastly, of the other six control variables in the model, FDI, international trade, and globalisation 
yielded the correct sign. According to economic theory, an increase in FDI, an improvement in 
trade, and the deepening of globalisation have the potential to lead to a reduction in extreme 
poverty. The education indicator (gross enrolment in secondary education), though statistically 
significant, entered the model with a positive coefficient46. Other control variables that entered the 
model with unexpected signs are political freedom and trade openness. The possible reasons these 
control variables displayed an unexpected sign could be multicollinearity, small sample sizes, and 
minimum variation in the explanatory variables (Kennedy, 2002). As depicted in Table 5.2, the 
correlation between secondary education and GDP per capita is 0.69 and significant at the 5% 
level, while political freedom seems to be highly correlated with globalisation. Other variables 
have expected signs but are not statistically significant. The only control variable that has the 
expected sign and is statistically significant is globalisation.  
 
The post-estimation diagnostics on Model 1.1 show that the model meets the requirements for the 
two-step SGMM estimation with forward orthogonal deviations. The Arellano and Bond (1991) 
test for second-order serial correlation did not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
Furthermore, the Hansen (1982) test for over-identification failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
the OIRs are valid, and the DHT also failed to reject the null hypothesis that the instrument subsets 
are strictly exogenous. This confirms that Model 1.1 is an optimal model and passes all the post-
estimation diagnostic tests.  
 
5.2.5. Impact of different proxies of foreign aid on the proxies of extreme poverty 
 
Another important set of results displayed in Table 5.3 is the impact of different proxies of foreign 
aid on the poverty headcount rate. As shown in that table, the coefficients for total aid (ODA), 
grant, and both bilateral and multilateral aid are negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of loan is negative but statistically insignificant. This implies that with the 
exception of loans, the other types of foreign aid have a poverty headcount rate reduction effect in 
developing countries. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the results related to the analysis of the impact of 
total aid (ODA), grants, loans, and both bilateral and multilateral aid on the poverty gap and the 
squared poverty gap respectively.  
                                               
46 It might be the case that in the set of countries analysed, education is increasing income inequality and therefore 
increasing poverty instead of reducing it as per theoretical prediction. This is however, beyond the scope of this study.  
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Table 5.4: Impact of different proxies of foreign aid on poverty gap index 
Dependent Variables Poverty gap 
(Model 2.1) 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 2.2) 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 2.3) 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 2.4) 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 2.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.168*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.390*** (0.000)    
Loan   -0.087*** (0.008)   
Bilateral aid    -0.294*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.173*** (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.409*** 
(0.001) 
-0.546*** 
(0.001) 
-0.275* 
(0.060) 
-0.540*** 
(0.000) 
-0.269** 
(0.043) 
Gini coefficient  0.340 
(0.492) 
1.846** 
(0.037) 
0.984 
(0.148) 
1.794** 
(0.031) 
-0.019 
(0.977) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.003 
(0.871) 
-0.012 
(0.672) 
-0.049* 
(0.050) 
-0.002 
(0.949) 
-0.004 
(0.873) 
Political freedom -0.045 (0.809) 
0.794** 
(0.010) 
-0.026 
(0.912) 
0.387 
(0.140) 
0.470** 
(0.032) 
Secondary education 0.305*** (0.000) 
0.273*** 
(0.006) 
0.259*** 
(0.006) 
0.354*** 
(0.001) 
0.419*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.773 (0.103) 
-0.069 
(0.910) 
0.264 
(0.451) 
-0.791 
(0.221) 
-1.167** 
(0.020) 
Trade openness 0.142 (0.159) 
0.221 
(0.189) 
-0.683*** 
(0.001) 
0.282* 
(0.050) 
0.126 
(0.291) 
Globalisation -2.124*** (0.000) 
-1.411* 
(0.055) 
-0.714* 
(0.051) 
-3.168*** 
(0.000) 
-3.386*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.826*** 
(0.000) 
0.836*** 
(0.000) 
0.886*** 
(0.000) 
0.801*** 
(0.000) 
0.892*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 10.394*** 
(0.000) 
10.883*** 
(0.000) - 
15.626*** 
(0.000) 
13.522*** 
(0.000) 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.072 0.115 0.076 0.138 0.007 
AR (2) p-value 0.403 0.475 0.942 0.586 0.278 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.174 0.090 0.225 0.131 0.029 
DHT for instruments  
(a) Instrument in levels 
     
H excluding group 0.228 0.442 0.183 0.197 0.029 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.244 0.062 0.338 0.185 0.139 
(b) IV (years, eq[diff])      
H excluding group 0.285 0.064 0.321 0.116 0.037 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.164 0.374 0.222 0.337 0.179 
      
Observations 607 602 436 591 580 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of instruments 59 49 49 49 49 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space, they are not shown here. The abbreviations ODA, GDP, and GNI 
stand for official development assistance, gross domestic product, and gross national income, respectively; the others 
are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.5: Impact of different proxies of foreign aid on squared poverty gap index 
Dependent Variables Squared 
poverty gap 
(Model 3.1) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.2) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.3) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.4) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.274*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.267*** (0.001)    
Loan   -0.085** (0.024)   
Bilateral aid    -0.222*** (0.001)  
Multilateral aid     -0.145*** (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.415** 
(0.025) 
-0.454*** 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.950) 
-0.388** 
(0.045) 
-0.242* 
(0.081) 
Gini coefficient  0.140 
(0.871) 
0.856 
(0.295) 
0.071 
(0.936) 
0.657 
(0.454) 
-1.060 
(0.109) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
0.035 
(0.275) 
0.005 
(0.867) 
-0.016 
(0.601) 
0.012 
(0.707) 
-0.001 
(0.984) 
Political freedom 0.263 (0.343) 
0.454 
(0.167) 
-0.007 
(0.978) 
0.220 
(0.430) 
0.269 
(0.274) 
Secondary education 0.417*** (0.000) 
0.314*** 
(0.001) 
0.224** 
(0.046) 
0.307*** 
(0.003) 
0.431*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.918 (0.145) 
-0.511 
(0.409) 
0.245 
(0.758) 
-0.799 
(0.251) 
-1.109* 
(0.055) 
Trade openness 0.022 (0.868) 
0.073 
(0.627) 
-0.673*** 
(0.003) 
0.168 
(0.206) 
-0.025 
(0.819) 
Globalisation -3.155*** (0.000) 
-1.207** 
(0.046) 
-1.425*** 
(0.001) 
-2.509*** 
(0.000) 
-2.334*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.889*** 
(0.000) 
0.903*** 
(0.000) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.919*** 
(0.000) 
0.991*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 14.094*** 
(0.000) - 
7.345*** 
(0.001) -  -  
      
AR (1) p-value 0.008 0.003 0.034 0.005 0.006 
AR (2) p-value 0.666 0.704 0.927 0.610 0.386 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.270 0.271 0.308 0.111 0.023 
DHT for instruments  
(a) Instrument in levels 
     
H excluding group 0.639 0.586 0.456 0.476 0.242 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.168 0.185 0.269 0.075 0.024 
(b) IV (years, eq[diff])      
H excluding group 0.319 0.054 0.292 0.156 0.021 
Dif (null, H = 
exogenous) 
0.295 0.951 0.397 0.203 0.236 
 
Observations 596 589 430 580 568 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of instruments 59 49 49 49 49 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space, they are not shown here. The abbreviations ODA, GDP, and GNI 
stand for official development assistance, gross domestic product, and gross national income, respectively; the others 
are as defined in the text.  
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The main objective of the analysis in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 is to investigate the possible impact of 
different types of aid on each of the proxies of extreme poverty. As with Table 5.4, all the proxies 
of foreign aid lead to a reduction in the poverty gap, except for grants and multilateral aid. Even 
though the coefficients of both grants and multilateral aid are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, the two equations (Models 2.2 and 2.5) did not pass the Hansen OIR test. The 
other control variables generally maintain the expected signs.  
 
The results in Table 5.5 show that all five proxies of foreign aid lead to a reduction in the squared 
poverty gap with the exception of multilateral aid. As in Table 5.4, the coefficient of multilateral 
aid is negative and statistically significant (Model 3.5) but it failed the Hansen OIR test. In 
addition, the GDP per capita, globalisation, and lagged poverty have the expected signs and are 
highly significant. The other control variables displayed mixed results.  
 
The main findings from Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 can be summarised as follows: 
 The coefficient for total aid (ODA) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
across the three proxies of extreme poverty. This confirms that total foreign aid has a 
significant effect in terms of reducing extreme poverty in developing countries.  
 The analysis of the impact of different proxies of aid on the three proxies of extreme 
poverty demonstrates that 
o all five proxies of foreign aid except for loans reduce the poverty headcount rate 
o official development assistance, loans, and bilateral aid reduce the poverty gap, but 
grants and multilateral aid do not 
o official development assistance, grants, loans, and bilateral aid reduce the squared 
poverty gap, but multilateral aid does not.  
 The coefficient of GDP per capita is mainly negative and highly significant, indicating that 
an increase in economic growth helps in the reduction of all forms of extreme poverty.  
 The coefficient for the inequality variable is largely positive and significant. This confirms 
that high levels of inequality have a detrimental effect on the fight against extreme poverty. 
Therefore, this fight cannot be won without a corresponding fight against inequality.  
 The coefficient for globalisation is largely negative and significant, highlighting the 
importance of globalisation in the fight against poverty.  
 The lagged variables of the three proxies of extreme poverty are positive and highly 
significant, further confirming that poverty is strongly persistent.  
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The results summarised above and displayed in Table 5.3 to Table 5.5 are generally in line with 
the findings of Mosley et al. (2004), Bahmani-Oskooee and Oyolola (2009), Alvi and Senbeta 
(2012), and Arndt et al. (2015). All these studies utilised aid as a percentage of GNI as a proxy for 
ODA, though they slightly differed on the proxies for poverty. The majority of the studies used 
the poverty headcount rate only. Chong et al. (2009) however made use of the same three proxies 
of extreme poverty and the same estimation methodology (the SGMM) but found different results. 
Some of these main results are briefly discussed below. 
 
With respect to the issue of grants and loans, the findings are generally in line with literature on 
the allocation of aid which premises that grants are more likely to have poverty-reducing effects 
compared to loans (Senbeta, 2009)47. However, another body of empirical literature seems to 
suggest that loans are most effective for development. This literature argues that loans are 
generally used for infrastructure development and other investment activities, while grants are 
normally used for technical assistance (Odedokun, 2004; Gunatilake et al., 2015). A recent study 
by Das and Serieux (2015) concluded that all foreign inflows generate capital outflows. Loans lead 
to around 45% outflows, while grants are associated with 12% reverse flows. These reverse flows 
were found to be most prevalent in Asian and SSA countries.  
 
The present study’s findings on bilateral and multilateral aid go against prior expectations. 
Evidence was found that bilateral aid had a significant effect on poverty reduction compared to 
multilateral aid. Theoretically, however, one would expect multilateral aid to be more effective in 
reducing poverty. According to Riddell (2008) and Clunies-Ross et al. (2009), multilateral aid is 
most likely to be allocated to sustainable development and poverty-reduction concerns, whereas 
bilateral aid is allocated based on colonial, strategic, and other political considerations. According 
to OECD statistics, bilateral aid exceeds multilateral aid – roughly 70 to 30 (Rogerson, et al., 2004, 
p. 16). Therefore, approximately one-third of all ODA is allocated multilaterally (Riddell, 2008). 
Rogerson et al. (2004) argued that the events after the terrorist attack in the USA in 2001 
(commonly referred to as 9/11) have changed the focus of bilateral aid from the historical political 
and strategic motives to the addressing of poverty; this suggests that bilateral aid can indeed reduce 
poverty. Other studies by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) and Gunatilake et al. (2015) found 
inconclusive results regarding the differential effects between bilateral and multilateral aid.  
                                               
47 As defined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, grants are transfers made in cash, goods, or services for which no repayment 
is required. Loans are transfers for which repayment would be required. 
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Lastly, across the 15 models (Models 1.1 to 3.5) estimated in Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, the GDP 
per capita and the globalisation index remain negative and largely significant at the 5% level. This 
demonstrates the importance of boosting economic growth and embracing globalisation in the 
policy mix aimed at poverty reduction. The coefficient for inequality is largely positive, 
confirming that high levels of inequality hinder the fight against poverty. The coefficient for the 
lagged poverty rate is highly significant, corroborating both theoretical and empirical literature 
that poverty is persistent.  
 
5.2.6. Impact of political and economic freedom on the effectiveness of foreign aid 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to test whether political or economic freedom enhances the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in poverty reduction. Following studies by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and Collier and Dollar (2002), the current work investigated this question through the introduction 
of the interaction term in this research’s SGMM estimation framework. The policy proxies adopted 
in this study are political and economic freedom, represented by Polity IV (or democracy) and the 
EFW respectively.  
 
Unlike the previous analysis, the introduction of the interaction term suggests that the effect of 
foreign aid on poverty should be treated as a marginal effect (Brambor et al., 2006; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016) and should be estimated and calculated as shown in Equations 4.7 and 4.8 in 
Chapter 4. The results of this analysis are presented in the following six tables (Tables 5.6 to 5.11).  
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Table 5.6: Effectiveness of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – poverty 
headcount rate  
Dependent 
Variables 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.1) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.2) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.3) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.4) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of 
GNI 
-0.366*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.450*** (0.001)    
Loan   -0.097* (0.089)   
Bilateral aid    -0.405*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.167*** (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.584*** 
(0.000) 
-0.358*** 
(0.007) 
-0.239*** 
(0.009) 
-0.655*** 
(0.000) 
-0.348** 
(0.013) 
Gini coefficient  1.634*** 
(0.005) 
2.005*** 
(0.007) 
0.513 
(0.267) 
2.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.811 
(0.224) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.021 
(0.367) 
-0.046* 
(0.050) 
-0.049** 
(0.022) 
-0.031 
(0.238) 
-0.024 
(0.278) 
Political freedom -0.262 (0.177) 
-2.076** 
(0.030) 
-0.570 
(0.137) 
0.183 
(0.384) 
0.245 
(0.170) 
Pol. Freedom x 
Aid Variable 
0.197** 
(0.013) 
0.460*** 
(0.008) 
0.093 
(0.236) 
0.199** 
(0.036) 
0.046 
(0.352) 
Secondary 
education 
0.255*** 
(0.009) 
0.230** 
(0.015) 
0.263*** 
(0.000) 
0.274** 
(0.018) 
0.407*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.301 (0.599) 
0.317 
(0.456) 
0.001 
(0.999) 
-0.341 
(0.560) 
-0.604 
(0.213) 
Trade openness 0.157 (0.207) 
0.088 
(0.412) 
-0.255* 
(0.057) 
0.151 
(0.256) 
0.110 
(0.351) 
Globalisation -1.805*** (0.002) 
-1.453*** 
(0.004) 
-0.616*** 
(0.003) 
-1.883*** 
(0.001) 
-2.372*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate 
(lagged) 
0.795*** 
(0.000) 
0.854*** 
(0.000) 
0.893*** 
(0.000) 
0.777*** 
(0.000) 
0.880*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 12.122*** 
(0.000) - 
5.507*** 
(0.000) 
13.161*** 
(0.000) 
10.678*** 
(0.000) 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.006 0.001 
AR (2) p-value 0.860 0.757 0.454 0.355 0.684 
Sargan OIR p-
value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-
value 
0.591 0.134 0.311 0.623 0.342 
      
Observations 608 603 436 592 581 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of 
instruments 
53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies, but to save space, they are not shown here. The key abbreviations are as follows. ODA stands 
for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; Pol.: Political. The 
other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.7: Effectiveness of economic freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – poverty 
headcount rate  
Dependent 
Variables 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.1) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.2) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.3) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.4) 
Poverty rate 
(Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.540*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.665** (0.011)    
Loan   -0.410* (0.055)   
Bilateral aid    -0.660*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.389*** (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.299*** 
(0.001) 
-0.300*** 
(0.000) 
-0.245*** 
(0.006) 
-0.288*** 
(0.004) 
-0.180* 
(0.082) 
Gini coefficient  0.943*** 
(0.005) 
1.100** 
(0.011) 
0.536 
(0.115) 
1.361*** 
(0.001) 
0.694** 
(0.030) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.056*** 
(0.003) 
-0.053*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017 
(0.344) 
-0.039** 
(0.034) 
-0.053*** 
(0.005) 
Economic freedom -0.400** (0.011) 
-1.702** 
(0.041) 
-1.182* 
(0.066) 
-0.408** 
(0.011) 
0.045 
(0.682) 
Econ. Freedom x Aid 
Variable 
0.263*** 
(0.001) 
0.305** 
(0.037) 
0.204* 
(0.091) 
0.319*** 
(0.001) 
0.212*** 
(0.000) 
Secondary education -0.070 (0.264) 
0.109* 
(0.090) 
0.039 
(0.596) 
-0.061 
(0.380) 
-0.011 
(0.855) 
Civil conflict -0.493* (0.054) 
-0.175 
(0.541) 
-0.770* 
(0.051) 
-0.717** 
(0.022) 
-0.858*** 
(0.006) 
Trade openness -0.060 (0.364) 
-0.025 
(0.640) 
-0.458*** 
(0.004) 
-0.072 
(0.268) 
-0.245*** 
(0.002) 
Globalisation 0.307 (0.367) 
-0.380 
(0.282) 
-0.260 
(0.301) 
0.014 
(0.972) 
0.420 
(0.223) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.911*** 
(0.000) 
0.928*** 
(0.000) 
0.871*** 
(0.000) 
0.915*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 3.543*** 
(0.004) 
8.141*** 
(0.002) - 
4.972*** 
(0.002) - 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.032 0.019 0.108 0.038 0.007 
AR (2) p-value 0.821 0.655 0.191 0.977 0.917 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.335 0.069 0.373 0.506 0.776 
      
Observations 495 491 339 482 471 
No. of groups 82 80 76 81 81 
No. of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space, they are not shown here. The key abbreviations are as follows. ODA 
stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; and Econ.: 
Economic. The other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.8: Effectiveness of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – poverty gap  
Dependent Variables Poverty gap 
(Model 3.1) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.2) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.3) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.4) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.415*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.547*** (0.000)    
Loan   -0.276*** (0.000)   
Bilateral aid    -0.433*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.237*** (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.455*** 
(0.001) 
-0.440*** 
(0.001) 
-0.228* 
(0.068) 
-0.458*** 
(0.006) 
-0.200* 
(0.097) 
Gini coefficient  1.204** 
(0.042) 
1.649** 
(0.037) 
0.762 
(0.234) 
1.688** 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.981) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.002 
(0.925) 
-0.027 
(0.308) 
-0.062** 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.725) 
-0.014 
(0.572) 
Political freedom -0.139 (0.488) 
-2.609** 
(0.010) 
-1.419*** 
(0.007) 
0.145 
(0.489) 
0.455** 
(0.015) 
Pol. Freedom x Aid 
Variable 
0.238*** 
(0.004) 
0.565*** 
(0.002) 
0.281*** 
(0.006) 
0.226** 
(0.023) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
Secondary education 0.227** (0.013) 
0.236** 
(0.014) 
0.306*** 
(0.000) 
0.244** 
(0.016) 
0.399*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.473 (0.338) 
0.179 
(0.718) 
0.740 
(0.311) 
-0.572 
(0.319) 
-1.094** 
(0.022) 
Trade openness 0.262** (0.022) 
0.062 
(0.605) 
-0.458** 
(0.010) 
0.300** 
(0.019) 
0.162 
(0.149) 
Globalisation -3.062*** (0.000) 
-1.435** 
(0.012) 
-0.982*** 
(0.000) 
-3.296*** 
(0.000) 
-3.376*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.802*** 
(0.000) 
0.805*** 
(0.000) 
0.886*** 
(0.000) 
0.816*** 
(0.000) 
0.932*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 15.036*** 
(0.000) 
11.763*** 
(0.000) 
7.542*** 
(0.00) 
16.077*** 
(0.000) - 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.062 0.123 0.061 0.128 0.006 
AR (2) p-value 0.455 0.450 0.693 0.574 0.283 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.151 0.087 0.138 0.170 0.055 
      
Observations 607 602 436 591 580 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies, but for space reasons, they are not shown here. The main abbreviations are as follows: ODA 
stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; and Pol.: 
Political. The other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.9: Effectiveness of economic freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – poverty 
gap  
Dependent Variables Poverty gap 
(Model 3.1) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.2) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.3) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.4) 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.764*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.870*** (0.006)    
Loan   -0.263 (0.318)   
Bilateral aid    -0.921*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.559*** (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.248*** 
(0.008) 
-0.376*** 
(0.000) 
-0.178 
(0.112) 
-0.405*** 
(0.000) 
-0.214** 
(0.026) 
Gini coefficient  1.025*** 
(0.009) 
1.086** 
(0.022) 
1.270*** 
(0.004) 
1.030** 
(0.030) 
0.557 
(0.112) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.042** 
(0.036) 
-0.055** 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.941) 
-0.053*** 
(0.004) 
-0.079*** 
(0.001) 
Economic freedom -0.441*** (0.005) 
-2.419** 
(0.016) 
-0.721 
(0.340) 
-0.409** 
(0.012) 
0.023 
(0.855) 
Econ. Freedom x Aid 
Variable 
0.389*** 
(0.000) 
0.430** 
(0.015) 
0.096 
(0.517) 
0.440*** 
(0.000) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
Secondary education -0.178** (0.011) 
0.111 
(0.106) 
-0.048 
(0.579) 
-0.138* 
(0.056) 
-0.104* 
(0.090) 
Civil conflict -0.522* (0.072) 
-0.337 
(0.326) 
-0.752 
(0.161) 
-0.787** 
(0.028) 
-0.851*** 
(0.005) 
Trade openness -0.005 (0.949) 
-0.039 
(0.544) 
-0.583*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
(0.883) 
-0.291*** 
(0.005) 
Globalisation 0.163 (0.698) 
-0.487 
(0.161) 
0.035 
(0.921) 
0.283 
(0.533) 
0.849** 
(0.045) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.880*** 
(0.000) 
0.849*** 
(0.000) 
0.910*** 
(0.000) 
0.854*** 
(0.000) 
1.011*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 3.969*** 
(0.003) -  - 
4.806*** 
(0.003) - 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.145 0.186 0.647 0.206 0.014 
AR (2) p-value 0.486 0.501 0.092 0.473 0.261 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.093 0.126 0.431 0.102 0.157 
      
Observations 494 490 339 481 470 
No. of groups 82 80 76 81 81 
No. of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space. they are not shown here. The key abbreviations are as follows. ODA 
stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; and Econ.: 
Economic. The other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.10: Effectiveness of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – squared 
poverty gap  
Dependent Variables Squared 
poverty gap 
(Model 3.1) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.2) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.3) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.4) 
Squared 
poverty gap 
 (Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.480*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.393*** (0.002)    
Loan   -0.272*** (0.000)   
Bilateral aid    -0.366*** (0.001)  
Multilateral aid     -0.253*** (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.358** 
(0.018) 
-0.238* 
(0.069) 
-0.056 
(0.665) 
-0.369** 
(0.046) 
-0.223* 
(0.091) 
Gini coefficient  0.076 
(0.920) 
1.224* 
(0.050) 
0.193 
(0.820) 
1.130 
(0.178) 
-0.871 
(0.142) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
0.009 
(0.775) 
-0.004 
(0.875) 
-0.021 
(0.473) 
-0.004 
(0.989) 
-0.011 
(0.730) 
Political freedom -0.384 (0.183) 
-3.094*** 
(0.001) 
-1.359** 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.942) 
0.095 
(0.653) 
Pol. Freedom x Aid 
Variable 
0.314*** 
(0.007) 
0.578*** 
(0.001) 
0.270** 
(0.010) 
0.198* 
(0.079) 
0.153** 
(0.046) 
Secondary education 0.243** (0.031) 
0.235** 
(0.010) 
0.279*** 
(0.006) 
0.179 
(0.100) 
0.369*** 
(0.000) 
Civil conflict -0.580 (0.305) 
0.049 
(0.920) 
0.680 
(0.366) 
-0.335 
(0.607) 
-1.065** 
(0.042) 
Trade openness 0.194 (0.107) 
-0.094 
(0.363) 
-0.504*** 
(0.006) 
0.215* 
(0.088) 
0.060 
(0.625) 
Globalisation -3.033*** (0.000) 
-1.541*** 
(0.007) 
-1.568*** 
(0.000) 
-2.733*** 
(0.000) 
-2.394*** 
(0.000) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.877*** 
(0.000) 
0.912*** 
(0.000) 
0.955*** 
(0.000) 
0.894*** 
(0.000) 
0.992*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 13.666*** 
(0.000) 
10.112*** 
(0.000) 
8.271*** 
(0.000) 
13.113*** 
(0.000) 
9.069*** 
(0.000) 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.007 0.003 0.032 0.005 0.005 
AR (2) p-value 0.646 0.684 0.832 0.581 0.388 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.170 0.194 0.304 0.148 0.054 
      
Observations 596 589 430 580 568 
No. of groups 95 93 89 94 94 
No. of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies, but for space reasons, they are not included here. The primary abbreviations are as follows. 
ODA stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; and Pol.: 
Political. The other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
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Table 5.11: Effectiveness of economic freedom in different proxies of foreign aid – squared 
poverty gap  
Dependent Variables Squared 
Poverty gap 
(Model 3.1) 
Squared 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 3.2) 
Squared 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 3.3) 
Squared 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 3.4) 
Squared 
Poverty gap 
 (Model 3.5) 
ODA as % of GNI -0.697*** 
(0.000)     
Grant  -0.710*** (0.008)    
Loan   -0.206 (0.401)   
Bilateral aid    -0.794*** (0.000)  
Multilateral aid     -0.513*** (0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.003 
(0.972) 
-0.281*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.985) 
-0.214* 
(0.067) 
-0.079 
(0.356) 
Gini coefficient  0.721* 
(0.077) 
1.174* 
(0.057) 
1.225** 
(0.021) 
1.010** 
(0.047) 
0.315 
(0.421) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-0.030 
(0.228) 
-0.023 
(0.361) 
-0.014 
(0.547) 
-0.039 
(0.106) 
-0.054* 
(0.057) 
Economic freedom -0.467** (0.029) 
-1.719* 
(0.061) 
-0.469 
(0.473) 
-0.464** 
(0.032) 
0.077 
(0.637) 
Econ. Freedom x Aid 
Variable 
0.359*** 
(0.000) 
0.323** 
(0.030) 
0.069 
(0.607) 
0.364*** 
(0.000) 
0.252*** 
(0.000) 
Secondary education -0.228*** (0.003) 
0.083 
(0.406) 
-0.101 
(0.253) 
-0.178** 
(0.034) 
-0.127* 
(0.076) 
Civil conflict -0.546 (0.100) 
-0.364 
(0.439) 
-0.477 
(0.360) 
-0.704* 
(0.054) 
-0.746** 
(0.034) 
Trade openness -0.146 (0.169) 
-0.092 
(0.255) 
-0.608*** 
(0.001) 
-0.041 
(0.674) 
-0.158 
(0.123) 
Globalisation 0.051 (0.903) 
-1.011** 
(0.013) 
-0.234 
(0.558) 
0.046 
(0.919) 
0.258 
(0.511) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 1.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.931*** 
(0.000) 
0.945*** 
(0.000) 
0.997*** 
(0.000) 
1.077*** 
(0.000) 
Constant - 10.369*** (0.001) - 
4.245*** 
(0.000) - 
      
AR (1) p-value 0.005 0.005 0.129 0.004 0.006 
AR (2) p-value 0.450 0.533 0.062 0.418 0.298 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.061 0.088 0.472 0.216 0.130 
      
Observations 483 477 333 470 458 
No. of groups 81 79 75 80 80 
No. of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, and * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies; however, to save space, they are not shown here. The key abbreviations are as follows. ODA 
stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; Econ.: 
Economic. The other abbreviations are as defined in the text.  
 
The main results regarding the impact of political and economic freedom on the effectiveness of 
foreign aid are illustrated in Tables 5.6 to 5.11. Given the inclusion of the interaction term, the 
interpretation of these results is as per Section 4.2.2 of the Methodology Chapter, especially 
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Equation 4.8. According to Brambor et al. (2006) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016), in 
interactive multivariate regressions, there are three distinct effects, namely: (i) the unconditional 
effect  of foreign aid on poverty when policy variable is zero; (ii) the conditional (or interactive) 
effects; and the (iii) marginal or net effects which combines both unconditional and conditional 
(interactive) effects as shown in Equation 4.8. In interactive regressions, the interactive effects are 
not considered in isolation since, but the net or marginal effects. The detailed calculation of the 
marginal effects is in Appendix A.2.  
 
Below is a summary of the results based on Tables 5.6 to 5.11: 
 
i. Headcount poverty rate: 
a. The overall or net effect of total foreign aid (ODA) given (or in the presence of) 
political freedom is -0.266 (-0.366+0.197x0.51), where -0.366 is the unconditional 
effect of foreign aid, 0.197 is the conditional effect from the interaction between 
foreign aid and political freedom, and 0.51 is the mean value of political freedom. 
Grants and bilateral aid tend to reduce poverty headcount rates given political 
freedom, while the coefficients for the interaction terms between political freedom 
and both loans and multilateral aid are insignificant.  
b. The marginal effect of foreign aid given economic freedom is -0.088 (-
0.540+0.263x1.72), where -0.540 is the unconditional effect of foreign aid, 0.263 is 
the conditional effect from the interaction between foreign aid and economic 
freedom, and 1.72 is the mean value of economic freedom. There is evidence that all 
the other proxies of foreign aid except for grants have a poverty reduction effect in 
an environment of economic freedom.  
c. On the one hand, four out of the five (4/5) proxies of foreign aid showed evidence of 
a poverty reduction effect given economic freedom, compared to three out of five 
(3/5) for political freedom. This suggests that both political and economic freedom 
are important channels through which aid can impact and enhance poverty reduction.  
 On the other hand, the marginal effects of aid given political freedom tend to be 
larger than those given economic freedom.  
 
ii. Poverty gap index: 
a. The net effect of total ODA on the PG given political freedom is estimated at -0.294 
(-0.415+0.238x0.51), where -0.415 is the unconditional effect of total foreign aid, 
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0.238 is the conditional effect from the interaction between total foreign aid and 
political freedom, and 0.51 is the mean value of political freedom. Loans and bilateral 
aid tend to reduce the poverty gap given political freedom, while the models for 
grants and multilateral aid failed the Hansen OIR test.  
b. The model for the total ODA given economic freedom also failed the Hansen OIR 
test, and the marginal effect is therefore not significant. There is evidence that grants 
as well as bilateral and multilateral aid have a poverty reduction effect in an 
environment of economic freedom, while the coefficient for loans is not statistically 
significant.  
c. For both political and economic freedom, three out of the five (3/5) proxies of foreign 
aid presented evidence of poverty reduction effects, providing further proof that both 
political and economic freedom are important channels through which aid can impact 
and enhance poverty reduction.  
 
iii. Squared poverty gap index: 
a. The overall effect of total foreign aid (ODA) on the SPG given political freedom is -
0.320 (-0.480+0.314x0.51), where -0.480 is the unconditional effect of total foreign 
aid, 0.314 is the conditional effect from the interaction between total foreign aid and 
political freedom, and 0.51 is the mean value of political freedom. All the other 
proxies of foreign aid, with the exception of multilateral aid, showed evidence that 
they could reduce the SPG in a democratic environment. The multilateral aid model 
failed the Hansen OIR test.  
b. The model for the impact of total foreign aid on the SPG given economic freedom 
also failed the Hansen OIR test; therefore, the marginal effect is not significant. 
Evidence exists that only bilateral and multilateral aid have a squared poverty gap 
reduction effect in an environment of economic freedom.  
c. On the one hand, four out of the five (4/5) proxies of foreign aid yielded evidence of 
a squared poverty gap reduction effect given political freedom, compared to two out 
of five (2/5) for economic freedom. On the other hand, the marginal effects of aid 
given political freedom tend to be larger than the marginal effects of aid given 
economic freedom.  
 
Overall, the results regarding the impact of political and economic freedom on the effectiveness 
of foreign aid support the aid selectivity and conditionality paradigm (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). 
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This paradigm, which has been advocated by Western donors, states that aid should be channelled 
to countries practising political and economic freedom (Connors, 2011). Based on these findings, 
there is no evidence that the autocracy is better at enhancing the effectiveness of foreign aid in the 
fight against poverty.  
 
However, it is important to note that the conditional effects (coefficient of foreign proxy) has 
consistently been negative while the unconditional effects (coefficient of the interactive term 
between foreign and policy variable proxy) has been positive. This suggests the possible existence 
of some conflicts. However, the overall or net effect has been consistently negative, suggesting 
that the both political and economic freedom enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid. 
Nevertheless, the conflicting signs between the conditional and unconditional effects suggests the 
existence of thresholds in our data. A panel data threshold regression model could have estimated 
the optimal threshold (Hansen, 1996; 2003). However, this estimation technique is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
 
5.2.7. Impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction by country income group 
 
This sub-section deals with the analysis of the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction by 
country income group. To execute this task, developing countries were categorised into three 
groups, namely low income (26 countries), lower-middle income (48), and upper-middle income 
(42) according to the World Bank (2017) classification.  
 
Instrument proliferation and identification problems were controlled for by reducing the number 
of explanatory variables to the bare minimum (which includes ODA as a percentage of GNI, GDP 
per capita, and the Gini coefficient only). The results for the analysis of the impact of ODA on the 
headcount poverty rate by country income group are presented in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12: Analysis of the impact of foreign aid on poverty by income group 
Country Income 
Group 
Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income 
Dependent Variables: Poverty rate 
ODA as % of GNI 0.015 
(0.799) 
-0.201*** 
(0.000) 
-0.145*** 
(0.002) 
GDP per capita 0.202 
(0.300) 
-0.581** 
(0.020) 
-0.283 
(0.280) 
Gini coefficient  0.494 
(0.347) 
0.372 
(0.705) 
2.386*** 
(0.006) 
Democracy  -0.147 (0.210) 
0.871** 
(0.048) 
Globalisation  -0.808*** (0.001) 
-3.136*** 
(0.000) 
Age-dependent ratio  1.226*** 
(0.000) 
0.128 
(0.766) 
Poverty rate (lagged) 0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.823*** 
(0.000) 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
Constant 0.832 
(0.639) 
2.895 
(0.335) 
- 
    
AR (1) p-value 0.672 0.069 0.007 
AR (2) p-value 0.744 0.617 0.965 
Sargan OIR p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen OIR p-value 0.571 0.172 0.406 
    
Observations 186 308 285 
No. of groups 26 39 37 
No. of instruments 25 37 37 
Notes: All the regressions are estimated using the dynamic two-step SGMM estimator technique developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction. Numbers in parentheses () are p-values. 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, * Significance at the 10% level. All regressions 
include time dummies, but they are not shown here to save space. The abbreviations ODA stands for official 
development assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; GNI: gross national income; and the others are as defined in 
the text.  
 
As displayed in Table 5.12, the ODA coefficient in the low-income group is positive and 
insignificant, while that for the lower and upper middle-income groups is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Since all the results of the three equations shown in Table 5.12 meet 
the specifications and post-estimation diagnostic tests; it can be concluded that there is strong 
evidence that foreign aid reduces poverty in the lower and upper middle-income countries. This 
implies that such aid is less effective in poorer countries, and it becomes more effective as a 
country graduates to middle-income status. These results align with the arguments by Easterly 
(2006) that countries suffering from extreme poverty would not benefit from foreign aid because 
of limited natural resources, inadequate management, corruption and other internal challenges. 
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5.2.8. Specification, robustness checks, and comparison with other results 
 
Specification and robustness checks were performed and compared with other results on all the 
estimations shown in Tables 5.3 to 5.12. All the estimated results confirmed that extreme poverty 
was persistent (the coefficient of lagged poverty was positively signed and highly significant) and 
therefore the use of the DPD model specification is justified. Four different tests were used to 
assess the validity of the SGMM estimation (please see Asongu & De Moor, 2017; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018), and the results are briefly explained hereunder. First, the study checked for 
both first- and second-order serial correlation using the Arellano and Bond (1991) test. By 
definition, while first-order serial correlation is expected, second-order serial correlation is not 
anticipated for the consistency of the GMM estimator (Baltagi, 2008). In the majority of the 
estimations, the test for first-order serial correlation rejected the null hypothesis of “no first-order 
serial correlation (AR [1])”, while the null hypothesis of “no second-order autocorrelation (AR 
[2])” was not rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen tests for OIR were conducted, assessing the 
null that “instruments are valid or uncorrelated with the error term”. It is important to note that the 
Sargan OIR is not robust but not weakened by instruments, while the Hansen OIR is robust but 
weakened by instruments. Thus, to limit instrument proliferation, steps were taken to ensure that 
the number of instruments was equal to or lower than the number of cross-sections in all this 
study’s specifications. All the estimations that failed the Hansen OIR test were considered to be 
insignificant. 
 
5.3. Results of Panel Granger Causality Test Between Foreign Aid and 
Poverty 
 
This section presents the panel Granger causality tests between foreign aid and poverty reduction 
in a trivariate setting. It starts by briefly highlighting the descriptive statistics of the three variables 
(poverty headcount rate, foreign aid, and real GDP per capita) before discussing the time-series 
statistical properties of the variables.  
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5.3.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel Granger causality requires that the variables first be tested for stationarity and cointegration. 
Since the majority of the panel unit root and cointegration tests, a preconditional Granger causality 
test required that the data be fairly balanced, the sample size had to be reduced to 82 developing 
countries with fairly balanced panels for headcount poverty (poverty rate), foreign aid (ODA as a 
percentage of GNI), and GDP capita growth. The number of time periods remained the same at 
twelve (12) periods.  
 
Since the data have been linearised (by taking natural logarithms), the mean, minimum, and 
maximum values are in logarithm form and therefore will not be discussed further. Of importance, 
however, is the general comment on measures of central tendency, dispersion (standard deviation), 
and normality (skewness, kurtosis, and normality tests). Table 5.13 contains a summary of the 
descriptive statistics of three variables used in the panel Granger causality analysis. 
 
Table 5.13: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max. Skew. Kur. JB Pro. 
Poverty rate 964 2.98 1.33 -3.00 4.57 -1.25 4.67 363.09 0.00 
ODA 964 1.03 1.90 -7.70 4.78 -1.08 4.02 229.41 0.00 
GDP per capita 964 7.29 1.06 4.93 9.58 0.15 2.03 41.48 0.00 
Notes: The sample comprises 82 developing countries for the period 1981-2013. These summary statistics are based 
on the natural logs of the variable, in levels. The abbreviations are as follows. ODA stands for official development 
assistance; GDP: gross domestic product; Obs.: observations; Std.: standard deviations; Min.: minimum; Max.: 
maximum; Skew.: skewness; Kur.: kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera statistics; Pro.: probability. 
 
As listed in Table 5.13, the summary of the statistics for the three variables shows minimum 
variations across the 82 sampled developing countries of the world from 1981 to 2013. In terms of 
normality tests, the GDP per capita mirrors normal skewness and is platykurtic (with a kurtosis of 
less than 3). Both the poverty rate and ODA have a long-left tail (negative skewness) and are 
leptokurtic (with a kurtosis of more than 3). The Jarque-Bera statistics (the null hypothesis is that 
the distribution is normal) which measure the difference in the skewness and kurtosis of the series 
against those from the normal distribution demonstrate that the three variables are not normally 
distributed. This suggests the possibility of outliers in the data.  
 
Table 5.14 presents the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the VECM framework. 
As expected, the GDP per capita and poverty rate as well as the GDP per capita and ODA present 
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negative correlation coefficients of -0.89 and -0.71 respectively. The correlation coefficient for 
ODA and the poverty rate is positive (0.50). This suggests that the poverty rate and ODA in this 
sample move in the same direction or are correlated. 
 
Table 5.14: Correlation matrix 
Variables Poverty rate ODA GDP per capita 
Poverty rate 1.00 0.50 -0.69 
ODA  1.00 -0.71 
GDP per capita   1.00 
Notes: The sample comprises 82 developing countries for the period 1981-2013. These summary statistics are based 
on the natural logs of the variable, in levels. The abbreviations ODA and GDP stand for official development 
assistance and gross domestic product, respectively. 
 
5.3.2. Panel unit root test results 
 
The first step in a panel Granger causality analysis is to test whether the variables are stationary. 
Inclusion of non-stationary panels in the estimation might lead to spurious regressions (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009; Baltagi, 2013). Though the IPS is preferred because of its ability to cater for 
individual country heterogeneity, four-panel data unit root tests are used for robustness.  
 
The tests were applied on the three variables in levels and first differences, and the specifications 
included (i) no trend and intercept, (ii) with intercept only, and (iii) with intercept and trend. The 
LLC (2002) test assumes that the unit root process for the panel is common or homogenous, while 
the other three treat the panel as heterogeneous (individual unit root). In all four tests, the null 
hypothesis that the variable is non-stationary (meaning that it contains a unit root) was tested. 
Thus, rejection of the null means the variable in question is stationary. Table 5.15 provides results 
of the four-panel unit root tests, namely the LLC, IPS, ADF, and PP (by Fisher). 
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Table 5.15: Panel unit root tests 
Test 
Statistics 
Variables 
Level data First-difference data 
POV ODA GDP POV ODA GDP 
Case 1: No trend and intercept 
LLC -6.76*** -6.15*** 11.98 -10.81*** -26.61*** -6.92*** 
IPS - - - - - - 
ADF 303.48*** 213.32*** 36.85 338.11*** 584.13*** 302.42*** 
PP 402.06*** 246.96*** 58.30 565.90*** 749.67*** 413.98*** 
Case 2: With intercept only 
LLC 3.64 -17.44*** 0.06 -9.87*** -20.73*** -13.64*** 
IPS 8.63 -1.24 6.40 -3.48*** -7.76*** -5.02*** 
ADF 88.11 177.03 98.66 235.42*** 331.77*** 273.04*** 
PP 92.42 145.74 139.66 456.80*** 503.55*** 391.75*** 
Case 3: With intercept and trend 
LLC -4.95 -32.86*** -10.91*** -16.05*** -17.46*** -19.85*** 
IPS 3.74 -3.21*** 0.35 -2.47*** -3.00*** -5.40*** 
ADF 118.18 213.67*** 180.91 254.52*** 264.81*** 297.14*** 
PP 186.61 211.76*** 214.27 557.13*** 573.71*** 486.02*** 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ODA stands for official development assistance; GDP: gross domestic 
product; POV: poverty rate; LLC: Levine-Lin-Chu statistics; IPS: Im-Pessaran-Shin statistics; ADF: augmented 
Dickey-Fuller statistics; and PP: Philips-Perron statistics.  
 
As indicated in Table 5.15, under the “no trend and intercept” and “with intercept and trend” panel 
unit specification, the ODA panel seems to be stationary. However, the IPS (the preferred test) 
does not confirm this result when “intercept only” is included. The GDP and poverty rate panels 
are not stationary at this level but stationary in the first difference. In summary, the three panels 
could be considered as integrated of order one, I (1).  
 
5.3.3. Cross-sectional dependency test results 
 
Baltagi (2008) and Tekin (2012b) argue that the majority of causality studies suffer from 
estimation bias as a result of the use of econometric estimation techniques which do not consider 
cross-sectional dependence. Table 5.16 shows the results of the Pesaran CD (2004) test for cross-
sectional dependence.  
 
177 
 
Table 5.16: Panel cross-sectional residual dependence test 
Variables Test Statistic Probability 
Poverty rate/ 
ODA/GDP 
Breusch-Pagan LM 16446.56*** 0.000 
Pesaran scaled LM 152.388*** 0.000 
Pesaran CD 18.309*** 0.000 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
As depicted in Table 5.16, all the CSD tests strongly reject the null that there is no correlation 
(cross-sectional interdependence) between variables or residuals within the sample. The results 
present evidence of cross-dependence in poverty levels across countries in the sample. This is 
expected given that the countries in the sample are developing, and whose main characteristics are 
high levels of poverty and a low per capita GDP. This also shows that the poverty rate, ODA, and 
GDP per capita variables appear to reveal some dynamics that are common in developing 
countries.  
 
5.3.4. Panel cointegration test results 
 
Having found that the three variables are integrated of order one, the next step before testing 
Granger causality is to conduct cointegration tests. This is a test of whether there is a long-run 
relationship between the three variables (Granger, 1988; 2004). The study used the Pedroni (1999, 
2004) panel cointegration tests. The Kao (1999) panel cointegration test was used to validate the 
presence of a long-run relationship between the three variables. For both the Pedroni (1999, 2004) 
and Kao (1999) panel cointegration tests, the null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration. The 
results are listed in Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5.17: Panel cointegration test 
Test Statistic Dependent Variable 
Poverty Rate ODA GDP 
 
 
Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) 
Panel v-Statistic -4.40 0.05 -0.77 
Panel rho-Statistic 2.95 2.82 3.63 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.37*** -3.27*** 1.56*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.89*** -4.15*** 0.81*** 
Group rho-Statistic 5.33 5.71 5.81 
Group PP-Statistic -7.26*** -9.03*** -5.30*** 
Group ADF-Statistic -7.43*** -11.74*** -6.32*** 
Kao (1999) ADF t-Statistic -2.40*** -8.62*** -3.75*** 
Inference Co-integrated  Co-integrated Co-integrated 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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As displayed in Table 5.17, panel cointegration tests were conducted on each of the three equations 
with each of the variables – poverty rate, ODA, and GDP – assuming the role of the dependent 
variable and the others being explanatory variables. The results show that four out of the seven 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests reject the null of no cointegration at the 1% level of significance. 
According to Pedroni (2004), in a small N and small T sample, the group-ADF statistic performs 
better, followed by the panel-ADF statistic, while the panel-v statistic and panel-rho statistic 
perform poorly. The Kao (1999) panel cointegration test confirms the results of the Pedroni (1999, 
2004) tests. It can therefore be concluded that there is evidence of the existence of a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between the three variables when each of them is a dependent variable.  
 
5.3.5. Panel causality test results 
 
As explained in the literature on panel Granger causality tests (Engle & Granger, 1987; Granger, 
2004; Dumitrescu & Hurlin, 2012), when the variables are stationary but not co-integrated, a 
Granger causality test could be performed with the panel VAR framework. However, if the 
variables are integrated of the same order and are co-integrated, then a panel VECM can be applied 
to test both short- and long-run causality. The results of both the Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao 
tests showed evidence that foreign aid, poverty rate, and GDP per capita are co-integrated; 
therefore, a DPD model using the VECM Granger causality framework was estimated. Before the 
panel VECM estimation, the number of optimal lags was established as 2 using the SCs under the 
unrestricted panel VAR model. The panel Granger causality test results, based on the panel VECM, 
are presented in Table 5.18. 
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Table 5.18: Panel Granger causality based on VECM estimation  
Dependent  
Variable 
Direction of Causality/Explanatory Variables 
Short run 
𝜒ଶ statistics (p-value) 
Long run 
Coefficient (t-statistics) 
ΔPOV ΔODA ΔGDP ECT 
ΔPOV - 0.626 
(0.429) 
13.097*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(-0.882) 
ΔODA 0.187 
(0.666) 
- 17.513*** 
(0.000) 
-0.164*** 
(-9.286) 
ΔGDP 3.687* 
(0.055) 
15.971*** 
(0.000) 
- -0.001 
(-0.271) 
Notes: For the short run, the sum of the lagged coefficients for the respective short-run changes in the independent 
variable(s) are shown with their corresponding Wald 𝑋ଶstatistics and p-values in parentheses (). For the long-run, 
coefficients of the ECT are reported, and the t-statistics are in parentheses (). ***, **, and * denote a significance of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
As illustrated in Table 5.18, the short-run causality tests are performed through the Wald 𝜒ଶ 
statistics, whereas long-run causality is inferred from the coefficient of ECT and the corresponding 
t-statistics. In the short-run, there is evidence of (i) a bidirectional causal relationship between 
GDP per capita and headcount poverty rate (GDP ↔ POV), (ii) a unidirectional causal relationship 
from GPD per capita to foreign aid (GDP → ODA), and (iii) a unidirectional causality from 
poverty rate to foreign aid (POV→ODA). This study’s short-run results can be contrasted with 
those of Arvin and Barillas (2002, p. 2154), who found that “aid does not have a significant impact 
on poverty, nor does poverty affect the level of aid that is given”48. Pradhan and Arvin (2015) 
found evidence of short-term unidirectional causality from foreign aid to economic growth.  
 
For the long-run causality results, only the coefficient of the ECT – when foreign aid is the 
dependent variable – is negative and statistically significant. This implies that (i) foreign aid tends 
to converge to its long-run equilibrium path in response to changes in the per capita GDP and 
headcount poverty rates, and (ii) both the GDP per capita and poverty rate jointly Granger cause 
foreign aid in the long-run (GDP & POV → ODA). In contrast, there is no evidence of a long-run 
relationship or causality when ΔPOV and ΔGDP are the dependent variables.  
 
Both the short- and long-run Granger causality results reinforce each other that causality runs from 
GDP per capita and poverty rate to foreign aid. The short-run causality from GDP per capita to 
                                               
48 Please note that the Arvin and Barillas (2002) study, by its own specification, only focused on the short-run Granger 
causality. 
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ODA suggests that donors mainly consider this variable in their short-term foreign aid allocation. 
The long-run joint causality for poverty and GDP to ODA implies that aid is generally allocated 
to developing countries with high levels of poverty and a lower GDP per capita. Furthermore, 
decisions on aid allocation are taken over a long-time horizon, and changes in poverty levels 
sometimes take generations. The lack of a long-run relationship between poverty rate and foreign 
aid when ΔPOV is the dependent variable indicates that foreign aid is not a long-term solution for 
poverty.  
 
5.3.6. Diagnostics tests for panel causality results 
 
Lastly, after estimation of the panel VECM equations, it is important to perform panel data serial 
correlation tests to confirm the validity of the panel VECM estimations (Wooldridge, 2002; Muye 
& Muye, 2016). The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation (LM) test was used. The null hypothesis 
is that no serial correlation exists against the alternative that there is serial correlation. Apart from 
serial correlation, normality and heteroscedasticity diagnostic tests were also conducted. The 
results of these panel data diagnostic tests are shown in Table 5.19.  
 
Table 5.19: Diagnostic tests for panel Granger causality tests 
Dependent  
Variable 
Normality Test 
(Jarque-Bera) 
Serial Correlation 
(LM-Test) 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Joint test, no cross terms) 
ΔPOV 15 408.02*** 
(0.000) 
5.508 
(0.788) 
58.515 
(0.142) 
ΔODA 9 125.32*** 
(0.000) 
5.508 
(0.788) 
58.515 
(0.142) 
ΔGDP 823.59*** 
(0.000) 
12.220 
(0.201) 
326.83*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses (). ***, **, and * denote a significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
As listed in Table 5.19, all three models (equations) do not have serial correlation. The p-values 
for all three equations are more than 10%, and the null hypothesis thus cannot be rejected 
(therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted), which means that all the equations are free from serial 
correlations. The two main panel VECM equations (poverty rate and ODA) are homoscedastic. 
The main challenge across the three equations is that the residuals are not normally distributed. 
However, because of the absence of serial correlation, the results of the Granger causality can be 
relied upon (Wooldridge, 2002; Muye & Muye, 2016). 
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5.4. Summary and Discussion of Empirical Findings 
 
This sub-section covers a detailed discussion of the main findings from the empirical analysis. 
Each finding is briefly explained and contrasted with previous studies. The sub-section begins with 
the main findings from the SGMM estimations, which investigate the impact of the effectiveness 
of foreign aid in poverty reduction before highlighting the results of the assessment of the causal 
relationship between foreign aid and poverty.  
 
5.4.1. Main findings from the system-generalised method of moments estimations 
 
The initial analysis in Table 5.3 included the estimation of the baseline model using five different 
estimation methods. From this analysis, it was concluded that the SGMM is the optimal and most 
efficient estimation framework given the persistence of the dependent variable, suspected 
endogeneity, and simultaneity. Throughout all specifications, it was found that poverty is strongly 
persistent, hence the dynamic specification.  
 
First, the main finding from the SGMM estimation is that, in general, foreign aid does have a 
statistically significant extreme poverty reduction effect in developing countries. This is in line 
with a recent study by Arndt et al. (2015, p. 15), which found that “on average and over the long-
run, foreign aid reduces poverty …”. Alvi and Senbeta (2012, 2014) found similar results.  
 
Second, the analysis of the impact of the different types of aid on the three proxies of extreme 
poverty reveals that (i) grants and both bilateral and multilateral aid reduce the poverty headcount 
rate, but loans do not, while (ii) grants, loans, and bilateral aid reduce both the poverty gap and the 
squared poverty gap, but multilateral aid does not. This study’s grant versus loans results are in 
line with the recent AEL, whereas the bilateral versus multilateral aid results are contrary to prior 
expectations. It was, however, argued that given that around 70% of aid is bilateral in nature and 
that the majority of donors are now targeting poverty reduction in their poverty allocations post 
9/11, these results could be understood in this context.  
 
Third, almost all foreign aid proxies were found to be more likely to be effective in reducing 
extreme poverty in a democratic environment with freedom of enterprise. The results also imply 
that both political and economic freedom are channels through which foreign aid impacts extreme 
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poverty. This finding vindicates the aid selectivity and conditionality paradigm which has been 
advocated by Western donors.  
 
Fourth, the study found strong evidence that foreign aid reduces poverty in the lower and upper 
middle-income countries but not in low-income countries. This implies that foreign aid is less 
effective in poorer countries, and it becomes more effective as the country graduates to middle-
income status. This result tends to add to the old debate regarding whether poverty traps indeed 
exist and whether foreign aid could be a tool to help poor countries escape from these traps. The 
finding seems to suggest that the poorest countries do not benefit much from foreign aid in terms 
of poverty reduction. It would, however, be interesting to investigate this finding further with a 
particular focus on the income threshold at which foreign aid begins to affect extreme poverty.  
 
Fifth, in all the estimations where GDP per capita was included, as per the theoretical specification, 
it was found that the GDP per capita generally had a higher poverty-reducing effect (higher 
elasticity) compared to ODA, which confirms the results of an earlier study by Dollar and Kraay 
(2002), who boldly declared that “growth is good for the poor”. Furthermore, the inequality (Gini 
coefficient) coefficient was found to be mainly positive and significant, confirming that higher 
inequality is detrimental to poverty reduction.  
 
5.4.2. Main findings from the Granger causality tests 
 
The main findings from the panel VECM Granger causality analysis are that in the short-run, there 
is evidence of (i) a bidirectional causal relationship between GDP per capita and headcount poverty 
rate, (ii) a unidirectional causal relationship from GPD per capita to foreign aid, and (iii) 
unidirectional causality from poverty rate to foreign aid. In the long-run, the study found that (i) 
foreign aid tends to converge to its long-term equilibrium path in response to changes in the per 
capita GDP and headcount poverty rates, and (ii) both GDP per capita and poverty rate jointly 
Granger cause foreign aid in the long-run. No evidence was found of a long-term relationship or 
causality when poverty rate and GDP per capita were the dependent variables. 
 
The strong and joint causal effect from the poverty rate and GDP per capita to foreign aid could 
be a confirmation that the majority of aid is directed towards poor countries. This was highlighted 
in Table 2.3 which presents a chronology of aid volumes and motives over the years. The 
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conclusion from this historical perspective was that from the 1990s to the promulgation of the 
MDGs, there has been a shift of foreign aid allocation motive towards poverty reduction (Riddell, 
2008; Schaffner, 2014). As explained in the theoretical review section in Chapter 3, foreign aid 
can be associated with the aid-dependency syndrome, the encouragement of rent seeking or 
corruption, the Dutch disease, and the crowding-out of local investments, all of which tend to limit 
the aid’s impact in reducing extreme poverty.  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has empirically (i) examined the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing extreme 
poverty in developing countries, (ii) investigated the impact of different proxies of foreign aid on 
the three proxies of extreme poverty, (iii) explored whether political freedom (democracy) or 
economic freedom enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid, (iv) analysed the impact of foreign 
aid on extreme poverty by income group, and (v) tested the direction of causality between foreign 
aid and poverty. The first five study objectives were examined using the SGMM estimation 
method, and the last one was conducted through a panel VECM Granger causality framework. 
Given the persistence in extreme poverty, a DPD specification was employed. In both estimation 
methods, specification and diagnostics tests were performed to ensure that the results would be 
reliable.  
 
The main findings of the study are as follows. First, foreign aid does have a statistically significant 
poverty reduction effect, and the results are consistent across all the three extreme poverty proxies. 
Second, the disaggregation of aid by source and type shows that total aid, and both grant and 
bilateral aid are more likely to reduce extreme poverty. Third, evidence exists that both political 
and economic freedom are effective channels through which aid impacts extreme poverty. Fourth, 
foreign aid was found to be more effective in in middle-income countries. Lastly, the panel 
Granger causality results presented evidence of both short- and long-run causality, mainly from 
poverty and GDP per capita to foreign aid.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This final chapter summarises and concludes this study. It also offers policy implications based on 
the main empirical findings of the study. Further, it presents research challenges and limitations 
encountered in the study and offers pointers on areas for further research. The organisation of the 
chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 summarises the overview of the study, and Section 6.3 offers a 
summary and discussion of empirical findings. Then, Section 6.4 presents the conclusions and 
policy implications of the investigation. Finally, Section 6.5 highlights the limitations of the study 
and identifies areas for further research. 
 
6.2. Overview of the Study 
 
Broadly, the two main objectives of this study are to (i) estimate the impact of official development 
assistance (ODA) or foreign aid on poverty reduction and (ii) examine the direction of causality 
between foreign aid on poverty in developing countries. Following from these two broad 
objectives, there are six specific objectives which are summarised as follows: 
i. To empirically assess the overall impact of foreign aid (total ODA) on extreme poverty 
(headcount poverty rate) in developing countries; 
 
ii. To empirically test the impact of different proxies of foreign aid on the three proxies of 
extreme poverty;  
 
iii. To empirically investigate whether political freedom (democracy) and economic freedom 
enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid;  
 
 
iv. To compare the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty according to developing country 
income groups; and  
 
v. To examine the causal relationship between foreign aid and extreme poverty in developing 
countries. 
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The following alternative hypotheses were tested in this study: 
i. Foreign aid (total ODA) leads to a reduction in extreme poverty (headcount poverty rate) 
in developing countries; 
 
ii. Different types of foreign aid (loans, grants, as well as bilateral and multilateral aid) lead 
to a reduction in different proxies of extreme poverty (headcount poverty rate, poverty gap, 
and squared poverty gap index) in developing countries; 
 
iii. Political and economic freedom enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing 
extreme poverty in developing countries; 
 
iv. The effectiveness of foreign aid in extreme poverty reduction spans different country 
income groups; and 
 
v. Foreign aid Granger causes extreme poverty.  
 
To meet the study’s objectives and exhaustively test the study hypothesis, two econometric models 
were developed. The first model, with several variations, estimated the impact of foreign aid on 
poverty. This model was used with respect to specific objectives (i) to (iv) and the corresponding 
alternative hypothesis. The technique for estimating the impact of foreign aid on poverty is system 
GMM. Though this technique has been criticised, it is believed that it was the most suitable 
estimation technique for this study due to a number of reasons. These include: (i) system GMM is 
suitable for dynamic or persistent panels; (ii) the method can address biases because of 
endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity; (iii) it is appropriate in the “small T, large N” context, 
by addressing the Nickell (1981) bias and applying the “Windmeijer finite-sample correction”; 
(iv) the method eliminates the country-fixed effects by differencing the internal instruments in 
order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects without eliminating the country differences – it 
controls for cross-country dependence, limits instrument proliferation, and restricts over-
identification; (v) the two-step SGMM approach adopted in this study’s specification has the 
ability to control for heteroscedasticity; and (vi) the framework also allows for the adoption of 
forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing, so as to minimise data loss.  
 
For the examination of the direction of causality between foreign aid on poverty in developing 
countries, the panel VECM technique was adopted. The panel VECM Granger causality 
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framework was found suitable because of its ability to explicitly distinguish between (i) short-run 
causal effects; (ii) long-run causal effects; and (iii) strong causal effects. Furthermore, the method 
was chosen because the variables were found to be integrated in the same order and were co-
integrated.  
 
6.3. Summary of Empirical Findings and Conclusion 
 
This sub-section summarises and offers a brief discussion of the results with regard to the two 
main objectives and some secondary objectives which were investigated. The point of departure 
are the results of the impact of foreign aid on poverty and its secondary objectives.  
 
6.3.1. Main empirical findings on the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction 
 
The study used the SGMM estimation method for assessing the impact of foreign aid on extreme 
poverty. The empirical results are summarised as follows: 
 
i. The main finding from the SGMM estimation is that, in general, foreign aid does have a 
positive impact on poverty reduction in developing countries. This is in line with the 
findings from the country-based literature in Chapter 2 which confirms that a number of 
countries have graduated from reliance on foreign aid over the years as a result of increases 
in their per capita income. In fact, some countries have shifted from being aid recipients to 
being aid donors. This result is consistent with Mosley et al. (2004), Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Oyolola (2009), Alvi and Senbeta (2012, 2014), and Arndt et al. (2015). However, 
Chong et al. (2009) found conflicting results when using the same methodology.  
 
ii. The analysis of the impact of the different types of aid on the three proxies of extreme 
poverty reveals that grants and bilateral and multilateral aid reduce the poverty headcount 
rate but loans do not; and grants, loans, and bilateral aid reduce both the poverty gap and 
the squared poverty gap but multilateral aid does not. The finding that grants generally 
reduce extreme poverty compared to loans is in line with the recent aid effectiveness 
literature (see also Senbeta, 2009; Odedokun, 2004; Gunatilake et al. 2015; and Das and 
Serieux, 2015). However, the finding that bilateral aid generally reduces extreme poverty 
compared to multilateral aid is contrary to our a priori expectations. Theoretically, one 
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would expect multilateral aid to be more effective in reducing poverty. This is because 
multilateral aid is most likely to be allocated to sustainable development and poverty-
reduction concerns, whereas bilateral aid is allocated based on colonial, strategic, and other 
political considerations. This contrast could be due to the fact that around 70% of aid is 
bilateral in nature and that the majority of donors are now targeting poverty reduction in 
their poverty allocations post 9/11. Moreover, empirical literature is still divided on which 
type of aid is beneficial for poverty reduction. Das and Serieux (2015), for example, found 
that loans lead to more reverse capital outflows compared to grants, while Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) and Gunatilake et al. (2015) found inconclusive results on the 
differential effects between bilateral and multilateral aid. 
 
iii. Almost all foreign aid proxies (total ODA as a percentage of GNI), grants, loans, bilateral 
and multilateral aid were found to be more effective in reducing extreme poverty in an 
environment of political and economic freedom. The results also imply that both political 
and economic freedom are channels through which foreign aid impacts extreme poverty. 
This finding vindicates the aid selectivity and conditionality paradigm which has been 
advocated by Western donors. These results are generally in line with previous studies by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Kosack (2003), Mosley et al. (2004), and Connors (2011). 
 
iv. The study found strong evidence that foreign aid reduces poverty in the lower and upper 
middle-income countries but not in low-income countries. This implies that foreign aid is 
less effective in poorer countries, and it becomes more effective as the country graduates 
to middle-income status. This result tends to add to the old debate about whether there are 
indeed poverty traps and whether foreign aid could be a tool to help poor countries escape 
from those traps. The finding seems to suggest that the poorest countries do not benefit 
much from foreign aid in terms of poverty reduction. It would, however, be interesting to 
investigate this finding further, especially in relation to the income threshold at which 
foreign aid begins to affect extreme poverty.  
 
v. The results of all the estimations where GDP per capita was included, as per the theoretical 
specification, show that the GDP per capita generally had a higher poverty-reducing effect 
(higher elasticity) compared to ODA. This confirms the importance of GDP growth in the 
fight against poverty. The study further argues that GDP per capita is a major driver of 
poverty reduction compared to foreign aid.  
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vi. Furthermore, the inequality coefficient was generally found to be positive and significant, 
confirming that higher inequality is detrimental to poverty reduction.  
 
6.3.2. Main empirical findings on the causal relationship between foreign aid and 
poverty  
 
The results from the panel VECM-based Granger causality framework which examined the 
direction of causality between poverty and foreign aid in a panel trivariate setting reveal the 
following: 
 
i. In the short run, there was evidence of unidirectional causal flow from poverty rate to 
foreign aid. Other results indicate that there was a bidirectional causal relationship between 
the GDP per capita and headcount poverty rate and a unidirectional causal flow from GPD 
per capita to foreign aid. 
 
ii. In the long-run, the study found that (i) foreign aid tends to converge to its long-term 
equilibrium path in response to changes in the per capita GDP and headcount poverty rates, 
and (ii) both poverty rate and GDP per capita jointly Granger cause foreign aid in the long-
run. No evidence was found of a long-run relationship or causality when poverty rate and 
GDP per capita were the dependent variables. 
 
iii. There was a strong joint causal flow from poverty rate and GDP per capita to foreign aid. 
This could be a confirmation that the majority of aid is directed towards poor countries. 
This is in line with Riddell (2008) and Schaffner (2014) who contend that the promulgation 
of the MDGs has led to a shift of the foreign aid allocation motive towards poverty 
reduction since the early 1990s.  
 
6.4. Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
The main finding from this study is that foreign aid has a statistically significant poverty-reduction 
effect, and the results are consistent across all three extreme poverty proxies. The policy 
implication of this finding is that development partners and donors should continue to focus on 
poverty reduction as the main objective of ODA as has been the case during the MDGs. One of 
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the main targets of the recently promulgated SDGs is to eradicate extreme poverty for all people 
everywhere by 2030. One of the policy tools for reaching this target has been to encourage rich 
countries to increase their ODA allocations to developing countries by 0.7% of the former 
countries’ GNI.  
 
Based on the net or marginal effects, this study found that both political freedom (democracy) and 
economic freedom enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid in the reduction of extreme poverty. 
This also implies that democracy and freedom of enterprise are important channels through which 
foreign aid affects extreme poverty in developing countries. It would be important for aid donors 
to continue with the WC aid selectivity and conditionality paradigm which has been advocated by 
Western donors. Therefore, apart from advocating for political freedom, donors and international 
agencies should also encourage the development of institutions that ensure economic freedom. 
Building strong institutions, especially those which promote and protect economic freedom, might 
boost entrepreneurship, which is regarded as an engine for job creation and poverty reduction. 
 
The study also found that GDP per capita had a positive impact on poverty reduction in developing 
countries. This suggests that per capita income remains an important channel and tool for poverty 
reduction. It would be crucial for foreign aid to also focus on addressing those bottlenecks which 
hinder economic growth. Literature has shown that sustainable poverty reduction programmes are 
anchored on prolonged and high economic growth rates.  
 
Lastly, the study also found that an increase in inequality has a detrimental effect on the fight 
against poverty. Aid-recipient countries should therefore be encouraged to create income 
distributional policies that allow the benefits of growth to accrue to many people, thereby lifting 
the majority of people out of extreme poverty. Most countries that succeeded in lifting the majority 
out of extreme poverty, especially China, implemented some social and distributional policies. 
Lastly, the results illustrate the importance of combining increases in foreign aid with recipient 
country reforms such as promotion of FDI, trade liberalisation, and globalisation in order 
maximise the impact of foreign aid on poverty reduction. 
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6.5. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
6.5.1. Limitations of the study 
 
Given the nature of the data and data availability constraints, the GMM is, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, the most robust empirical strategy when T < N. Even though all efforts 
were made to make this study analytically defensible, it suffers from a few limitations, as is the 
case with many other scientific research studies. First, as with most cross-country aid-growth-
poverty dynamic panel data studies, there are obvious challenges to effectively controlling for 
endogeneity and establishing causality. This is especially true when the dynamic specifications are 
designed to eliminate country-specific effects which account for the unobserved country 
differences.  
 
Second, although panel data offers many advantages, it still has certain shortcomings (Hsiao, 
2007). Some of the challenges include selectivity problems, short time-series dimensions, 
heterogeneity, and cross-section dependence among others (Baltagi, 2013). The inclusion of 120 
developing countries in one estimation model presented some of these challenges.  
 
The limitations identified above could have affected the empirical results and the inferences drawn 
from this analysis. However, it is presumed that their effects are minimal and that they have not 
significantly influenced the theoretical and empirical findings of this study. 
 
6.5.2. Areas for further research  
 
To counter the challenge of panel data as well as address the macro-micro paradox, future research 
could explore possibilities of individual country analysis, disaggregating poverty analysis by rural 
and urban areas. It would also be vital to examine the direction of causality between foreign aid, 
poverty, and democracy or economic freedom. 
 
Another area of interest could be to assess the importance of foreign aid on those countries that 
graduated from ODA dependence through detailed case studies on individual countries. It would 
also be critical to understand those countries’ features and domestic policies. 
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This study found evidence that foreign aid tends to reduce poverty in the lower and upper middle-
income countries but not in low-income countries. This implies that the poorest countries do not 
benefit much from foreign aid in terms of poverty reduction. It would be interesting for future 
studies to investigate this finding further, especially in relation to the income threshold at which 
foreign aid begins to affect extreme poverty.  
 
Our analysis of the unconditional and conditional effects showed revealed that (i) the 
unconditional effect of foreign aid on poverty was consistently negative; (ii) the conditional effect 
of foreign aid and freedom on poverty was consistently positive; and (iii) the net or marginal effect 
was consistently negative. Though we concluded, based on the negative marginal effects, that 
political and economic freedom enhances the effectiveness of foreign aid, it would be important 
for future research to employ panel data threshold analysis in order to determine the optimal 
thresholds.   
 
Lastly, future studies might conduct a comparison of the impact of aid on different measures of 
poverty and welfare. These could include proxies such as the human poverty index, human 
development index, and multidimensional poverty index among others.  
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Appendix A.1: Country List (Sample of Developing Countries) 
 
ID Country Region 
 
ID Country Region 
 
ID Country Region 
1 Albania ECA 
 
41 Guatemala LAC 
 
81 Nigeria SSA 
2 Algeria MENA 
 
42 Guinea SSA 
 
82 Pakistan SA 
3 Angola SSA 
 
43 Guinea-Bissau SSA 
 
83 Panama LAC 
4 Armenia ECA 
 
44 Guyana LAC 
 
84 Papua New Guinea EAP 
5 Azerbaijan ECA 
 
45 Haiti LAC 
 
85 Paraguay LAC 
6 Bangladesh SA 
 
46 Honduras LAC 
 
86 Peru LAC 
7 Belarus ECA 
 
47 India SA 
 
87 Philippines EAP 
8 Belize LAC 
 
48 Indonesia EAP 
 
88 Rwanda SSA 
9 Benin SSA 
 
49 Iran, Islamic Republic  MENA 
 
89 Samoa EAP 
10 Bhutan SA 
 
50 Iraq MENA 
 
90 Sao Tome and Principe SSA 
11 Bolivia LAC 
 
51 Jamaica LAC 
 
91 Senegal SSA 
12 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
ECA 
 
52 Jordan MENA 
 
92 Serbia ECA 
13 Botswana SSA 
 
53 Kazakhstan ECA 
 
93 Seychelles SSA 
14 Brazil LAC 
 
54 Kenya SSA 
 
94 Sierra Leone SSA 
15 Burkina 
Faso 
SSA 
 
55 Kiribati EAP 
 
95 Solomon Islands EAP 
16 Burundi SSA 
 
56 Korea, Rep. EAP 
 
96 South Africa SSA 
17 Cabo Verde SSA 
 
57 Kyrgyz Republic ECA 
 
97 Sri Lanka SA 
18 Cambodia EAP 
 
58 Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
EAP 
 
98 St. Lucia LAC 
19 Cameroon SSA 
 
59 Lesotho SSA 
 
99 Sudan SSA 
20 Central 
African 
Republic 
SSA 
 
60 Liberia SSA 
 
100 Suriname LAC 
21 Chad SSA 
 
61 Macedonia, former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
ECA 
 
101 Swaziland SSA 
22 Chile LAC 
 
62 Madagascar SSA 
 
102 Tajikistan ECA 
23 China EAP 
 
63 Malawi SSA 
 
103 Tanzania SSA 
24 Colombia LAC 
 
64 Malaysia EAP 
 
104 Thailand EAP 
25 Comoros SSA 
 
65 Maldives SA 
 
105 Timor-Leste EAP 
26 Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
SSA 
 
66 Mali SSA 
 
106 Togo SSA 
27 Congo, 
Republic of 
SSA 
 
67 Mauritania SSA 
 
107 Tonga EAP 
28 Costa Rica LAC 
 
68 Mauritius SSA 
 
108 Tunisia MENA 
29 Cote 
d'Ivoire 
SSA 
 
69 Mexico LAC 
 
109 Turkey ECA 
30 Djibouti MENA 
 
70 Micronesia, Federated 
States of 
EAP 
 
110 Turkmenistan ECA 
31 Dominican 
Republic 
LAC 
 
71 Moldova ECA 
 
111 Tuvalu EAP 
32 Ecuador LAC 
 
72 Mongolia EAP 
 
112 Uganda SSA 
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ID Country Region 
 
ID Country Region 
 
ID Country Region 
33 Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
MENA 
 
73 Montenegro ECA 
 
113 Ukraine ECA 
34 El Salvador LAC 
 
74 Morocco MENA 
 
114 Uzbekistan ECA 
35 Ethiopia SSA 
 
75 Mozambique SSA 
 
115 Vanuatu EAP 
36 Fiji EAP 
 
76 Myanmar EAP 
 
116 Venezuela, Republica 
Bolivariana de 
LAC 
37 Gabon SSA 
 
77 Namibia SSA 
 
117 Vietnam EAP 
38 Gambia, 
The 
SSA 
 
78 Nepal SA 
 
118 West Bank and Gaza MENA 
39 Georgia ECA 
 
79 Nicaragua LAC 
 
119 Zambia SSA 
40 Ghana SSA 
 
80 Niger SSA 
 
120 Zimbabwe SSA 
 
Appendix A.2: Graduates from the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
 
Countries and territories removed (which Graduated) from the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
Number Country Year Region 
1 Portugal  1991 ECA 
2 French Guyana 
1992 
LAC 
3 Guadeloupe LAC 
4 Martinique LAC 
5 Réunion  Africa (Owned by France) 
6 Saint Pierre and Miquelon  LAC 
7 Greece 1995 ECA 
8 Bahamas 
1996 
LAC 
9 Brunei EAP 
10 Kuwait MENA 
11 Qatar MENA 
12 Singapore SA 
13 United Arab Emirates  MENA 
14 Bermuda 
1997 
LAC 
15 Cayman Islands LAC 
16 Chinese Taipei EAP 
17 Cyprus ECA 
18 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) LAC 
19 Hong Kong (China) EAP 
20 Israel MENA 
21 Aruba 
2000 
LAC 
22 the British Virgin Islands LAC (Owned by Britain) 
23 French Polynesia EAP (Owned by France) 
24 Gibraltar ECA 
25 Korea EAP 
26 Libya MENA 
27 Macau (China) EAP 
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Countries and territories removed (which Graduated) from the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
Number Country Year Region 
28 Netherlands Antilles LAC 
29 New Caledonia  EAP 
30 Northern Marianas Islands  EAP 
31 Malta 2003 ECA 
32 Slovenia  ECA 
33 Bahrain  2005 MENA 
34 Saudi Arabia  2008 MENA 
35 Turks and Caicos Islands LAC (Owned by Britain) 
36 Barbados 
2011 
LAC 
37 Croatia ECA 
38 Mayotte SSA (Owned by France) 
39 Oman MENA 
40 Trinidad and Tobago LAC 
41 Anguilla  2014 LAC (Owned by Britain) 
42 Saint Kitts and Nevis LAC 
43 Chile 
2018 
LAC 
44 Seychelles  SSA 
45 Uruguay LAC 
1 Antigua and Barbuda 
Pr
oj
ec
te
d-
20
30
 
LAC 
2 Equatorial Guinea SSA 
3 Libya MENA 
4 Gabon SSA 
5 Kazakhstan ECA 
6 Panama LAC 
7 Turkey ECA 
8 Brazil LAC 
9 Argentina LAC 
10 Costa Rica LAC 
11 Malaysia EAP 
12 Mauritius SSA 
13 Mexico LAC 
14 Suriname LAC 
15 Turkmenistan ECA 
16 Belarus ECA 
17 Lebanon MENA 
18 Azerbaijan ECA 
19 China EAP 
20 Maldives SA 
21 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ECA 
22 Peru LAC 
219 
 
Countries and territories removed (which Graduated) from the DAC List of ODA Recipients 
Number Country Year Region 
23 St. Vincent and Grenadines LAC 
24 Thailand EAP 
Source: Own Compilation from OECD (2014; 2018) 
 
 
Appendix A.2: Marginal Effects of Aid Calculations 
 
Impact of political and economic freedom on the effectiveness of foreign aid 
Effect of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid - poverty headcount rate   
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean Pol. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Sigficance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.366 0.197 0.51 -0.266 Yes Yes 
Grant -0.450 0.460 0.51 -0.215 Yes Yes 
Loan -0.097 0.093 0.51 -0.050 No Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.405 0.199 0.51 -0.304 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.167 0.046 0.51 -0.144 No Yes 
              
Effect of economic freedom on different proxies of foreign aid - poverty headcount rate  
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean 
Econ. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Significance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.540 0.263 1.72 -0.088 Yes Yes 
Grant -0.665 0.305 1.72 -0.140 Yes No 
Loan -0.410 0.204 1.72 -0.059 Yes Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.660 0.319 1.72 -0.111 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.389 0.212 1.72 -0.024 Yes Yes 
              
Effect of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid - poverty gap  
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean Pol. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Significance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.415 0.238 0.51 -0.294 Yes Yes 
Grant -0.547 0.565 0.51 -0.259 Yes No 
Loan -0.276 0.281 0.51 -0.133 Yes Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.433 0.226 0.51 -0.318 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.237 0.106 0.51 -0.183 Yes No 
              
Effect of economic freedom on different proxies of foreign aid - poverty gap   
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean 
Econ. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Significance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.764 0.389 1.72 -0.095 Yes No 
Grant -0.870 0.430 1.72 -0.130 Yes Yes 
Loan -0.263 0.096 1.72 -0.098 No Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.921 0.440 1.72 -0.164 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.559 0.289 1.72 -0.062 Yes Yes 
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Effect of political freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – Squared poverty gap  
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean Pol. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Significance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.480 0.314 0.51 -0.320 Yes Yes 
Grant -0.393 0.578 0.51 -0.098 Yes Yes 
Loan -0.272 0.270 0.51 -0.134 Yes Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.366 0.198 0.51 -0.265 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.253 0.153 0.51 -0.175 Yes No 
              
Effect of economic freedom on different proxies of foreign aid – Squared poverty gap  
Foreign Aid Proxy Aid 
Coefficient 
Interaction 
Term (IT) 
Mean 
Econ. 
Freedom 
Marginal 
effect of 
Aid 
Significance 
of IR 
Hansen 
OIR p-
value 
ODA as % of GNI -0.697 0.359 1.72 -0.080 Yes No 
Grant -0.710 0.323 1.72 -0.154 Yes No 
Loan -0.206 0.069 1.72 -0.087 No Yes 
Bilateral aid -0.794 0.364 1.72 -0.168 Yes Yes 
Multilateral aid -0.513 0.252 1.72 -0.080 Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
